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ABSTRACT 
A Grassroots War on Poverty: 
Community Action and Urban Politics in Houston, 1964-1976 
by 
Wesley G. Phelps 
Grassroots studies of the implementation of the federal antipoverty initiatives of 
the 1960s and 1970s are showing that the War on Poverty did not operate in a vacuum; 
rather, it was profoundly shaped by a multifarious group of local actors that included 
public officials, local elites, grassroots antipoverty activists, program administrators, 
federal volunteers, civil rights activists, and poor people themselves. In Houston, 
grassroots activists created a local context in which to implement the War on Poverty that 
was much more diverse in its intellectual and political influences than the rather narrow 
confines of New Deal-Great Society liberalism. The moderate liberalism that motivated 
the architects of the federal War on Poverty certainly helped galvanize local antipoverty 
activists in Houston, but even more prominent in their antipoverty philosophy were 
Prophetic Christianity, radical civil rights activism, and the vision of participatory 
democracy and community organizing espoused by members of the New Left and 
iconoclastic figures like Saul Alinsky. This local context created a favorable environment 
for these activists to use the War on Poverty to advance an agenda of social change by 
empowering the poor and helping them engage in confrontations with the city's elite. By 
the same token, the diversity of ideas that fueled the implementation of the War on 
Poverty in Houston - and especially the small victories that grassroots activists were able 
to achieve in their quest to empower the city's poor - provoked a swift and powerful 
backlash from local public officials and conservative defenders of the status quo. In 
Houston, therefore, local political conditions and contests, even more than federal 
politics, determined how the War on Poverty was fought, and the interaction between the 
federal antipoverty program and a broad range of local ideas gave the War on Poverty a 
distinctive flavor in Houston that both created opportunities for grassroots activists to 
bring about social change and set limits on what those activists could accomplish. 
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1 
Introduction 
Bringing the Local Back In: 
The War on Poverty from a Grassroots Perspective 
Perhaps the story of Community Action must be told by a poet or mystic rather 
than a politician or historian. 
-Donald Rumsfeld 
Director, Office of Economic Opportunity1 
On May 22, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson delivered the keynote address to the 
graduating class of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. In a speech that would 
forever mark the launching of his Great Society, Johnson pledged "an end to poverty and 
racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time." In response to the 
African American civil rights movement, Johnson had made remarkable progress using 
the power of the federal government to help movement activists tear down the walls of 
racial segregation in the American South, and indeed the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was less than a month away. What the federal government could accomplish in a 
pursuit to end poverty, however, was a much more complicated and unprecedented 
matter. The president had made statements about fighting poverty before, most notably in 
his State of the Union address to Congress the previous January in which he declared an 
"unconditional war on poverty in America." In the University of Michigan speech, 
however, Johnson's liberal optimism and his faith that Americans could solve any 
problem with enough will and determination bubbled to the surface in an almost Utopian 
1
 Donald Rumsfeld, "Remarks at NACD Conference, Silver Spring Maryland," 11 October 1969, Box 2, 
Folder CAP (General), Office of Economic Opportunity, Southwest Region, VISTA, Central Files, Budget-
Mexican American Affairs, Record Group 381, National Archives and Records Administration, Southwest 
Region, Fort Worth, Texas (hereafter cited as NARASW). 
2 
vision of a perfect America free from the problems plaguing it since the founding of the 
nation.2 
One result of these proclamations was the federal War on Poverty, launched in 
August 1964 with the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act as part of Johnson's 
quest to make the Great Society a reality. Like the president's statements during the 
previous few months, the act called for a bold and ambitious series of initiatives fueled by 
the spirit of 1960s American liberalism. It created the Job Corps to provide unemployed 
and underemployed young men and women with marketable skills, Volunteers in Service 
to America (VISTA) to tap the great resource of idealistic youth eager to take an active 
role in fighting poverty, and the Community Action Program (CAP) to coordinate the 
delivery of new and existing local social services and initiate reform of the institutions 
that affected the lives of the poor. Soon the War on Poverty would also include a number 
of additional programs, such as Legal Services and Head Start, designed to provide 
services for the poor to which they otherwise would not have access. The massive federal 
antipoverty program would be administered by the newly created Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO).3 
Several policy analysts began writing about the War on Poverty while it was still 
being fought in the 1960s and early 1970s, but it was not until the 1980s - a decade that 
saw the systematic dismantling of much of the Great Society - that a significant number 
of historians and social scientists became interested in Johnson's federal poverty war. 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963-1964, Volume I, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
"Remarks at the University of Michigan," 22 May 1964, 704-707 (first quotation), and Lyndon B. Johnson, 
"Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," 8 January 1964, 112-118 (second quotation). 
3
 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, S 2642, 88th Cong., 2ndsess., United States Serial Set 12616-3 
(August 1964). For the history of the launching of the War on Poverty, see Allen J. Matusow, The 
Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 217-271. 
3 
The first generation of scholars writing about the federal antipoverty initiative were 
particularly concerned with the impact of its programs on the fate of American liberalism 
in the 1960s, and they tended to focus on a broad national narrative and to make 
assessments based on the president's ambitious pledge to eradicate poverty from 
American society. The most prominent scholars in this group - historian Allen J. 
Matusow and political scientist Charles Murray - approached the study of the War on 
Poverty from very different perspectives yet reached strikingly similar conclusions. The 
War on Poverty, argued Matusow and Murray, was a failure because it fell short of 
eradicating poverty in America. As Matusow stated, "the War on Poverty was destined to 
be one of the great failures of twentieth-century liberalism." Arguing that antipoverty 
programs of the 1960s never attempted to redistribute the nation's wealth in a more 
equitable way, Matusow suggested that the epitaph for the War on Poverty should have 
read, "Declared but Never Fought." 4 Murray argued that the government's social policy 
during the 1960s, particularly the War on Poverty, actually resulted in more poverty 
because it made more American citizens dependent on the welfare system for survival. 
"We tried to provide more for the poor," proclaimed Murray, "and produced more poor 
instead. We tried to remove the barriers to escape from poverty, and inadvertently built a 
trap."5 Like Matusow and Murray, recent accounts also approach the War on Poverty 
from a macro level, with many historians seemingly fixated on judging the success of this 
4
 Matusow, Unraveling, 220, 270. 
5
 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
Other examples with arguments similar to Murray's are Lawrence Mead, Beyond Entitlement (New York: 
Free Press, 1986) and Myron Magnet, The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties' Legacy to the 
Underclass (New York: W. Morrow, 1993). 
4 
series of massive and complex federal programs with the use of statistical national 
aggregates.6 
Although national studies are necessary for understanding the ideas and politics 
that shaped federal policy, they tend to obscure the multitude of ways that poverty 
warriors actually implemented these policies in local communities. This is particularly 
true with regard to the Community Action Program (CAP), which was by far the most 
ambitious and least understood component of the poverty program and the part most 
contingent on local factors and dependent on grassroots activists to make it successful. As 
Matusow admitted twenty-five years ago, the real story of community action in the War 
on Poverty rests with organizations "in one thousand communities across the country" 
working to implement their vision of effective antipoverty programs. Since historians 
know very little about how War on Poverty programs operated at the local level, 
continued Matusow, no final judgment of them is possible "until an army of local 
historians recovers the program's lost fragments."7 
Fortunately, over the last ten years historians have begun to do just that. By 
investigating the implementation of the War on Poverty at the grassroots level, these 
6
 See John A. Andrew, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998); Gareth 
Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996); Marshall Kaplan and Peggy L. Cuciti, eds., The Great 
Society and Its Legacy: Twenty Years of U.S. Social Policy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986); Irwin 
Unger, The Best of Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great Society Under Kennedy, Johnson, 
and Nixon (New York: Doubleday, 1996); Thomas F. Jackson, "The State, the Movement, and the Urban 
Poor: The War on Poverty and Political Mobilization in the 1960s," in The Underclass Debate: Views from 
History , ed. Michael B. Katz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 403-439; Judith Russell, 
Economics, Bureaucracy, and Race: How Keynesians Misguided the War on Poverty (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004). For a recent Marxist interpretation of the War on Poverty that continues 
the tradition of asking the same questions about the eradication of poverty, see Frank Strieker, Why 
America Lost the War on Poverty - And How to Win It (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2007). Two important works that came before historians began studying the War on Poverty were Frances 
Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1971) and Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow, eds., The Great Society: Lessons for the 
Future (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
7
 Matusow, Unraveling, 254-255. 
5 
historians are forcing a reevaluation of the federal antipoverty programs of the 1960s and 
are broadening our understanding of twentieth-century American politics.8 For example, 
in her study of the War on Poverty in the state of Alabama, Susan Youngblood Ashmore 
has shown that the implementation of the federal poverty program helped African 
Americans become political actors by providing avenues to local power. In this way, 
according to Ashmore, the War on Poverty at the grassroots level was a significant 
extension of the civil rights movement. In his investigation of New Orleans, Kent B. 
Germany argued that the War on Poverty rejuvenated liberalism in the Crescent City by 
helping keep southern liberals relevant in the midst of the conservative counterrevolution. 
Political organizations resulting from the War on Poverty and other Great Society 
programs provided Louisiana's Democratic Party with a firm base of support for the next 
several decades. As Germany stated, "In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the South 
developed its first long-term, clearly legitimate political liberalism in which cultural 
tolerance, intellectual openness, and racial inclusiveness were guiding themes." Robert 
A sampling of these recent studies, but certainly not a comprehensive list, includes Kent B. Germany, 
New Orleans after the Promises: Poverty, Citizenship, and the Search for the Great Society (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2007); Susan Youngblood Ashmore, Carry It On: The War on Poverty and the 
Civil Rights Movement in Alabama, 1964-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); Thomas 
Kiffmeyer, Reformers to Radicals: The Appalachian Volunteers and the War on Poverty (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2008); Robert Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East 
L.A. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008); William S. Clayson, Freedom is Not Enough: The 
War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010); Guian 
A. McKee, The Problem of Jobs: Liberalism, Race, and Deindustrialization in Philadelphia (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008); Amy Kearney Jordan, "Citizenship, Welfare Rights and the Politics of 
Respectability in Rural and Urban Mississippi, 1900-1980," (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2003); 
Annelise Orleck, Storming Caesar's Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2005); Lisa Gayle Hazirjian, "Negotiating Poverty: Economic Insecurity and the 
Politics of Working-Class Life in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, 1929-1969," (PhD diss., Duke University, 
2003); Jill S. Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994); Mark Edward Braun, Social Change and Empowerment of the Poor: 
Poverty Representation in Milwaukee's Community Action Programs, 1964-1972 (Lanham, Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2001). A fascinating study that does not focus the analysis on the grassroots but rather 
widens the lens to view the War on Poverty within the broad context of the international Cold War and the 
search for ways to enhance national security in the United States is David Raymond Jardini, "Out of the 
Blue Yonder: The RAND Corporation's Diversification into Social Welfare Research, 1946-1968," (PhD 
diss., Carnegie Mellon University, 1996). 
6 
Bauman has discovered that the War on Poverty intersected with a wide variety of social 
movements in Los Angeles and helped grassroots activists redefine their own racial, 
ethnic, and gender identities. The implementation of the federal poverty program, 
according to Bauman, also provided a structure for activists to create Black Power, 
Chicano, and feminist political organizations.9 As these few examples illustrate, the vast 
majority of recent scholarship on the War on Poverty attempts to explain the concrete 
effects of the federal poverty program on the ground and to move beyond questions of 
success or failure. By reevaluating the War on Poverty from the grassroots level, 
historians have been able to pose new questions about the wide array of complex 
consequences - both intended and unintended - that resulted from the federal poverty 
war of the 1960s and 1970s. 
For the present grassroots study of the War on Poverty in Houston, a return to 
Johnson's Great Society speech at the University of Michigan is an excellent place to 
begin this reevaluation. In addition to launching his domestic program and giving it a 
name to connote the massive scale the president had in mind for it, Johnson made several 
important points in his speech that are instructive for how historians can continue 
rethinking the War on Poverty. 
The first place where Johnson planned to attack poverty and racial injustice was 
in the nation's cities. "Our society will never be great," Johnson proclaimed, "until our 
cities are great. Today the frontier of imagination and innovation is inside those cities and 
not beyond their borders." Quoting Aristotle, Johnson told the graduating class, "Men 
come together in cities in order to live, but they remain together in order to live the good 
9
 Ashmore, Carry It On; Germany, New Orleans, 5-11 (quotation); Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty, 
5-9, 137-138. 
7 
life." Yet the president expressed concern that it was becoming increasingly difficult for 
citizens to live the good life in the cities of the nation because of urban decay, inadequate 
housing and transportation, and the erosion of "the precious and time honored values of 
community." To combat the ills of the modern American city, Johnson argued that "in the 
next 40 years we must rebuild the entire urban United States." How the War on Poverty 
affected America's major cities, which was a priority for Johnson and other program 
planners, remains an understudied part of the historical record.10 
An equally significant part of Johnson's speech outlined how the federal 
government would carry out this plan to rebuild the nation's cities. In order to solve the 
twin problems of poverty and racial injustice, particularly in urban centers, Johnson told 
University of Michigan graduates that he would rely on a new "creative federalism" to 
attack the problems of the nation. "The solution to these problems does not rest on a 
massive program in Washington," Johnson stated, "nor can it rely solely on the strained 
resources of local authority. They require us to create new concepts of cooperation . . . 
between the National Capital and the leaders of local communities." This conception of 
federal-local relations had significant implications for the War on Poverty and had 
important effects on the course of American politics in the twentieth century.'' 
These two components of Johnson's University of Michigan speech - the clear 
focus on the nation's cities and a new "creative federalism" - can guide current historical 
work on the War on Poverty. Historians Robert O. Self and Thomas J. Sugrue have 
argued that "the signal contribution of post-1945 urban historiography has been to rework 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963-1964, Volume I, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
"Remarks at the University of Michigan," 22 May 1964, 704-707. 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963-1964, Volume I, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
"Remarks at the University of Michigan," 22 May 1964, 704-707. 
8 
postwar political narratives by seeing local places as the central sites, not peripheral 
phenomena, of post-Depression battles over the extension and legacy of the New Deal."12 
By viewing the implementation of the War on Poverty at the grassroots level, historians 
can reframe the questions they ask about the federal antipoverty initiative of the 1960s in 
order to gain a more nuanced understanding of American politics during the decade. 
Whereas scholars once asked why the War on Poverty failed to eradicate poverty in 
America and how liberalism failed to complete its reform agenda in the 1960s, new 
scholarship accepts the unsurprising conclusion that the poverty program failed in its 
Utopian plan to eradicate poverty in American society and attempts to move beyond this 
success versus failure paradigm in order to investigate the on-the-ground impact of the 
War on Poverty at the grassroots level. 
Grassroots studies of the implementation of the federal antipoverty initiatives of 
the 1960s and 1970s are showing that the War on Poverty did not operate in a vacuum; 
rather, it was profoundly shaped by a multifarious group of local actors that included 
public officials, local elites, grassroots antipoverty activists, program administrators, 
federal volunteers, civil rights activists, and poor people themselves. In Houston, the 
federal War on Poverty briefly opened a window of opportunity for grassroots activists to 
use federal programs to empower the poor by organizing them to confront certain pillars 
of the local power structure. An important part of why and how these activists sought to 
empower Houston's poor using the War on Poverty lies in the antipoverty philosophy 
12
 Robert O. Self and Thomas J. Sugrue, "The Power of Place: Race, Political Economy, and Identity in the 
Postwar Metropolis," in A Companion to Post-1945 America, eds. Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy 
Rosenzweig (Maiden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002), 26. At least one contemporary observer of the War 
on Poverty suggested that the antipoverty program's most important contribution was its redefinition of 
federalism. Political scientist Robert H. Davidson argued in 1969 that the War on Poverty, particularly the 
Community Action Program, made an important intellectual contribution through its use of "creative 
federalism." See Davidson, "The War on Poverty: Experiment in Federalism," Annals of the Academy of 
Political and Social Science 385 (September 1969): 1-13. 
9 
that fueled their grassroots actions. The Houston case thus shows that one of the most 
significant ways that local circumstances determined the course of the federal antipoverty 
program was the way in which the local context shaped the intellectual ground upon 
which the War on Poverty operated. 
In Houston, grassroots activists created a local context in which to implement the 
War on Poverty that was much more diverse in its intellectual and political influences 
than the rather narrow confines of New Deal-Great Society liberalism. The moderate 
liberalism that motivated the architects of the federal War on Poverty certainly helped 
galvanize local antipoverty activists in Houston, but even more prominent in their 
antipoverty philosophy were Prophetic Christianity, radical civil rights activism, and the 
vision of participatory democracy and community organizing espoused by members of 
the New Left and iconoclastic figures like Saul Alinsky. This local context created a 
favorable environment for these activists to use the War on Poverty to advance an agenda 
of social change by empowering the poor and helping them engage in confrontations with 
the city's elite. By the same token, the diversity of ideas that fueled the implementation 
of the War on Poverty in Houston - and especially the small victories that grassroots 
activists were able to achieve in their quest to empower the city's poor - provoked a swift 
and powerful backlash from local public officials and conservative defenders of the status 
quo. In Houston, therefore, local political conditions and contests, even more than federal 
politics, determined how the War on Poverty was fought, and the interaction between the 
federal antipoverty program and a broad range of local ideas gave the War on Poverty a 
distinctive flavor in Houston that both created opportunities for grassroots activists to 
bring about social change and set limits on what those activists could accomplish. 
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The city of Houston offers a valuable location for a case study of the 
implementation of the federal War on Poverty and a comprehensive analysis of the 
Community Action Program. Houston was and continues to be the largest city in the 
American South, yet is also by far one of the most understudied cities in the nation. The 
lack of scholarly attention paid to Houston is really a shame since the city has a strikingly 
rich multicultural history and has been near the center of so much of the country's 
development in the twentieth century, particularly in the post-World War II period. 
Similarly, the decade of the 1960s was a period of transition for the city of Houston as its 
boundaries were rapidly expanding, its economy was growing, its population was 
diversifying, and its city government was becoming more powerful. In essence, the city 
of Houston was becoming a modern urban metropolis, and the implementation of the War 
on Poverty was an important part of that story. 
Ultimately, historians must look to cities like Houston to find both the 
opportunities that made new antipoverty efforts possible and the constraints that limited 
how much activists were able to achieve. It takes neither a poet nor a mystic to recognize 
that local circumstances shaped the implementation of this massive federal program in 
profoundly important ways. Yet Donald Rumsfeld's remark about community action in 
the 1960s and 1970s holds some truth. The ideas behind the War on Poverty's 
Community Action Program were complicated, often confused, and occasionally 
contradictory, but in the process of implementing these ideas, grassroots activists 
assigned new meanings and established new objectives for the program. By focusing on 
the implementation of these ideas in the city of Houston, it becomes apparent that the 
11 
War on Poverty was even more complicated and had even more significant consequences 
than historians previously believed. 
12 
Chapter 1 
Declaring a War on Poverty in Houston: 
The Tumultuous Road to Establishing a Community Action Agency, 1964-1965 
"Through Houston's modern civic and social history seeps a pervasive 
conservatism," stated Houston historian David G. McComb in his landmark study of the 
city, 
reflected in varying degrees in politics, public schools, and reactions to urban 
problems. It is the conservatism of a nineteenth-century robber baron -
exploitative, laissez-faire, and at times generous in philanthropy. Its roots lie in 
the Southern heritage of the town, the expansive, opportunistic nature of the area, 
and the strong business orientation of the economy. It gives to the people a certain 
bold, reckless, stubborn, independent, and sometimes lawless attitude, which 
means that the conservatism both helps and hinders the development of the city.1 
The conservatism that McComb described certainly defined the city's politics in the mid 
1960s and had a profound effect on the implementation of the War on Poverty in 
Houston. 
The War on Poverty was not simply a top-down phenomenon imposed on local 
communities from Washington; rather, a multitude of local complications defined the 
program in significant ways. From the moment of its declaration local circumstances 
profoundly shaped the implementation of the War on Poverty in Houston. Between 
August 1964 and December 1965, local public officials, politicians, grassroots 
antipoverty activists, members of the city's traditional welfare bureaucracy, and federal 
1
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program administrators wrangled over how the War on Poverty would be fought in the 
city. Much of the disagreement stemmed from divergent interpretations of the meaning of 
community action, a concept developed by federal War on Poverty architects with roots 
in the federal juvenile delinquency programs of the early 1960s. According to federal 
program developers, community action would offer a novel and aggressive method for 
attacking the root causes of poverty in American society. Despite pressure from federal 
War on Poverty administrators and a handful of local advocates of this new antipoverty 
philosophy, Houston's public officials and members of the city's traditional welfare 
establishment interpreted the concept of community action in a very conservative 
manner. The city's public officials, particularly Houston Mayor Louie Welch, interpreted 
the federal mandate in a way that would increase their own political power. During the 
first year of the War on Poverty, Welch attempted to use federal antipoverty funds to pay 
for services the city government had yet to provide, such as infrastructure improvements 
and increases in sanitation and other municipal services, for which the mayor could take 
credit and reap the political rewards. Members of the city's traditional welfare 
bureaucracy similarly tried to use the community action concept to strengthen their 
control over the purse strings of private charitable giving in the city. Meanwhile, several 
federal program administrators and a few grassroots antipoverty activists in Houston 
began calling for nothing short of a revolution in the way the city addressed the needs of 
the poor. The contentious process of creating a community action agency to administer 
the War on Poverty in Houston was therefore shaped by local power struggles and the 
contours of city politics more than by debates in Washington about how to fight poverty. 
14 
The concept of community action was ill defined, open to a multitude of 
interpretations, and remains the most poorly understood element of the War on Poverty. 
At its core, community action presented a new way of thinking about both the causes of 
and solutions for poverty. According to historian Allen J. Matusow, the Community 
Action Program (CAP) called for local communities to create community action agencies 
that would be capable of "mobilizing local resources for a comprehensive attack on 
poverty." The goals of this direct attack on poverty would be threefold: 1) to create and 
provide new social services for the poor; 2) to provide centralized coordination of all 
social services available to the poor; and 3) to bring about institutional change that would 
benefit those living in poverty. This final CAP objective of reforming local institutions 
proved to be political dynamite in many communities because it implied a direct 
challenge to the balance of power, especially in the larger cities. A good portion of the 
architects of the federal War on Poverty had learned "to despise local schools, police, 
welfare departments, and private charity institutions," Matusow argued, "for dispensing 
demeaning, fragmented services to the poor." While more and better services were 
certainly needed, many federal planners believed that real social change was required in 
order to attack poverty in any meaningful way.2 
As Matusow pointed out, the reformers among the War on Poverty planners 
recognized that local institutions would be openly defiant of efforts to change them. The 
reformers' solution to this problem was to declare that all community action agencies 
must be administered with the "maximum feasible participation" of a community's poor 
residents. "Community action," concluded Matusow, "would seek to reform institutions 
2
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by empowering the poor." The edict of maximum feasible participation could operate in 
three ways: 1) poor residents could serve on the governing boards of the local community 
action agencies; 2) the poor could be hired to work in the various programs; or 3) local 
community action agencies could employ community organizers to help empower the 
poor to make demands on local institutions and elected officials. Predictably, this final 
application of maximum feasible participation, which called for nothing short of the 
politicization and empowerment of the poor to demand a greater share of a community's 
resources, provoked the strongest response from local public officials and institutions.3 
The amorphousness of the community action concept left it wide open to 
interpretation. As Matusow argued, big city mayors in particular tended to be "guided by 
their own convenient conceptions of what community action should be." This was 
certainly the case in Houston, where Mayor Louie Welch and members of the traditional 
welfare establishment interpreted community action in a way that did not challenge the 
city's "pervasive conservatism" that McComb described so poignantly.4 
Like other Sunbelt politicians, Louie Welch was a moderate conservative who had 
an overtly favorable attitude toward business enterprise in Houston. Welch actually 
gained political clout and ultimately won the mayor's seat in 1963 by appearing as an 
outsider to the established political culture in the city. Most importantly, many people 
saw Welch as a common-sense moderate on racial issues. Although there was a sizable 
number of Houstonians who resisted calls to desegregate the city in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, the most powerful business interests recognized that ugly racial conflicts like 
3
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those occurring in places like Birmingham would only serve to hurt Houston's reputation 
as a business friendly city. In response to an increasing number of calls from the city's 
civil rights leaders to desegregate businesses in Houston, the city's business and political 
elites gathered behind closed doors and decided to desegregate much of the city quietly 
and without fanfare.5 
During his tenure on Houston's city council between 1950 and 1962, Louie 
Welch built a reputation as a racial moderate who was sympathetic to the business 
community's efforts to avoid showdowns over desegregation in the city and at the same 
time as a friend of and advocate for the city's African American community. In 1959, as 
an increasing number of black Houstonians lodged complaints of police brutality and 
harassment against the Houston Police Department, Welch demanded that the city 
attorney's office perform a complete investigation and take disciplinary action against 
any guilty officer. Coming on the heels of this political victory, one particular event in 
1960 solidified Welch's reputation as a moderate conservative whose commonsense 
approach would save the city from the bad publicity of tense racial confrontations. In 
March 1960, about thirty-five black and white students from nearby universities staged a 
sit-in at the segregated cafeteria located in the basement of City Hall, whose owner was 
one of the few holdouts resisting desegregation. As the students sat in the cafeteria 
waiting to be served, a crowd of angry whites began to gather inside the building and on 
the sidewalk outside the main window. Welch was upstairs in the council chambers, and 
when he got news of what was happening in the cafeteria he rushed to the scene. The 
5
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cafeteria manager sought out Welch and asked him what she should do. "Serve them," 
Welch responded, "because if you don't you are going to get into trouble. They are 
citizens of the city and this is a city building, so serve them." Welch then fought his way 
through the crowd and walked over to the table where the students were sitting. Someone 
from the crowd of onlookers yelled, "Get those niggers out of here!" Welch looked at the 
students, looked back at the crowd, and said, "Well, we don't all have to be damn fools, 
do we?" Welch then sat down beside the students and started up a conversation. In just a 
few minutes the cafeteria manager had served all of the students, and Welch became an 
important part of this civil rights triumph in the city.6 
Just three years later, after two failed attempts, Welch finally won the mayor's 
race with the help of a substantial majority of black Houstonians supporting him. His 
opponent, the incumbent Lewis Cutrer, once had the overwhelming support of the city's 
black voters. As the sit-ins began in the early 1960s, however, Cutrer found himself 
recast as a stubborn opponent of civil rights because he was not willing to support 
desegregation efforts publicly or help create more job opportunities for African 
Americans in city agencies. Most concerning to Houston's black citizens was Cutrer's 
hiring of the overtly racist and brutal Carl Shuptrine as police chief. Welch promised that 
as mayor he would fire Chief Shuptrine and clean up the police department to make it 
more professional and more just in its treatment of all citizens. He also promised to 
address the problems of poverty in Houston.7 
6
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Welch's antipoverty philosophy was essentially traditional and conservative in 
nature, and his interpretation of the community action concept reflected his moderate 
approach. With the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act in August 1964, Welch 
declared that his office and the City Council would work together to develop a plan to 
apply for some of the $5 million to which the city was entitled under the new antipoverty 
act. Welch envisioned using these funds to make infrastructural improvements to the city, 
such as extending water and sewage services to the outskirts of town and perhaps paving 
roads in some neighborhoods. What the mayor did not have in mind, however, was a 
community action program in Houston like national planners had advocated. As for the 
maximum feasible participation edict, Welch stressed that he and the City Council alone 
were responsible for deciding when and how the city of Houston would participate in the 
federal War on Poverty. If the city did indeed apply for and receive federal antipoverty 
funds, Welch promised to appoint an antipoverty committee himself to oversee the use of 
these funds. So while Welch was part of the new breed of southern politician who was 
moderate on racial issues and at least open to the idea of accepting federal funds to 
improve the city, the message was clear: Welch would be in control of the War on 
Poverty in the city of Houston.8 
The 1964 national elections indicated to Welch that even his moderately 
conservative positions would meet some resistance in Houston's more dogmatically 
conservative political environment. Houston's mayoral politics were ostensibly 
gambling industry, and replaced him with Herman Short. Short's reputation would eventually top that of 
Shuptrine as a notorious racist. See Davidson, "Negro Politics," 65. 
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nonpartisan, and many of the city's past mayors had steered clear of national politics and 
instead focused solely on local issues. The War on Poverty, however, presented Welch 
with a new challenge because it intertwined national and local politics so closely. When 
the Democrats met in Atlantic City in late August 1964 for their national convention, 
they overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of making the War on Poverty a major campaign 
issue. Party leaders noted that Barry Goldwater, Johnson's challenger for the presidency, 
had voted against the Economic Opportunity Act. New York Mayor Robert F. Wagner 
implored the convention delegates to highlight this important difference between the two 
candidates in the general election. Wagner stated, "The issue between the parties is clear. 
The platform must reflect this clearcut issue and give it the dramatic prominence it 
deserves." Platform writers agreed and made the War on Poverty a major theme of the 
party's campaign document. The final draft pledged the Democratic Party to carrying 
"the War on Poverty forward as a total war against the causes of human want" and 
relished in the accomplishment of getting the Economic Opportunity Act passed through 
Congress. In fact, the Democratic Party platform mentioned the War on Poverty seven 
separate times throughout the document, making it clear that the poverty program, along 
with civil rights for minorities, would be the centerpieces of the campaign that year.9 
A few weeks after the Democratic national convention, Mayor Welch, who was 
not a member of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in Texas, announced his 
approval of the party platform and his endorsement of the Johnson-Humphrey ticket. This 
proclamation prompted a flood of angry letters from Goldwater supporters and other 
9
 Sam Kinch, "Dems May Make Poverty Act Major Issue in Election Drive," Houston Chronicle, August 
22, 1964 (first quotation); "Democratic Party Platform of 1964," 24 August 1964, John Woolley and 
Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php (second 
quotation). 
20 
conservatives in Houston, and many of these letters attacked Welch's implied support for 
Johnson's War on Poverty. Exemplifying the reaction of many conservatives in Houston, 
Virginia Eastham wrote to berate Welch for his support of Johnson and the Democratic 
Party's alleged left-wing agenda. "In my opinion, you favor socialism, destruction of free 
enterprise, [and] federal control (this is borne out by your request for federal anti-poverty 
funds)," she said. A letter from Mrs. John T. Carter accused Welch of playing politics 
with the federal antipoverty program. Carter stated, "I also note that you have been quick 
to seek Washington aid for local affairs, and these efforts, if fruitful, may enhance you in 
the eyes of some of the recipients of this government dole, but certainly I do not believe it 
will prove politically advantageous to you." Although Welch was open to the idea of 
obtaining federal funds through the War on Poverty, these kinds of letters reminded him 
that strong conservative forces would oppose him and undoubtedly served to temper the 
mayor's interpretation of the federal antipoverty mandate.10 
The War on Poverty and the prospect of its implementation in Houston also 
opened up serious political rifts that had been brewing for some time among the city's 
elected officials. Harris County Judge Bill Elliott, whose position was akin to a chief 
financial officer for the county, was known as a staunch liberal and vocal critic of many 
of Welch's moderate pro-business policies. Elliott attacked the mayor's plan to control all 
of the city's War on Poverty funding and said it "smelled to high heaven of being an 
election year gimmick." Elliott objected to the fact that Welch would have the power to 
10
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appoint a board and a director for any central antipoverty committee in the city of 
Houston. Attacking the War on Poverty from the right, in September George H. W. Bush, 
a millionaire oilman in Houston, launched his campaign as a Republican against liberal 
Democrat Ralph Yarborough for the United States Senate. During the first month of 
campaigning, Bush made the War on Poverty a central issue by accusing Yarborough and 
his liberal colleagues of being paternalistic in their antipoverty efforts. War on Poverty 
proponents, argued Bush, "assign the needy a number and tell them to get into a federal 
handout line." Bush said he would offer his own brand of "compassionate conservatism" 
as an alternative to Yarborough's "cold liberalism." ' ' 
The results of the 1964 election seemed quite favorable to the liberal War on 
Poverty both nationally and locally in Houston. In Harris County, the Johnson-Humphrey 
ticket won 63.1 percent of the popular vote and outpolled Goldwater by about 75,000 
votes. Considering the Democratic Party made the War on Poverty one of the campaign's 
major issues, it is reasonable to assume that there were many War on Poverty supporters 
in Houston. A further indication of this support was Senator Yarborough's defeat of 
Bush, who lost Harris County even though he lived there. Harris County voted 
overwhelmingly Democratic for the first time since 1948, and voters made Lyndon 
Johnson the first Democratic president to win Harris County since Harry Truman. 
President Johnson interpreted the 1964 election as a mandate to continue building the 
Great Society, and Houston civic leaders drew similar conclusions about Harris County 
11
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returns. Mayor Welch and County Judge Elliott, in particular, began moving closer to 
direct participation in the War on Poverty.12 
Welch and Elliott were not alone in calling for some sort of War on Poverty for 
the city of Houston. The Houston Community Council, the established bureaucratic 
agency responsible for coordinating the activities of all the major public welfare agencies 
in the city, also began positioning itself to be a part of the implementation of the federal 
antipoverty initiative. The Community Council was responsible for studying the needs of 
the poor in Houston, publishing its findings in an annual report, and ensuring the 
cooperation of the city's various welfare agencies to address these needs. Like similar 
welfare coordinating boards in other major cities across the United States, Houston 
Community Council members came mostly from the ranks of the city's white upper 
middle class and worked closely with the city's public officials. In May 1964, as 
President Lyndon B. Johnson's Economic Opportunity bill made its way through 
Congress, the executive committee of the Community Council launched a study of how 
the new federal antipoverty initiative might be implemented in Houston once it became 
law. Members of the Community Council's executive committee immediately recognized 
the potential for the Economic Opportunity bill to have profound implications for poverty 
work in Houston. Like Welch, members of the Community Council had a conservative 
view of the concept of community action, but they also recognized the need for an 
increased level of social services that would benefit the poor. Although Welch had tried 
to make it clear that he would control any War on Poverty funds that might come to the 
city, Houston Community Council members remained confident that their organization 
12
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would become the community action agency for Houston and the primary recipient of 
federal funds to fight poverty in the city.13 
This confidence was reinforced in August 1964 when Joseph Zarefsky, Executive 
Secretary of the Community Council, traveled to Austin to attend a meeting of the State 
Mental Health Planning Committee and had a lengthy conversation with Fred Baldwin, 
who was a member of President Johnson's Task Force on Poverty. Baldwin stressed to 
Zarefsky that the federal government would approve only one official community action 
agency per city and that it would be very wise for that agency to work closely with public 
authorities and local politicians in order to ensure any proposed antipoverty programs 
would not meet any resistance from those in power. The Houston Community Council, 
Baldwin argued, was in a great position to assume this leadership role for the War on 
Poverty in Houston and seemed to be on good terms with the mayor and the city 
council.14 
As Welch began making statements asserting his authority over the 
implementation of the War on Poverty in Houston, Zarefsky responded by inviting the 
mayor and his staff to a Community Council Board of Directors meeting in late August to 
discuss the possibility of forming a coordinating committee to administer the War on 
Poverty in Houston. As Zarefsky stated during the meeting, the Community Council 
already possessed the tools and staff to administer the War on Poverty based on its 
previous welfare work in the community. Despite his need to retain control, Welch 
seemed receptive to the idea of the Community Council being involved in the War on 
13
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Poverty in the city, most likely because their interpretations of the concept of community 
action were so similar. Zarefsky and other board members made it clear that a traditional 
service-delivery philosophy would continue to guide the Community Council and that 
there would only be minimal participation of the poor in planning and implementing 
these antipoverty services. Community Council Chairman J. Robert Reynaud noted that 
the War on Poverty, once implemented in Houston, would require the involvement of 
"lay people and professionals, official agencies and voluntary agencies, [and] school 
districts," and would need the same kind of participation from the "city, county, the 
Employment Commission, the Community Council, and many other agencies." The 
concept of "maximum feasible participation" of the poor seemed to have been lost on 
Community Council members in Houston.15 
With Welch's informal approval, by late September 1964 the Houston 
Community Council was actively positioning itself as the logical board to administer the 
War on Poverty in the city. The executive committee met that month and decided to 
begin forming a community committee made up of the Community Council and several 
of its delegate agencies. The board of directors of the Community Council then issued a 
public statement asking Mayor Welch to approve this committee as the central 
antipoverty agency for the city of Houston. In an effort to obtain that approval from 
Houston's public officials, Community Council leaders also requested that both Mayor 
Welch and County Judge Elliott each appoint some of the members of the committee. 
15
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Welch and Elliott both responded favorably, and it seemed the War on Poverty might 
actually begin to be implemented in Houston during its first year.16 
Despite giving tacit approval for the Community Council to become the central 
coordinating board for the War on Poverty in Houston, Welch still wanted to retain 
control of its implementation and continued to favor obtaining federal grants to fund 
improvements to the city's infrastructure rather than expand and improve social welfare 
services for the poor. Welch continued developing his own personal plan for using 
federal antipoverty funds in the city, and part of his plan included asking the Office of 
Economic Opportunity to award a grant to the city of Houston to improve water and 
sanitation services in a poor, mostly African American neighborhood in the northwest 
part of Harris County called Acres Homes. Welch announced that he would request $8 
million from the federal government to install sanitary sewers, drainage, and water lines, 
and to provide training in construction industry skills for poor residents of the area. 
Meanwhile, Houston Community Council members continued their efforts to persuade 
Welch and Elliott to appoint a central committee to oversee the War on Poverty in the 
city. To make their case stronger, the Community Council's board of directors began 
developing ideas for antipoverty service programs that could be funded through the War 
on Poverty, particularly through the city's traditional welfare agencies such as the Harris 
16
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County Welfare Department, the Opportunity Center for Retarded Children, the Texas 
Employment Commission, and the Houston Neighborhood Centers Association.17 
While adequate sanitation services and the delivery of traditional welfare services 
are important in any city, it is clear that Houston's city leaders and welfare bureaucracy 
refused to accept fully the implications of the Economic Opportunity Act. Architects of 
the federal War on Poverty, especially when they developed the community action 
component of the act, envisioned a different kind of poverty program than what 
traditional welfare agencies offered. New and expanded social services and the 
centralized coordination of those services was certainly part of the Community Action 
Program, but an equally significant component was the idea of reforming local 
institutions by promoting the participation of poor residents in the planning, 
development, and implementation of poverty programs designed not simply to alleviate 
the symptoms of poverty but to attack the root causes of poverty. The War on Poverty 
certainly was neither supposed to subsidize the building of infrastructure, which was the 
responsibility of cities and municipalities, nor designed simply to increase funding to 
traditional welfare agencies. 
It is certainly possible that Mayor Welch and members of the Houston 
Community Council simply failed to understand the new antipoverty philosophy that 
motivated the designers of the War on Poverty. A more likely explanation for their 
actions, however, is that both the mayor and the Community Council board wanted to 
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retain control over the traditional welfare bureaucracy in Houston, and in order to 
accomplish this, they intentionally worked to keep the poverty program conservative in 
philosophy and to prevent poor residents from participating. In fact, there were a few 
voices in the wilderness in Houston who recognized this play for power and advocated 
for a more aggressive interpretation of the concept of community action. One of these 
critics was Reverend John F. Stevens, director of Christian Social Relations for the 
Episcopal Diocese of Texas and the head of the Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial 
Unity in Houston. Stevens offered a powerful critique of the entire welfare philosophy of 
the service-oriented welfare agencies in Houston. He stated that Houston's traditional 
welfare agencies had become "just another outside service to a poverty-ridden area" and 
had "lost touch with local leadership." Stevens said this happened because members of 
these organizations had a faulty understanding of the remedy for poverty, "which sees the 
dominant (affluent Anglo-Saxon) community providing a solution for the depressed area 
on its own terms, while being distrustful of any exercise of power on the part of residents 
in the depressed area." As a result, "no real solution is possible until the status quo in 
society is changed to give residents of depressed areas equal educational and job 
opportunities, competitive pay and equal access to good housing." As Welch, Elliott, and 
the Community Council moved forward with their plans for a piecemeal antipoverty 
effort in Houston that they controlled, critical voices like that of Reverend Stevens would 
grow louder and more forceful and begin to gain an increasing amount of legitimacy in 
the poor neighborhoods of the city.18 
In addition to a few vocal critics of the way Houston's public officials and 
traditional welfare bureaucracy were handling the declaration of the War on Poverty in 
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the city, several additional antipoverty agencies actually began to compete for a piece of 
this new pool of federal money to fight poverty. The Neighborhood Centers Association, 
an organization created in the early twentieth century as part of the Progressive Era 
settlement house movement, teamed up with the Houston Independent School District in 
January and submitted a proposal for using War on Poverty funds to create a program to 
keep at-risk high school students in school by providing them with remedial education 
and job training. In April the federal government also approved a Neighborhood Centers 
Association application to administer a Neighborhood Youth Corps program in 
Houston.19 
The antipoverty organization that eventually forced public officials and members 
of the Houston Community Council into action was Houston Action for Youth (HAY). 
Professional social workers in Houston created HAY in the summer of 1964 as part of the 
Kennedy-Johnson effort to curb juvenile delinquency in the nation's cities, and the 
organization was already funded by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
through May 1965. HAY administered traditional programs such as homeless shelters 
and job training centers for impoverished young people in Houston and in April 1965 
partnered with the HISD school board to draw up a proposal to administer a summer 
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Head Start preschool program in Houston funded by OEO to reach approximately 2,500 
children living in poverty. 
Members of the Community Council board, wanting to avoid losing any control 
or influence over the development of the War on Poverty in Houston and threatened by 
an organization like HAY that was conceivably large enough to administer the federal 
antipoverty program in the city and already receiving federal funds, began to put 
additional pressure on Mayor Welch to give formal approval for the appointment of a 
central antipoverty committee for the city made up of Community Council members. 
Board Chairman Reynaud met with Welch in January and reiterated the need for a 
committee in Houston, yet Welch continued to be coy about his intentions. At a board 
meeting near the end of February, Community Council board member William Ballew 
expressed alarm about the fact that some antipoverty agencies in Houston were already 
submitting funding applications to the Office of Economic Opportunity. Ballew argued 
that despite the difficulties the Community Council had been experiencing with Mayor 
Welch, it was time to move forward with creating a committee to oversee War on Poverty 
funding in Houston regardless of whether or not the mayor gave his approval. There were 
simply too many organizations calling for the Community Council to take an active 
leadership role in the War on Poverty, according to Ballew, and those voices could no 
longer be ignored. 
Ballew, who would later become the head of Houston's community action agency 
and move the organization in a more radical and confrontational direction, was a very 
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politically astute individual. As a successful attorney with one of the city's oldest and 
largest law firms, Ballew understood the intricacies of Houston's local politics. In an 
effort to push Welch more forcefully, Ballew began making overtures toward County 
Judge Bill Elliott, Welch's political rival, and asked him to help convene an antipoverty 
committee. He then persuaded the Community Council board to appoint a task force, to 
be chaired by Ballew, whose sole responsibility was to perform a study of how War on 
Poverty programs could be implemented in Houston and to convince the mayor to name a 
committee.21 
Federal War on Poverty administrators also ramped up their efforts to persuade 
Welch to help establish a community action agency for Houston. Sargent Shriver, 
director of OEO, sought to help smooth the process of getting an antipoverty committee 
appointed by sending a letter to Mayor Welch expressing his desire to work closely with 
local leaders in the implementation of the War on Poverty across the country. Shriver 
stated, "I have always felt and OEO policy has always supported the position that local 
public officials have a major role to play in community action - a role which they have in 
fact carried out with great dedication and intelligence. Successful programs in over 600 
American communities attest to the effectiveness of this participation." In March 1965 
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey invited thirteen mayors from the nation's largest cities 
to Washington to discuss the possibilities for implementing the War on Poverty at the 
local level. During this meeting Welch told Humphrey that he wanted to apply for OEO 
grants, but he was unsure how to get the process started. In response, Humphrey and 
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federal OEO officials promised to send three representatives from their office to Houston 
in the coming weeks to help work out a plan for implementation of the new federal 
antipoverty program. On March 22 and 23, 1965, two OEO officials visited Houston, and 
after their visit neither was optimistic about the War on Poverty's future in the city. The 
officials noted the presence of multiple power struggles occurring simultaneously, and all 
seemed to revolve around the question of who would control the War on Poverty in the 
Although federal War on Poverty planners wanted each city to have a community 
action agency to provide centralized administration of the implementation of federal 
antipoverty programs, Welch told the OEO representatives that he was only interested in 
obtaining no-strings-attached federal grants to make improvements to the city and that he 
in no way wanted a community action agency in Houston. In fact, the more Welch 
learned about the Community Action Program in the national media, the more he became 
opposed to its implementation in his city. The only logical avenue for federal funding in 
Houston, Welch told the OEO officials, was to help build the city's infrastructure as 
reflected in his proposal for an $8 million grant to improve the water and sanitation 
system in Acres Homes. Welch said that if certain groups in Houston forced him to create 
a community action board, then he would follow the example of Chicago Mayor Richard 
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Daley and would create a "blue ribbon group," which meant he would appoint all of the 
members himself from the elite business community and the board would have no 
authority except to investigate poverty conditions in Houston and report back to the 
mayor. Under no circumstances, however, would Welch share the responsibility for 
appointing the members of such a board with anyone, especially not County Judge Bill 
Elliott, whom the OEO officials called "a liberal political rival." It became clear to OEO 
officials that the mayor was reinterpreting the concept of community action in order to 
turn the War on Poverty into a vehicle for him to increase his own political power in the 
city.23 
While in Houston, OEO officials also scheduled meetings with other individuals 
and groups in the community who were interested in the War on Poverty. In a meeting 
with Bill Elliott, the county judge indicated that he would be willing to accept any 
number of compromise positions on the appointment of an antipoverty committee for 
Houston, but that he would be strongly opposed to a board whose members were all 
appointed by Welch. During a meeting with the board of directors of the Houston 
Community Council, OEO officials learned that the council had developed a proposal for 
the creation of an antipoverty committee whereby the mayor, county judge, and the 
Community Council would each appoint an equal number of members. OEO officials 
noted that this proposal would be acceptable in Washington but would be entirely 
irrelevant if Welch stuck to his guns and refused to share appointment power. Members 
of Houston Action for Youth told the OEO officials that they planned on moving forward 
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with their own antipoverty plans for Houston and that they wanted to expand their 
services into more areas of the city. Finally, a small group of Mexican Americans who 
had attended a War on Poverty conference in Tucson, Arizona, that month had begun 
meeting weekly in an attempt to form their own antipoverty committee for Houston.24 
Upon returning to Washington, the OEO officials who had visited Houston made 
several recommendations to the OEO office. First, they advised senior OEO staffers that 
if Welch insisted on appointing all the members of a central antipoverty committee, then 
they should press the mayor as hard as possible to make the committee community-wide 
and "representative of more than the conservative wing of the Democratic party." While 
the OEO officials were resigned to the fact that the committee would indeed probably be 
a "blue ribbon group," they nevertheless stressed the need to encourage some 
decentralization of the decision-making power in Houston in an attempt to get some 
policymaking authority in the hands of neighborhood organizations, if not the poor 
residents themselves. The OEO representatives recognized, however, that Welch would 
strongly and vocally oppose this because he had already made it known that he was 
against "a Philadelphia situation," a reference to the rumored corruption said to have 
already occurred with the War on Poverty there. Finally, the OEO officials recommended 
that while Welch organized his blue ribbon group, OEO should go ahead and fund the 
programs being carried out by Houston Action for Youth in some of Houston's poor 
neighborhoods. OEO should not, however, fund HAY at a level that would allow the 
organization to expand its services into additional areas of the city, as this would "give 
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HAY an invitation to empire-building, to which its chairman, Mrs. Helen Lewis, seems 
prone." Rather, OEO should partially fund HAY as a way to put pressure on Welch to 
appoint a community action agency that would meet federal CAP requirements.25 
Between March and May 1965 several factors came together to force the mayor to 
accept a compromise position on the appointment of a committee. Immediately after 
OEO officials left Houston at the end of March, the Mexican American group that had 
been meeting weekly to discuss the implementation of the War on Poverty in Houston 
officially formed the Anti-Poverty Council of Houston. The Reverend James Novarro, 
pastor of a local Baptist church in a predominantly Mexican American neighborhood and 
chairman of the new antipoverty council, urged the Latin American community in 
Houston to unify its political and social agencies into one force in order to claim a 
policymaking voice in the War on Poverty. During a rally at the end of March organized 
by the city's chapter of the Political Association of Spanish Speaking Organization in 
support of bringing the War on Poverty to Houston, Novarro told his audience that rivalry 
among the various antipoverty agencies in Houston could threaten the whole program. 
"There are many power structures in Houston," Novarro warned, and "we must 
encompass all these organizations or the anti-poverty program will have passed us by." 
Novarro said his new council "hopes to serve as a bridge of communication between the 
agencies that are going to help and the people who need it."26 
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Reverend Novarro and other members of the Anti-Poverty Council of Houston 
grew tired of waiting for Mayor Welch to act. During the first Houston City Council 
meeting in April 1965, Novarro and several other members spoke in an effort to put some 
added pressure on the mayor to appoint a central committee to administer the War on 
Poverty in the city. Novarro stressed to the city council that minority groups in Houston, 
many of whom were disproportionately affected by poverty, desperately needed help 
through the federal War on Poverty. Members of the city council responded by giving 
Mayor Welch a two-week deadline to come up with a plan for the implementation of the 
War on Poverty in Houston.27 
Later in April 1965, the Houston Community Council's Task Force on the 
Economic Opportunity Act, chaired by William Ballew, finally completed its report 
entitled "Tentative Proposal for Community Action Program for Metropolitan Houston," 
and it revealed a level of poverty in Houston that many thought had been eradicated by 
the general prosperity the Sunbelt city enjoyed following the end of World War II. Using 
the current accepted yardstick for defining poverty, which included all families earning 
less than $3,000 annually and all individuals earning less than $2,000 annually, the study 
showed that there were 227,000 people - about one-fifth of the population of Harris 
County - whose total household incomes were below the poverty line, and 78 percent of 
these individuals lived inside Houston's city limits. This number included 57,000 poor 
families and more than 76,000 children. The study found that the twenty-five poorest 
census tracts in Houston housed 21 percent of Houston's population, yet also accounted 
for 29 percent of the city's deaths, 36 percent of the city's infant deaths, 58 percent of 
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deaths from tuberculosis, and 54 percent of the city's homicides. The report also 
indicated that 41 percent of Houston's poor families lived in deteriorated or dilapidated 
housing. Not surprisingly, authors of the study argued that nonwhite families were most 
vulnerable to poverty. The report stated that a "caste system" existed in the city for 
nonwhites and that African American and Mexican American families were 
disproportionately represented among poor families. Though nonwhites in Houston 
accounted for only 23 percent of the total population, half of the families living in 
•JO 
poverty were nonwhite. 
As the task force's report suggested, a closer look at the median income of 
Houston's thirty-five poorest census tracts revealed the extent of poverty in the city. 
There were significant sections of Houston that suffered from unemployment rates two to 
three times the average rate in the city and had average incomes that were less than half 
of the citywide average. In many of these poor sections of Houston, there was a very low 
rate of home ownership and a significant amount of housing was considered substandard. 
The statistics also showed that while much of the poverty was concentrated around the 
inner city, there were also many impoverished neighborhoods interspersed throughout the 
rest of the city and county. In other words, there was no single concentrated poverty 
"ghetto" in Houston.29 
Welch was up for reelection in November and apparently realized there was 
substantial popular support for at least some of the War on Poverty in Houston. Word had 
also gotten back to Welch that OEO officials were considering funding Houston Action 
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for Youth as the major War on Poverty agency for the city, a development that both 
Welch and members of the Community Council greeted with trepidation. Additionally, 
the Community Council's report confronted Welch with concrete statistics about poverty 
in Houston that he simply could not ignore. In response, Welch began meeting with 
representatives of the Community Council and with County Judge Bill Elliott in an effort 
to find a way to appoint a central committee that would satisfy everyone and still allow 
public officials to retain control of the poverty program. The compromise they reached 
was that each party-the mayor, the county judge, and the Community Council-would 
appoint five members to a fifteen-member executive committee that would serve as the 
central antipoverty board for the city of Houston. As the Community Council's report 
recommended, the members of the Executive Committee would then select a 60-person 
Advisory Council to assist in developing an antipoverty program for Houston.30 
When Welch, Elliott, and members of the Community Council board got around 
to naming the executive committee in May 1965, the fears that federal OEO 
administrators had of a blue-ribbon group came to fruition. Many of the appointed 
members came from the ranks of wealthy businessmen in the city. George H. W. Bush, 
an oil industry executive, Republican politician, and recent critic of the War on Poverty, 
found his name on the committee roster, as did Houston Post Vice-President William P. 
Hobby Jr. and Texas National Bank Vice-President Charles W. Hamilton. The mayor, 
county judge, and Community Council also appointed a few middle-class African 
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American business leaders to the executive committee, including Sid Hillard, a real estate 
agent, and Francis Williams, a prominent African American attorney in Houston. The 
committee would be chaired by Houston attorney Leon Jaworski, who was a friend of 
President Johnson and had been considered for the position of Attorney General after 
Johnson's reelection in 1964.31 
The newly appointed executive committee charged with overseeing the creation 
of a community action agency for Houston used the Community Council's report as a 
framework for how the poverty program would operate in the city. Since the Community 
Council had been the coordinating agency for the traditional welfare establishment in 
Houston for some time, the task force's report predictably highlighted the role of social 
service delivery in the effort to eradicate poverty. Community Council members were 
willing to accept the call to increase social services and coordinate the programs of the 
traditional welfare agencies in Houston. What Community Council members would not 
accept, and what Welch would never have approved, was the idea that the poor could be 
empowered to reform the institutions that affected their lives. The majority of the 
programs suggested by the task force's report therefore were simply extensions of social 
services already offered by welfare agencies in Houston. The only difference was the 
additional funding provided by OEO that these agencies would have at their disposal. 
Considering the conservative way in which members of the Community Council 
interpreted the concept of community action and the fact that Welch was very much in 
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control, it is not surprising that the report envisioned no role whatsoever for poor people 
themselves in the planning, development, or implementation of antipoverty programs in 
Houston's poor neighborhoods. Authors of the report indicated that the Board of 
Directors of the new agency would be made up of an equal number of representative 
directors and directors-at-large. The representative directors would come from the ranks 
of elected and public officials in Houston, such as the mayor, the president of the school 
board, and the president of the Chamber of Commerce. These representative directors 
would, in turn, appoint the directors-at-large during the first meeting of the board. This 
board of directors would serve as a repository for information on War on Poverty 
programs and policies, and the traditional welfare organizations would act as delegate 
agencies to administer the antipoverty programs. The report never even offered the 
possibility of including the poor on the board of the community action agency, and in fact 
some of the hypothetical programs presented in the report were quite paternalistic and 
condescending.32 
By the beginning of May 1965, OEO administrators were pleased that local 
officials in Houston were following at least the minimal procedures for establishing a 
community action agency for the city. This optimism was quickly dashed, however, when 
the OEO office in Washington dispatched a representative to travel to Houston and report 
on progress there. Vince Ximenes, an OEO consultant stationed in Lubbock, Texas, 
arrived in Houston in mid May and began sending highly critical reports back to 
Washington as soon as he arrived. His first complaint was that the appointment of the 
city's poverty committee was motivated entirely by local politics since Mayor Welch was 
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running for reelection and County Judge Elliott was most likely going to run for the 
United States Representative office in 1966 from the newly created congressional district 
in Houston. According to Ximenes, Welch and Elliott agreed to split evenly the number 
of members each would appoint to the committee to satisfy the political aspirations of 
both politicians.33 
Ximenes was most troubled by the complete absence of poor people on the 
executive committee, and for this reason he believed the Houston antipoverty board 
would fail to meet the minimum community action specifications for poverty resident 
participation. When Fred Baldwin, an OEO official working out of the Washington 
community action office, read this report, he immediately contacted the Houston 
Community Council to urge members of the new antipoverty committee to include the 
poor in the planning and implementation of War on Poverty programs in Houston. A 
representative from the Community Council assured Baldwin that although neither Welch 
nor Elliott nor the Community Council appointed any poor people to the executive 
committee, it was the understanding of the Community Council board that the executive 
committee would appoint a 60-person advisory council that would indeed include poor 
residents.34 
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When the executive committee members appointed the advisory council a few 
days later, they did include a few representatives from the poor neighborhoods in 
Houston. Of the sixty total members of the advisory council, fifteen were considered 
"poor," and this included eight African Americans and four Mexican Americans. The 
announcement issued to the public by Welch, Elliott, and the members of the Community 
Council stated that the members of the advisory council "were jointly chosen to represent 
the viewpoints of the broadest number of people in the community, and each person 
accepted the nomination enthusiastically." While on the surface it appeared that 
Houston's poor residents in some small way might begin to have a voice in the planning, 
development, and implementation of antipoverty programs in the city, Ximenes quickly 
discovered that this advisory council would in fact have no influence over the executive 
committee and would have very little voice in making policy or developing antipoverty 
programs. According to Ximenes, this advisory council would "serve no purpose except 
window dressing." 
Ximenes attended a meeting of the new antipoverty organization's executive 
committee while he was in Houston and was unimpressed with what he saw. Several 
individuals, including Ximenes, urged the executive committee to include the 60-member 
advisory council in making major decisions and in developing programs, and each time 
executive committee chairman Leon Jaworski and other committee members turned 
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down the suggestions. Jaworski announced that the executive committee would agree to 
meet with the advisory council only four times per year, and during these meetings the 
executive committee, rather than seeking the advice of the advisory council, would 
simply keep the advisory council abreast of the committee's activities in the community. 
Ximenes pointed out to Jaworski and the rest of the executive committee that the 
Economic Opportunity Act, as well as OEO guidelines, required community participation 
in the War on Poverty, but the committee members quickly dismissed Ximenes's 
argument and told him to come back and talk to them at a later date. As the meeting drew 
to a close, Ximenes reported that he "was given to understand that the community 
development concept has no place in Houston."36 
"If Houston is an example of what is being done in other towns," Ximenes wrote 
in his report, "then I suppose the self-help ideal will once again be defeated. . . . There is 
an obvious fear of including minorities or poor people in any kind of function, 
administrative or operative." Even the middle-class African American representatives on 
the executive committee, according to Ximenes, would not be allowed to have any voice, 
"except as it may have been pre-determined." Ximenes urged OEO officials to take note 
of the "predominance of millionaires" on the executive committee and argued that there 
was "every reason to believe that the board as it is constituted now has no intention of 
allowing communities to formulate their own programs much less decide policy." 
Ximenes warned that if Houston's antipoverty committee continued to insist on its 
present course of action, the residents of the poverty areas in the city would continue to 
insist on true representation on the policymaking committee, possibly using mass 
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demonstrations to get their point across. It was just in the previous week that two 
thousand African American students and supporters had marched through the streets of 
Houston to demand that public school desegregation proceed more quickly. If a mass 
demonstration in support of poor and minority representation on the antipoverty 
committee occurred, OEO would be forced to side with the poor residents against 
Houston's public officials, a situation most OEO officials would have rather avoided.37 
Federal OEO administrators were concerned enough about the events in Houston 
that they passed on Ximenes's reports to OEO Director Sargent Shriver. Ximenes 
recommended that OEO go ahead and fund other antipoverty agencies in Houston, such 
as Houston Action for Youth, and argued that this might put more pressure on the 
executive committee to comply with OEO guidelines on representation of the poor. His 
report, however, ended rather pessimistically. Ximenes warned that he was not at all 
convinced that Houston's antipoverty committee was "a sincere effort to utilize OEO 
funds on any basis. It could be a typical Houston delaying tactic. The kind that finally 
caused the Negroes to march in support of school integration." Shriver agreed with 
Ximenes's assessment of the gravity of the situation in Houston and immediately issued a 
memo instructing OEO officials to "please watch Houston closely." After reading 
Ximenes's report, Fred Baldwin recommended that OEO fund Houston Action for Youth 
at the highest amount possible, even though OEO had serious doubts about the 
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competence of HAY's staff. There were simply no other options available. As Baldwin 
stated, "HAY is the only vehicle for getting substantial services into its target areas." 
By the time that Welch, Elliott, and members of the Community Council got 
around to establishing a committee to oversee the implementation of the War on Poverty 
in Houston, Houston Action for Youth had become a major contender for federal 
antipoverty funding as its members positioned themselves as a viable alternative for a 
community action agency for the city. During the summer and fall of 1965, as federal 
OEO inspectors expressed serious reservations about the officially appointed antipoverty 
board in Houston, it appeared that federal administrators might designate HAY as the 
official recipient and coordinator of War on Poverty funds in the city. OEO officials did 
not want to see the city of Houston left out of the national War on Poverty during the first 
year of funding. Even though HAY was a traditional welfare organization, it seemed to 
be the most desirable outlet for OEO funding given the dearth of alternatives in Houston. 
This relationship between OEO and local HAY administrators eventually 
provoked the newly appointed antipoverty board into action and forced them to come up 
with a plan for the War on Poverty in Houston acceptable to federal program officials. 
HAY's application for OEO funding submitted in late May 1965 revealed the traditional 
nature of this welfare agency that focused on social service delivery to poor residents in 
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Houston. HAY requested $2.8 million to continue delivering services like foster care for 
homeless youth, family education projects, family planning, counseling services for 
troubled youth, nursery school services, and Boy Scout and Girl Scout projects. HAY 
also had a very limited reach in the city. According to its application, HAY proposed to 
carry out these services in just a few neighborhoods north of downtown Houston. HAY 
delivered most of their social services out of neighborhood service centers, and despite 
HAY's claim to include poor residents in the implementation of these services, there was 
no indication that there were any neighborhood residents in leadership positions at these 
centers. Although CAP guidelines required the maximum feasible participation of poor 
residents in the planning, development, and implementation of War on Poverty programs, 
HAY's application remained quite vague about how poor residents would be involved at 
all other than informally telling HAY staffers what services they desired.39 
OEO decided to approve HAY's request in spite of the organization's limitations 
and the improbability it would carry out the community action program that War on 
Poverty architects had envisioned. It was even more unlikely that the newly created 
antipoverty board that the mayor, county judge, and Community Council appointed 
would be prepared to implement a program that year, and it seemed that HAY offered the 
only possibility for any substantial OEO funding to be used in Houston. Every OEO 
official who visited Houston during the spring of 1965 agreed with the sentiment 
expressed in an internal OEO memo in early May, which stated that HAY "is the only 
vehicle for getting substantial services into its target area" and therefore should be funded 
by OEO "in large amounts." OEO officials announced on July 2 they would immediately 
39
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grant HAY $2 million to carry out the programs outlined in its application. In addition to 
the general antipoverty grant, OEO also approved HAY's application to administer Head 
Start preschool centers in its target neighborhoods in conjunction with the Houston 
Independent School District.40 
When it became clear that OEO would fund HAY as the primary community 
action agency for the city of Houston, the central antipoverty committee appointed by the 
mayor, county judge, and Community Council - now called the Houston-Harris County 
Economic Opportunity Organization (H-HCEOO) - moved into action. Fearful that their 
organization would be rendered irrelevant if they were unable to secure funding and 
determined to retain control of the War on Poverty in the city, members of the H-HCEOO 
executive committee quickly wrote up an application for a community action grant. 
Submitted during the second week in June, H-HCEOO's CAP application requested the 
relatively small amount of $40,000 to carry out an in-depth survey of poverty in Houston 
and to develop a plan for action in conjunction with existing antipoverty agencies and 
residents of the target neighborhoods. This initial survey and development grant, 
according to the application, would allow H-HCEOO to ascertain the necessary 
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information to submit a full community action grant application some time in the 
following months.41 
OEO officials, who were fed up with the delaying tactics and inadequate makeup 
of H-HCEOO's executive committee and advisory board, denied the CAP grant 
application because H-HCEOO made no top staff positions available to any of the 
residents of the poor neighborhoods in Houston, despite the fact that many of these 
residents were well qualified for the jobs. While executive committee members promised 
to employ poor people in lower level jobs like clerks and interviewers, OEO officials 
objected because none of the poverty residents would have a voice in the policymaking 
decisions of H-HCEOO. To make matters worse, a Houston minister affiliated with 
Protestant Charities wrote an anonymous letter to OEO protesting the makeup of H-
HCEOO's executive committee and advisory board by pointing out that of the seventy-
sixty members of the executive committee and board, only six were African American 
and only three were Mexican American. In addition to inadequate minority 
representation, only three of the sixty-one advisory board members actually lived in any 
of the poverty areas in Houston. The most blatant failure to live up to OEO guidelines, 
according to the minister, was the fact that none of the fifteen executive committee 
members, who held the policymaking power of the organization, represented the poor. 
The unnamed minister's letter only reinforced the OEO officials' original decision to 
fund HAY as the sole community action agency for Houston. They recommended that H-
41
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HCEOO adjust the makeup of its governing body and resubmit an application at a later 
date. OEO officials held out hope that H-HCEOO's executive committee and advisory 
board would comply with OEO guidelines and eventually serve as Houston's community 
action agency, but they realized that this restructuring would probably not occur until the 
next year.42 
When OEO announced that they were going to fund HAY as the community 
action agency for the city in July 1965, however, some H-HCEOO members panicked. H-
HCEOO executive committee member George Bush sent a letter to chairman Leon 
Jaworski that same month and declared that he was "disturbed to see yesterday's 
newspaper article" announcing OEO funding of HAY and several other smaller 
antipoverty projects in the city of Houston. "I think it would be a mistake," Bush 
continued, "if the Office of Economic Opportunity started approving all sorts of 
miscellaneous requests from Houston. I hope that our Board of Directors can make a 
strong plea to OEO to funnel its grants through our Committee. It seems to me that if all 
types of groups are able to go directly to OEO, the effectiveness of your committee will 
be minimized and all kinds of confusion could result." This "confusion," of course, meant 
that the business elites on H-HCEOO's executive committee might lose control of the 
War on Poverty in Houston.43 
A majority of H-HCEOO's executive committee and advisory board agreed with 
Bush's assessment of the situation, and in late August they hastily prepared and 
submitted to OEO a full grant application requesting $1.2 million for a ten-month 
antipoverty program in Houston. In a letter included in the application, H-HCEOO Board 
42
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Chairman Leon Jaworski informed OEO officials that since HAY only targeted a small 
section of the city north of downtown Houston, H-HCEOO would direct its antipoverty 
programs at the rest of the city. Conveying a sense of urgency, Jaworski urged OEO 
officials in Washington to approve the request quickly, especially since H-HCEOO was 
"far behind in its previous schedule for developing a complete Community Action 
Program."44 
H-HCEOO's application outlined several antipoverty projects that members of the 
organization intended to initiate in Houston, including research and survey projects that 
had been included in the previous initial program development grant application 
submitted to OEO. Beyond ascertaining the nature and prevalence of poverty in Houston, 
H-HCEOO members proposed several antipoverty programs for the city. Much like the 
HAY grant application, the program proposals included in this application were social 
services such as vocational training and child care for working mothers. In order to meet 
OEO requirement for including poor residents in policymaking and program development 
decisions, H-HCEOO's new grant application stated that the organization would appoint 
counselors for each poor neighborhood whose job would be to seek out opinions from the 
neighborhood residents concerning which services they wanted and which programs they 
would like to see initiated in their communities.45 
In September OEO once again rejected H-HCEOO's application and its bid to 
become Houston's community action agency. Despite the new proactive attitude 
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evidenced by H-HCEOO's application, OEO officials continued to be critical of the 
organization's provisions for including poor residents in policymaking and program 
development. Donald Mathis, regional OEO director based in Austin, Texas, explained to 
H-HCEOO members that not only were the poor not sufficiently represented on the staff 
and in leadership positions within the organization, but there were also no provisions or 
procedures to establish cooperation between the social service agencies in Houston 
necessary to carry out H-HCEOO's programs. "The law is quite specific," argued Mathis, 
"in requiring representation from these groups to the maximum extent feasible. . . . There 
are only one or two on the board of directors representing the poor." Mathis continued his 
criticism of H-HCEOO's application by stating, "Most of the projects require the 
cooperation of several organizations and we see no evidence of how they would achieve 
this cooperation." Though he offered several ways to remedy these problems, Mathis 
reminded H-HCEOO members that the solution should come from the people of 
Houston.46 
This most recent rejection of H-HCEOO's application for a community action 
grant set off a firestorm of criticism directed at OEO from high-ranking officials in 
Houston. Mayor Welch blasted OEO's decision in the newspapers the next day and 
proclaimed that he had no intention whatsoever of naming a new antipoverty committee 
for Houston to meet OEO guidelines. Referring to Mathis's statement about H-HCEOO's 
shortcomings, Welch replied, "Apparently a bureaucrat is setting up new rules. I have full 
"Poverty Funds Bid By City is Rejected," Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1965. 
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confidence in the committee and in Leon Jaworski, the chairman. I have no intention of 
naming a new committee because I think the present committee is doing a good job."47 
H-HCEOO Executive Committee Chairman Leon Jaworski echoed Welch's 
remarks and argued that it was "illogical, to put it mildly," to think that simply appointing 
additional poor members to the advisory board would improve the function of H-HCEOO 
as a community action agency. Jaworski continued, "The mayor and the county judge 
with the advice of civic leaders carefully selected this committee and it is to be regretted 
that an individual who knows so little about the qualifications of those selected should 
undertake arbitrarily to say that a number of other persons should be added to this group 
whose sole qualification needs to be that of being poor." In a statement that clearly 
indicated his complete rejection of the new antipoverty philosophy of the War on 
Poverty, Jaworski argued that the boards of the "great charitable organizations in our 
community consist of men and women dedicated to aiding those in need, and one's 
financial standing has never been a test for serving." These men and women, according to 
Jaworski, were "dedicated and determined in the pursuit of endeavors for the benefit of 
others."4* 
Jaworski's statements once again revealed an unwillingness to accept the 
philosophy that drove the architects of the federal War on Poverty, namely that poor 
people themselves should be very much involved in the planning, development, and 
implementation of antipoverty programs in their own communities. While it seemed 
"illogical" to Jaworski to include members on the committee simply because they were 
poor, the logic behind this OEO guideline was based on the notion that poor residents 
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themselves were most familiar with the nature of poverty in their communities and 
therefore were in the best position to plan and develop antipoverty programs to be 
implemented in their own neighborhoods. Further, War on Poverty architects believed 
that rather than developing programs and services from afar and then implementing them 
in poor neighborhoods - how traditional welfare organizations typically operated - the 
new antipoverty initiatives of the 1960s would ask poor residents to take active 
leadership roles in carrying out whatever programs they planned and developed. H-
HCEOO remained steadfast in its refusal to adhere to these OEO guidelines because the 
city's elected officials and members of the traditional welfare bureaucracy were fearful of 
losing control of federal funding and the administration of antipoverty services in the 
city. 
The furor over this latest OEO rejection, however, died down rather quickly as H-
HCEOO members, under threat from HAY, quickly searched for ways to comply as best 
they could with OEO guidelines. During a closed-door meeting of the executive 
committee a few days after OEO officials turned down their grant request, H-HCEOO 
members agreed to create a seventy-five-member board of directors with fifteen members 
coming directly from the poverty neighborhoods. Though both Jaworski and Welch 
claimed that there had simply been a misunderstanding between H-HCEOO and OEO 
and that the plan had always been to add poor residents to the board once H-HCEOO was 
funded, it seems unlikely that this explains why the H-HCEOO executive committee had 
such a quick change of heart. If Jaworski and other members of the executive committee 
had originally planned on adding more poor people to the board of directors eventually, it 
seems unlikely he and Welch would have made such harsh statements about OEO's 
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recent rejection of their grant application. It is more likely that enough members of H-
HCEOO's executive committee were in favor of doing whatever it took to get funding 
approval before the organization was excluded completely from the implementation of 
the War on Poverty in Houston. A clear indication of this was Jaworski's statement to the 
press after the organization made the decision to comply with OEO guidelines. He said, 
"Some of these requirements in my view are unsound but we will work it out with them." 
Clearly the H-HCEOO executive committee was not happy about sharing any power with 
poor residents, but it seems many were willing to work toward a compromise if it meant 
retaining control over the War on Poverty in Houston.49 
In October 1965 H-HCEOO submitted its revised grant application to OEO, and 
War on Poverty officials in Washington expressed relief that the showdown ended 
peacefully. OEO staffer Bill Crook, soon to be appointed southwest regional director of 
OEO and who had recently admitted that the situation in Houston "could have been a bad 
one," sent a memorandum to Sargent Shriver lauding the resolution as "an excellent 
example of what the courteous but unrelenting pressures of 'maximum feasible 
participation' can bring about in a city. . . . I consider the favorable turn of events to be an 
important breakthrough that will make easier the work that we have to do state-wide." 
Shriver passed this memo on to the White House and stated, "The President can see in 
this specific case exactly how 90% of the 'fighting' develops, and how solutions have 
been reached in more than 1,100 cities, towns, and counties." Although they still wanted 
further indications that H-HCEOO members shared their commitment to community 
action and maximum feasible participation of the poor, OEO officials had a renewed 
49
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sense of confidence after their apparent victory. For the time being, OEO decided to fund 
a portion of H-HCEOO's grant request to get the organization off the ground and begin 
planning some antipoverty programs for the city of Houston. Rather than fund the entire 
$1.1 million that H-HCEOO asked for, OEO officials decided on a lesser amount of 
$130,000 to fund exploratory projects designed to ascertain the needs of Houston's poor 
communities. OEO informed H-HCEOO that once it was able to plan a few antipoverty 
programs, the Washington office would grant funding for those projects.50 
By the end of 1965 Houston Action for Youth and the Houston-Harris County 
Economic Opportunity Organization had been funded for a combined total of $3 million, 
had planned programs for various poor neighborhoods in the city, and were ready to 
begin implementing the War on Poverty in Houston. In October Harlem Congressman 
Adam Clayton Powell brought his House Committee on Education and Labor to Houston 
as one of thirty-three major cities to receive an investigation of the progress of the War 
on Poverty around the country. Following two days of meetings with antipoverty 
organization staff and touring the target neighborhoods, Powell's committee concluded 
that after a shaky beginning, the War on Poverty was progressing smoothly in Houston. A 
Powell aide told the local newspapers, "We have received no flack or letters or anything 
else from Houston so you must have a very model program down there." Sam Price, 
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HAY's director of neighborhood organization, reported, "From all indications, we got a 
perfectly clean bill of health."51 
Yet more trouble lay ahead for the implementation of the War on Poverty in 
Houston. At the end of October, OEO in Washington sent Ivan Scott, an inspector hired 
by War on Poverty administrators to investigate community action boards and report on 
compliance with federal guidelines, to Houston to spend a day at H-HCEOO 
headquarters. Though he recommended that OEO approve the grant application, Scott 
had serious concerns about H-HCEOO's outright refusal to include poor residents in any 
decision making processes. Scott discovered that of the fifteen additional members of the 
board of directors that the H-HCEOO executive committee appointed to comply with 
OEO guidelines, only two were actually poor. H-HCEOO administrators assured Scott, 
however, that they would reorganize the board once OEO funded the organization and 
promised that more poor people would be included. Scott also uncovered a problem of a 
different sort that would continue to hamper antipoverty activities in Houston for the next 
two years. A rivalry had emerged between H-HCEOO and HAY over which organization 
could operate in particular areas of the city and what types of programs each group could 
offer. While Scott concluded that most of the problems could be solved in a satisfactory 
way for each antipoverty organization, important questions remained about whether H-
HCEOO and HAY would be able to work together to administer the War on Poverty in 
Houston. It would take the next two years to answer these remaining questions in any 
satisfactory way.52 
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Even though the War on Poverty was a national program, local circumstances 
profoundly shaped its implementation in Houston. The conservative way in which local 
elected officials and members of the city's traditional welfare bureaucracy interpreted the 
concept of community action had significant consequences for the early years of the 
federal antipoverty initiative. Yet Houston's "pervasive conservatism" that McComb 
described did leave open a small window of opportunity for those who had a different 
understanding of what the Community Action Program should be. Although in their first 
year of operation members of the city's official community action agency interpreted the 
community action concept conservatively, the possibility remained that at any time the 
H-HCEOO Board could decide to reinterpret their federal mandate and change the 
direction of the entire poverty program. Beginning in 1966, this is precisely what 
happened. Before this shift could transpire in Houston, however, grassroots antipoverty 
activists operating outside of H-HCEOO would have to present an alternative 
interpretation of the concept of community action and maximum feasible participation of 
the poor. 
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Chapter 2 
Creating an Alternative Antipoverty Philosophy for Houston: 
Grassroots Religious Activists and VISTA Workers Outside the City's Community 
Action Agency, 1964-1966 
In May 1966 Winifred Pollack, a volunteer with the federal War on Poverty's 
Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program working in an impoverished African 
American neighborhood in Houston's old Fifth Ward, helped organize a group of forty 
area residents to protest several recent actions by the Houston Independent School 
District board. When Pollack had first arrived in the neighborhood a few months earlier, 
one neighborhood resident had approached her for assistance after school board members 
offered to buy his Fifth Ward home to build a new elementary school. According to this 
resident, the school board offered the meager sum of $7,000 for his home even though it 
was valued at more than $20,000. The school board's offer to buy the home was also 
accompanied by a threat; if the homeowner failed to sign the necessary paperwork to sell 
the house within seven days, school board members, as they had done in other 
neighborhoods, would petition the city to condemn the property and turn it over to the 
school district. Pollack immediately recognized the unfairness of the situation and 
promised to arrange a meeting of all neighborhood residents who had received similar 
threats from the school board. 
Forty neighborhood residents met with Pollack a few days later to discuss the 
school board's efforts to purchase their homes. While Pollack came into the meeting 
convinced that the real issues that needed to be addressed were the unfair prices being 
offered by the school board and the threatening tone of their communications with 
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residents, she quickly discovered that area residents had a larger critique of the school 
board's actions. Despite pressure from the federal government and civil rights activists in 
the city, many Houston school board members continued to resist public school 
desegregation in the mid and late 1960s by using subtle and devious tactics to prevent 
African American and Mexican American students from attending white schools. One 
way they accomplished this was to build new schools in African American 
neighborhoods that bordered white areas of the city where white schools were sometimes 
in close proximity to nonwhite residents. Fifth Ward residents explained to Pollack that 
the school board's effort to build a new school in their neighborhood was simply another 
part of their plan to transform the crumbling system of de jure segregation into a more 
permanent system of de facto segregation. As Pollack stated in an interview shortly after 
the meeting, she "was very impressed that these elderly and not particularly literate 
people were so aware of the situation." 
As a VISTA volunteer, Pollack had received some training in the tactic of 
community organizing, and the response of Fifth Ward residents to the school board's 
exploitative actions provided her with an opportunity to try the strategy on the ground. 
After holding a series of neighborhood meetings to discuss the issue and develop a plan 
of action, Pollack mobilized this group of forty residents to appear at several school 
board meetings to voice their disapproval. Much to the surprise of Pollack and the 
residents, school board members, undoubtedly caught off guard by this politically 
mobilized group, agreed to back off from their coercive actions. This small victory 
emboldened Pollack and the residents to continue their efforts to organize the Fifth Ward 
in order to empower the poor to make demands on the institutions that affected their 
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lives. As Pollack stated in an interview shortly after the protest, the only way for VISTA 
volunteers to leave a lasting impact on the area was to help residents learn how to 
organize in order to gain power. "This power," continued Pollack, "can help them acquire 
many of their smaller, mutual needs such as streetlights and better facilities. . . . If the 
fight against the School Board works, [community] organization may lead in the long run 
to the possibility of a quality education." Pollack's antipoverty philosophy and her efforts 
to attack poverty in one of Houston's poor neighborhoods were in stark contrast to the 
vision laid out by the conservative members of the Houston-Harris County Economic 
Opportunity Organization (H-HCEOO), the city's official community action agency. The 
preceding narrative documents only one example of the many ways in which grassroots 
antipoverty activists operating outside the official community action agency in Houston 
used the War on Poverty to empower the poor by organizing them to confront powerful 
city institutions and bring about meaningful social change.1 
Experiences like Pollack's show that one of the ways local circumstances shaped 
the War on Poverty was the manner in which grassroots antipoverty activists constructed 
the intellectual ground upon which the War on Poverty was implemented in Houston. 
Between 1964 and 1966, grassroots antipoverty activists unaffiliated with H-HCEOO 
created a local context in which to implement the War on Poverty that was much more 
diverse in its intellectual and political influences than the rather narrow confines of New 
Deal-Great Society liberalism, with its inherent commitment to social harmony and 
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reluctance to offend the middle class or challenge entrenched interests. The moderate 
liberalism that motivated the architects of the federal War on Poverty certainly helped 
galvanize local antipoverty activists in Houston. Even more prominent in the antipoverty 
philosophy of many grassroots activists in Houston, however, were Prophetic 
Christianity, radical civil rights activism, and the vision of participatory democracy and 
community organizing espoused by members of the New Left and iconoclastic figures 
like Saul Alinsky. These local Houston activists promoted a radical interpretation of the 
community action concept and created an environment in which it became possible to 
imagine using the War on Poverty to advance an agenda of social change by empowering 
the poor and helping them engage in confrontations with the city's public officials and 
other elites. Most importantly, local activists helped open a small window of opportunity 
for members of Houston's official community action agency to reinterpret the concept of 
community action and begin to implement a more radical and confrontational program in 
the city. In Houston, therefore, the local political and intellectual environment, even more 
than federal politics, determined how the War on Poverty was fought. 
Perhaps no one did more to create the local context for the implementation of the 
War on Poverty in Houston than Reverend Wallace B. Poteat, a local minister of the 
Ecumenical Fellowship United Church of Christ, whose grassroots antipoverty 
organization became one of the official sponsors of the Volunteers in Service to America 
(VISTA) program in the city in 1966. His influence on the manner in which local 
activists implemented the War on Poverty in Houston, however, extended far beyond the 
VISTA program. By 1967, nearly all of the community organizers affiliated with the War 
on Poverty in Houston had begun implementing Poteat's model of community 
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organization and empowerment of the poor that the young minister articulated through 
his use of VISTA volunteers in the city. 
When the War on Poverty was launched in 1964, the recent history of the 
Ecumenical Fellowship helped shape the way its members would interpret their role in 
the fight against poverty. The Ecumenical Fellowship emerged out of a bitter church split 
between two factions within the Garden Villas United Church of Christ, an all-white 
congregation in southeast Houston, that occurred during the summer of 1964. Garden 
Villas was located in an area of the city that was gradually transitioning from an all-white 
neighborhood to a majority African American and Latino neighborhood. Many Garden 
Villas members, including Poteat, the young pastor of the congregation, wanted to reach 
out to welcome their new neighbors to the area. In order to begin this outreach program, 
Poteat and several members teamed up with a nearby African American congregation to 
sponsor a racially integrated vacation church school for children during the summer of 
1964. A significant majority of Garden Villas's members, however, remained steadfastly 
opposed to challenging entrenched patterns of segregation in that part of the city. After 
several months of factional battles within the walls of Garden Villas, the congregation 
voted to dismiss Poteat as pastor in October. This decision prompted several dozen 
members of the church to withdraw their membership from Garden Villas and to commit 
themselves to establishing a new church under Poteat's leadership.2 
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Poteat maintained that he and the younger Garden Villas members who left the 
congregation were simply trying to carry out the mission of the United Church of Christ, 
which had a strong commitment to supporting multiracial and multicultural 
congregations. When the prospect of racial integration appeared, however, Poteat 
exclaimed that "the traditional patterns of Houston's characteristic church life of serving 
the interest of constituents only and the interests of the immediate vicinity reasserted 
themselves." The group of Garden Villas members who opposed his actions, according to 
Poteat, "have made the decision to participate in the mission of the church only in those 
areas of life which would not violate the 'time honored' taboos, patterns, and prejudices 
of the ringed in and defensive community of Garden Villas." Above all, Poteat and his 
followers believed that the "race issue" was the most important problem confronting the 
modern church and must be overcome in order for the church to be a positive force in 
Houston.3 
The desire to be actively involved in the communities of Houston beyond the 
church walls propelled Poteat and his supporters to create the Ecumenical Fellowship 
United Church of Christ immediately upon leaving Garden Villas. Poteat argued that the 
city of Houston desperately needed a new congregation whose members engaged with the 
outside world because most churches in the city had become "spiritual retreats from the 
rapidly changing patterns of urbanization." Rather than cutting itself off from the social 
Villas United Church of Christ, "Annual Report," November 1964, Box 1, Folder Ecumenical Fellowship, 
VISTA Collection. 
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problems in Houston like Garden Villas had done, this new church congregation would 
seek solutions for societal ills and attempt to be a transformative force in the city.4 
Poteat and his followers had been profoundly influenced by several recent trends 
advanced by prominent Protestant theologians in the early and mid-1960s, particularly 
the renewed emphasis on original sin and the Old Testament prophets spearheaded by 
Reinhold Niebuhr, the call for people of faith to engage with the world more directly by 
Harvey Cox, and the ecumenical push coming from the National Council of Churches. In 
creating the Ecumenical Fellowship United Church of Christ, Poteat and his supporters 
hoped to combine these three elements into a theology that called church members out 
into the slums of Houston to be a prophetic voice exposing the evil of poverty in an 
ecumenical way. These trends had significant implications for the way Poteat and his 
congregation viewed the opportunities created by the federal War on Poverty. 
In January 1965 Poteat urged members of his new congregation to read carefully 
Moral Man and Immoral Society, Reinhold Niebuhr's most widely known book. Often 
labeled a neo-orthodox theologian by contemporary observers, Niebuhr called for a 
renewed emphasis on man's original sin and the depravity of humankind and criticized 
liberal theology (and postwar liberalism in general) for purporting that man could be 
ultimately perfected. American liberals, going back to John Dewey and other political 
theorists during the first few decades of the twentieth century, had an unshakeable faith in 
the inevitable progress of human civilization that would be brought about by education 
and democracy. As society improved, conflict between groups and individuals would 
accordingly decline. Niebuhr, on the other hand, disagreed with this faith in progress and 
4
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argued that social conflict was inevitable because of man's depraved and fallen nature. 
Liberals, Niebuhr said in the book, "completely disregard the political necessities in the 
struggle for justice in human society by failing to recognize those elements in man's 
collective behavior which belong to the order of nature and can never be brought 
completely under the dominion of reason or conscience. They do not recognize that when 
collective power, whether in the form of imperialism or class domination, exploits 
weakness, it can never be dislodged unless power is raised against it. If conscience and 
reason can be insinuated into the resulting struggle they can only qualify but not abolish 
it." In other words, the liberal's belief in inevitable human progress and the perfectibility 
of man failed to take into account that man's very nature was imperfect because of 
original sin. Once this basic fact about human nature was accepted, Niebuhr argued that 
the only way justice could be achieved on earth was through conflict and coercion. 
"Conflict is inevitable," Nieburh stated, "and in this conflict power must be challenged 
by power."5 
Niebuhr also tried to restore the prophetic voice to Christianity, and according to 
historian David L. Chappell, this was his most significant intellectual contribution to mid-
twentieth century struggles for justice in the United States. In his provocative book A 
Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow, Chappell argued that the 
core beliefs of civil rights intellectuals, particularly Martin Luther King, Jr., consisted not 
of liberalism, with its faith in the ability of education and inevitable moral progress to 
bring about racial justice and an end to segregation, but rather by a prophetic brand of 
Christianity advanced by Niebuhr. Contrary to the views of most American liberals, 
5
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Niebuhr argued that real evil existed in the world. For many African Americans, living 
with segregation and racism meant that they too had firsthand experience with human 
depravity and societal evil. The Jim Crow system in the American South and the white 
racism that propped up that racial caste system were evils that had to be confronted. 
According to Chappell, King and other movement leaders believed that whites would 
relent and the Jim Crow system would crumble only when those in power were coerced 
into allowing it to occur. By bringing the prophetic voice to the American South, civil 
rights activists hoped to expose this grave societal evil and deliver blacks in the South 
from its clutches. It was also this brand of Prophetic Christianity that sustained the civil 
rights movement and brought about some measure of success while many liberals 
abandoned the goals of the movement. 6 
Poteat and his followers were similarly influenced by Niebuhr and a prophetic 
brand of Christianity. In response to a question about whether the new church 
congregation would be "liberal" or "conservative," Poteat responded by arguing that "the 
words Liberal and Conservative which we sometimes use with abandon really confuse 
the issue because of the varied connotation of these terms." Rather than being concerned 
with where the new church would fall on the American political or theological spectrum, 
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Poteat insisted that he and his supporters were concerned to maintain a "creative dialectic 
between the priestly and prophetic aspects" of their faith. "If we sound weighted to 
prophecy," Poteat concluded, "it is perhaps because we believe that the prophetic voice in 
the local church needs to be strengthened in Houston."7 
In addition to being greatly influenced by Niebuhr, Poteat and his followers saw 
themselves as part of a religious movement whose participants were dedicated to 
establishing Christian missions in the country's urban centers. Foremost among the 
influential theologians in this movement was Harvey Cox, whose 1965 publication The 
Secular City synthesized an increasing number of calls to reengage with the outside 
world. In January 1966 Poteat asked his congregation to read this book in which Cox 
lambasted Christians who were fearful of secularization. Rather than being something to 
fear, Cox argued that the process of secularization was "the liberation of man from 
religious and metaphysical tutelage, the turning of his attention away from other worlds 
and toward this one. . . . The task of Christians should be to support it and nourish it." In 
the secular city, which Cox argued every part of the country was quickly becoming, 
traditional religion, with its preoccupation with otherworldliness, had no place. Modern 
Christians, Cox said, should reject that kind of traditional religion and enter freely into 
the secular world as full participants. Most attractive to Poteat and his congregation, 
however, was Cox's attempt to develop a theology of social change. "We are trying to 
live in a period of revolution without a theology of revolution," exclaimed Cox. "Our task 
is that of developing a theology of politics, and in particular a theology of revolutionary 
social change. . . . The secular city provides the starting point for such a theology." For 
7
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grassroots antipoverty activists like Poteat and his congregation, Cox provided a 
theological justification for a radical political philosophy by advocating a thorough 
democratization of the economy as a whole to produce a world without the evils of 
poverty.8 
Poteat looked to theologians like Harvey Cox for guidance in his attempt to 
establish an urban church in Houston. As Poteat explained to his congregation, the trend 
of contemporary church congregations to leave the inner city and retreat to the suburbs 
meant that the city of Houston needed a new church that would actively and ambitiously 
reach out to the urban poor. "It is our conviction," proclaimed Poteat, "that those who 
stand outside the doors of the churches in an exploding metropolis with its problems and 
promise deserve to be served by faithfully witnessing churches rather than pious 
professions of concern."9 In a brochure advertising the founding of the Ecumenical 
Fellowship, Poteat asked, "Will Sunday morning begin your eager week of involvement 
or will it hear your prayer of relief that toil is done? Will you attend a sanctuary where an 
inordinate claim on your time drags you out of the world and makes life one big retreat? . 
. . where the emphasis is on ceremony, ritual, narrow-minded minutiae, pious platitudes? 
. . . where exalted ideals are proclaimed but no attempt is made to implement them or live 
up to them? . . . where charity is only a food basket from Lady Bountiful?" Or, Poteat 
asked, will you attend a "Church . . . where the whole church means the whole world? . . . 
8
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where the emphasis is on our common needs, racial and social justice, the brotherhood of 
man? . . . where concern is courageous and the church will take a stand on issues? . . . 
where charity recognizes human dignity and helps others raise themselves?" The 
Ecumenical Fellowship, according to Poteat, would be this new brand of urban church 
"committed to seeking a faith adequate to the challenge of today and the promise of 
tomorrow."10 
In addition to Prophetic Christianity and a commitment to establishing an urban 
mission in Houston, a significant national trend that had a profound effect not only on 
Poteat and his supporters but on the entire United Church of Christ body was the 
ecumenical movement that began slowly at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1950 the 
National Council of Churches was formed, capping off a half century of efforts to create 
an interdenominational organization capable of encouraging dialogue between believers 
of different faiths. Members of the National Council of Churches wanted to shift the 
focus away from the relatively small doctrinal differences that served to divide people of 
faith and toward the many commonalities among the denominations. As they stated in 
their message "To the People of the Nation" during their founding meeting in 1950, "we 
have forged an implement for cooperation such as America has never seen before. . . . 
The Council itself is a demonstration of [Jesus's] power to unite his followers in joyous 
cooperation. Let nation and nation, race and race, class and class unite their aims in his 
broad purposes for man, and out of that unitedness there will arise new strength like that 
of which we ourselves already feel the first sure intimations."1' 
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As Poteat explained to his congregation in March 1966, "Denominational 
parochialism, static concepts, and competition [were] and [are] the worst enem[ies]" of 
the modern urban church, and they represented "a curse on the seamless robe of Christ." 
Whereas suburban church congregations could cling to their denominational differences 
and remain financially viable, Poteat argued that "competition and isolation spells doom 
to the inner city church," as evidenced by the fact that "in the cruel heart of the city, 
traditional middle class neighborhood churches are closing their doors and are objects of 
indifference and hostility." To cling to outdated denominational differences and 
peculiarities, while holding up one's own as the only true way to worship, according to 
Poteat, is "to take the historical position that the Christian Church in 2000 years has only 
produced a limited few models for the development of churches and missions that can be 
both Christian and successful. . . . To claim that there is only one structure, one way of 
development, one valid way of becoming a self sustaining church, one restricted mission 
of the church is ultimately to castrate the future of the church and its mission." There 
was, however, reason for hope. The growth of the National Council of Churches and the 
increasing strength of the ecumenical movement, according to Poteat, were encouraging 
developments showing that "the walls of hostility between diverse religious groups, 
ethnic groups, economic groups, between suburb and inner city are being broken" in 
order to serve "the poor, the blind, the deaf, the oppressed, the captives."12 
These diverse theological trends played a determining role in the creation of the 
Ecumenical Fellowship in Houston. As members of the congregation set out to engage 
with the secular world, they quickly discovered that the problem of urban poverty would 
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also require a political solution. Poteat believed that Niebuhr provided a coherent 
philosophy for exposing and attacking the evils of poverty, but he also attempted to 
combine Niebuhrian Prophetic Christianity with the radical political vision of Saul 
Alinsky. Over time, Poteat became a firm believer in what was known as the Saul 
Alinsky method. Alinsky was the radical community organizer who in 1939 helped create 
the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council in Chicago and had received national 
attention by traveling the country training organizers in his methods. Alinsky argued that 
individuals, especially those trapped in poverty, had little hope of successfully dealing 
with any city's public officials, government agencies, or welfare organizations because of 
the overwhelming amount of power an urban bureaucracy possessed over its poor 
citizens. According to Alinsky, it was only through organization, as labor had 
accomplished through the creation of industrial unions, that the poor could attempt to 
match the power of a city's government and bring about needed changes in their 
communities. Alinsky's method of organizing and mobilizing poor communities was 
incredibly attractive to some antipoverty workers across the country because Alinsky 
seemed to understand that the problems of poverty boiled down to one core issue - power 
relations. Alinsky's followers believed that only through upsetting the traditional balance 
of power between a city's power structure and its poor residents and implementing a 
vision of participatory democracy could the evils of poverty be resolved.13 
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Alinsky's most coherent articulation of his ideas was his 1946 book Reveille for 
Radicals. In the first half of the book, Alinsky defined what it meant to be an American 
radical and differentiated radicals from American liberals. He explained, "The Radical is 
not fooled by shibboleths and facades. He faces issues squarely and does not hide his 
cowardice behind the convenient cloak of rationalization. The Radical refuses to be 
diverted by superficial problems. He is completely concerned with fundamental causes 
rather than current manifestations. He concentrates his attack on the heart of the issue. . . . 
The Radical recognizes that constant dissension and conflict has been the fire under the 
boiler of democracy." Alinsky warned that radicals should not be confused with liberals, 
who "are hesitant to act" and whose "opinions are studded with 'but on the other hand.'" 
Alinsky continued, "Caught on the horns of this dilemma, [liberals] are paralyzed into 
immobility. They become utterly incapable of action. They discuss and discuss and end 
in disgust." The true American radical, however, "does not sit frozen by cold objectivity. 
He sees injustice and strikes at it with hot passion." Because of the American radical's 
propensity for action, according to Alinsky, "Society has good reason to fear the Radical. 
Every shaking advance of mankind toward equality and justice has come from the 
Radical. He hits, he hurts, he is dangerous. Conservative interests know that while 
Liberals are most adept at breaking their own necks with their tongues, Radicals are most 
adept at breaking the necks of Conservatives."14 
The most important difference between liberals and radicals with regard to 
bringing about meaningful social change, according to Alinsky, was in their disparate 
understandings of power. "Liberals fear power or its application," he argued. "They labor 
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in confusion over the significance of power and fail to recognize that only through the 
achievement and constructive use of power can people better themselves. They talk glibly 
of a people lifting themselves by their own bootstraps but fail to realize that nothing can 
be lifted or moved except through power." Radicals, on the other hand, "precipitate the 
social crisis by action - by using power." Alinsky concluded that the only sure way for 
common people to attain and use power effectively was through organization. He argued, 
"If we strip away all the chromium trimmings of high-sounding metaphor and idealism 
which conceal the motor and gears of a democratic society, one basic element is revealed 
- the people are the motor, the organizations of the people are the gears. The power of the 
people is transmitted through the gears of their own organizations, and democracy moves 
forward."15 
In the second half of Reveille for Radicals, Alinsky offered a blueprint for 
establishing "People's Organizations" capable of organizing communities and 
empowering them to challenge any structure or institution that oppressed them. A 
People's Organization, according to Alinsky, was not simply a community council 
designed by liberals merely to remedy the symptoms of the problems of a community but 
rather a radically inspired group of citizens empowered to attack the root causes of 
society's ills. Alinsky explained, "You don't, you dare not, come to a people who are 
unemployed, who don't know where their next meal is coming from, whose children and 
themselves are in the gutter of despair - and offer them not food, not jobs, not security, 
but supervised recreation, handicraft classes and character building! Yet that is what is 
done\ Instead of a little bread and butter we come to them with plenty of bats and balls!" 
Highlighting the futility of job training programs, Alinsky argued, "To train men for a job 
15
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when there is no job is like dressing up a cadaver in a full-dress suit; in the end you still 
have a cadaver." Alinsky readily admitted that most charity and social workers would 
surely disagree with his assessment, primarily because the traditional charity and social 
workers "pride themselves upon their techniques and talents for adjusting people to 
difficult situations. They come to the people of the slums under the aegis of benevolence 
and goodness, not to organize the people, not to help them rebel and fight their way out 
of the muck - NO! They come to get these people 'adjusted'; adjusted so they will live in 
hell and like it too. A higher form of social treason would be difficult to conceive - yet 
this infamy is perpetrated in the name of charity." Alinsky designed the People's 
Organizations to be a radical alternative to the largely ineffective liberal programs of the 
various community councils around the country.I6 
In order to build an effective People's Organization, Alinsky argued that native 
leadership must be identified through which the organization could be created. Only the 
people themselves, according to Alinsky, could form an organization that would be 
respected by a majority of any community's members. The role of the radical community 
organizer was to come to a thorough understanding of the life of the community, 
including specific customs and traditions. Though many members of the community 
would initially view the radical organizer with suspicion and distrust, the organizer must 
remain honest and selfless as he or she reached a level of personal identification with the 
community as a whole. By respecting the dignity of the people, Alinsky argued, the 
organizer would eventually earn the trust of the community and would be able to begin 
organizing its members and start solving the problems of the community. According to 
Alinsky, once a community was organized it would become imperative for the People's 
16
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Organization to engage in conflicts that would upset the status quo. He stated, "A 
People's Organization is dedicated to an eternal war. It is a war against poverty, misery, 
delinquency, disease, injustice, hopelessness, despair, and unhappiness." Alinsky argued 
that only by empowering People's Organizations to disrupt the status quo could its 
members begin to solve the problems of their community.17 
Alinsky concluded his book by arguing that the continuation of democracy itself 
was dependent upon the successful organization of the American people. "The 
fundamental issue that will resolve the fate of democracy is whether or not we really 
believe in democracy," he concluded. "The only hope for democracy is that more people 
and more groups will become articulate and exert pressure upon their government." 
Alinsky also issued a dire warning to those who opposed the organization and 
empowerment of relatively powerless communities. "Those who fear the building of 
People's Organizations as a revolution also forget that it is an orderly development of 
participation, interest, and action on the part of the masses of people. It may be true that it 
is revolution, but it is orderly revolution. To reject orderly revolution is to be hemmed in 
by two hellish alternatives: disorderly, sudden, stormy, bloody revolution, or a further 
deterioration of the mass foundation of democracy to the point of inevitable dictatorship. 
The building of People's Organizations is orderly revolution, it is the process of the 
people gradually but irrevocably taking their places as citizens of a democracy." 
Poteat recognized the value of combining his religious beliefs with Alinsky's 
powerful message about community empowerment in order to attack poverty in the city 
of Houston. In February 1965 he urged members of the Ecumenical Fellowship to read a 
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recent article in the United Church of Christ's "Social Action" newsletter titled 
"Strategies for Community Change," which outlined the Alinsky method. In a church 
newsletter that same month, Poteat also criticized an editorial in The Christian Century 
that "unwarrantedly leveled its guns at the Saul Alinsky approach" that had been 
advocated by officials at the UCC Department of Urban Church. A few months later 
Poteat sent a representative from his congregation to a UCC Denominational Executive 
meeting to hear a church official speak about the cooperation between several inner city 
churches and Alinsky's antipoverty organization in northern cities. The speaker said UCC 
churches were involved in community programs organized by Alinsky's group in 
Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo, New York, and he implored members present to follow 
the same trend in their own cities or risk become irrelevant.19 
Poteat and his supporters envisioned the Ecumenical Fellowship carrying out this 
prophetic Christian mission in Houston's inner city neighborhoods through the use of 
Alinsky-style community organization, and he and the members of the congregation 
immediately went about implementing this vision in their community in the fall of 1964. 
The most important role of a prophet, of course, is to expose evil, and Ecumenical 
Fellowship members explicitly set out to expose and confront a racial caste system that 
kept certain Houston residents mired in poverty. In exposing the evils of poverty, Poteat 
and his followers most likely sought to emulate the Biblical prophet Amos, who in the 
eighth century BCE criticized Israel's leaders for neglecting the plight of the poor in the 
midst of staggering economic affluence. As a beginning, Poteat and his congregation 
19
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founded the Ecumenical Fellowship Latin American Channel (EF-LAC) project, a 
program designed in conjunction with Protestant Charities of Greater Houston that 
focused on the predominantly Mexican American population living near the ship channel 
in southeast Houston. As Poteat told a reporter with the Houston Chronicle, "Building a 
church must be based on mission, not just going out to some suburb and building." The 
stated goals of the project included a commitment to support "the development of 
indigenous 'grassroots' community organizations through which they can together 
prevent further deterioration of the area, effect community redevelopment, and attack the 
root causes of economic, political, social, cultural, and spiritual deprivation, alienation, 
and discrimination," and to "provide a means whereby the barriers which prevent the 
exercise and enjoyment of the rights and responsibilities [of] full and equal citizenship by 
all the residents of the area may be overcome."20 
Poteat and EF-LAC activists attempted to enhance their commitment to New Left 
ideas about participatory democracy by welcoming members of Houston's chapter of 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) into the ranks of their antipoverty crusade. SDS 
was a radical New Left organization formed in 1962 whose members set out to transform 
the United States into a participatory democracy. In their "Port Huron Statement" issued 
the year of their founding, SDS activists stated, "As a social system we seek the 
establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims: 
20
 Jan Morgan, "Churchmen to Work in Harrisburg Area," Houston Chronicle, September 11, 1965 (first 
quotation); Melvin Steakley, "Ship Channel Area to Get Outside Aid in Self-Help," Houston Chronicle, 
April 24, 1965; Don Britton to Charles Cross, 3 November 1964, Box 1, Folder Ecumenical Fellowship, 
VISTA Collection; EF-UCC, "Voice," 14 February 1965, Box 1, Folder Ecumenical Fellowship, VISTA 
Collection; EF-UCC, "Voice," 28 February 1965, Box 1, Folder Ecumenical Fellowship, VISTA 
Collection; EF-UCC, "Voice," 28 March 1965, Box 1, Folder Ecumenical Fellowship, VISTA Collection; 
EF-UCC LAC Project, "Projected Program for LAC Project, Houston, Texas, 1965-1966," April 1965, Box 
2, Folder The Lack Project, VISTA Collection; Wallace B. Poteat, "The Objectives of the LAC Project," 
August 1965, Box 1, Scrapbook, VISTA Collection (second quotation). 
77 
that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of 
his life; [and] that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide 
the media for their common participation." In 1965 Houston SDS members decided to try 
implementing their radical vision of turning America into a participatory democracy by 
working with the EF-LAC project. As the Houston SDS newsletter stated in November 
1965, by working closely with EF-LAC volunteers on "programs ranging from literacy 
work to recreation to tenants' organization work, we will get to know the community, and 
then perhaps branch out into more specifically political programs - whatever issue, be it 
garbage, schools, housing or jobs, that the community feels is of importance . . . and at 
the same time work to involve the people in political action." Reverend Poteat even 
arranged a training session with Houston SDS to teach the students how to go into 
communities and organize the poor and named a Houston SDS member, Gil Campos, as 
the EF-LAC project's youth director. The attitude of many SDS members about the 
possibilities of transforming the War on Poverty into a vehicle for radical political action 
was revealed in their announcement of this training session: "Do come! The possibilities 
for a dedicated, militant and sensitive organization are fantastic. The dedication, the 
militancy, and the sensitivity to people's needs depends on YOU." Although the EF-LAC 
project would receive ample criticism for welcoming student radicals into their ranks, 
EF-LAC organizers remained steadfast in their support for Houston SDS and saw it as a 
major accomplishment that theirs was the only antipoverty organization in Houston that 
welcomed the involvement of this increasingly high profile New Left organization. 
21
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Before applying for OEO funding or requesting VISTA volunteers from 
Washington, EF-LAC project activists initiated several programs in poor neighborhoods 
on the east side of Houston near the ship channel. Early in 1965 EF-LAC volunteers 
established a teen recreation center to provide activities for youth, especially in the 
summer months when school was out and nearly all of the parents worked full time. They 
also created a "Swap Shop" where neighborhood residents could swap items no longer 
needed for ones they did need. In addition to these service-oriented programs, EF-LAC 
volunteers also began organizing the poor into action groups such as the East End Teen 
Club, the Manchester Broadway Mothers Club, and the Golden Age Sewing Club. In the 
spring of 1965 the teen club staged a peaceful protest against the Houston school 
district's policy of busing African American students past white schools to majority black 
schools, and the mother's club spearheaded the creation of a credit union to serve the 
needs of neighborhood residents. EF-LAC volunteers also organized a citizenship 
education and voter registration drive in the area. As the projected program for the EF-
LAC project stated, "Political indifference of Latin Americans and Ghetto Negros [sic] 
has enabled [Houston's] political establishments to persuade the few who vote to often 
vote against their interests." The authors of EF-LAC's projected program also recognized 
the need to develop grassroots community organizations to put pressure on the city's 
elected officials. These types of activities would continue to grow with OEO funding. 
EF-LAC activists established a few service-delivery programs in their neighborhoods, but 
it was clear early on that they recognized the value of empowering the poor through 
community organization. Although these early efforts were small in scale and lacked 
Ask You to Support Our Cause?" Box 1, VISTA Scrapbook, VISTA Collection; Bud Poteat to EF-UCC 
Church Council Members, 1 August 1965, Box 1, Folder Ecumenical Fellowship, VISTA Collection. 
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clear direction, they nevertheless represented the beginning of significant community 
organizing initiatives in the city of Houston.22 
Poteat and his followers designed their antipoverty program to be the first of its 
kind in Houston and recruited volunteers to make an ambitious effort not only to provide 
services to the poor, but more importantly to empower the city's poor residents through 
community organization. As Poteat explained to a potential EF-LAC project volunteer, 
Houston had the ability to escape the fate of the northern ghettos "not by lady bountiful 
with a charity basket at Christmas, not by professional 'do-gooders,' not by expecting the 
government to do it all - but by voluntary, person-to-person involvement in projects in 
which the people, the churches, the businessmen, the clubs, and the schools are motivated 
and given an instrument and the necessary outside support by which they can unite in a 
concerted common effort to break the bonds of poverty - themselves!" Neighborhood 
residents would be organized with the goal of effecting widespread social change in 
Houston, according to Poteat, such as pressuring local businesses and institutions to 
comply with federal desegregation laws, registering voters and mobilizing them 
politically to prevent them from voting "against their own interests," and organizing 
residents to demand more public housing options from the city of Houston and from the 
federal government, more rapid desegregation of local schools, adequate funding for 
schools in poor neighborhoods, the creation of more job opportunities, the upgrading of 
medical and welfare services, and an end to police harassment of poor and minority 
residents. As Poteat and other EF-LAC members stated in a recruitment brochure, "We 
believe in grassroots democracy. . . . We believe in Racial Justice now. . . . We believe in 
22
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community organization and action.. . . We work with religious and secular 
organizations for justice now, for a new day in Houston." The time had come, according 
to Poteat, to force the churches in the city "to practice what [they] preach - i.e., Peace, 
instead of killing. Brotherhood instead of Segregation. Release of the Captives and 
Oppressed of our cities instead of Subjugation and Oppression of the weak." Poteat and 
the members of the EF-LAC project stood poised to use the federal War on Poverty to 
organize and empower the poor in Houston, but first they had to contend with a city 
bureaucracy vying to control the implementation of the federal antipoverty program in 
the city.23 
Soon after Poteat and other members of the Ecumenical Fellowship initiated the 
EF-LAC project, Houston Mayor Louie Welch, Harris County Judge Bill Elliott, and 
members of the city's welfare bureaucracy created H-HCEOO to administer the War on 
Poverty in the city. Reverend Poteat and other members of the EF-LAC project had little 
hope for the recently created community action agency to make much of an impact in 
Houston. In response, Poteat and EF-LAC members began to look for ways to become 
actively involved in implementing the federal antipoverty program in the city. While it 
was unlikely federal War on Poverty officials would fund more than one community 
action agency for the city, Poteat and EF-LAC project activists turned their attention 
toward the VISTA program and proposed using the young volunteers to continue the 
project's efforts to organize and empower the poor in Houston. 
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Scholars have paid a surprising lack of attention to the significant role of the 
VISTA program in the War on Poverty, presumably because it has been difficult to 
discover exactly what these volunteers were doing in the country's poor neighborhoods. 
As a result, historians know very little about VISTA experiences on the ground or the 
ideologies of grassroots VISTA-sponsoring organizations. Contrary to the view of many 
historians of the War on Poverty, the VISTA program was often crucial for the 
implementation of the War on Poverty at the grassroots level and greatly contributed to 
the proliferation of community organizing and confrontational tactics. By placing young 
and idealistic volunteers in poor communities under the supervision of local activist 
organizations, the VISTA program produced several unintended consequences that 
caught many liberal policymakers in Washington by surprise. Broadening the original 
intent of the War on Poverty, many VISTA volunteers employed the use of widespread 
community organization, mobilization, and confrontational tactics in order to empower 
the poor to demand increased participation in the local democratic process. And in 
Houston, the VISTA program had a direct impact on the activities of the official 
community action agency as well. 
Many historians downplay or altogether ignore the contributions of VISTA volunteers to the overall War 
on Poverty. Several histories of the War on Poverty do not include a discussion of the VISTA program at 
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To most national and local government officials in the 1960s, most of whom were 
committed to the ideals of social harmony and preservation of the status quo, the VISTA 
program seemed benign enough. Attorney General Robert Kennedy and his task force on 
juvenile delinquency first came up with the idea for a "domestic Peace Corps" in 1962 to 
give young people a way to serve their country at home. Though a bill to establish the 
National Service Corps stalled in Congress, architects of the War on Poverty picked up 
the idea and included the volunteer program, now called VISTA, in the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964. The federal government would train and fund volunteers to 
serve one-year tours of duty in the War on Poverty, most often in conjunction with local 
antipoverty organizations. What Peace Corps volunteers had done in remote villages in 
distant lands would be translated domestically, and many believed the young volunteers 
would assist families who lived in poverty in meeting everyday challenges associated 
with being poor.25 
Most historians of the War on Poverty agree with this contemporary assessment, 
and this seems to be the main reason why the VISTA program remains one of the most 
understudied parts of the poverty war. There were some individuals, however, including a 
few early architects of the federal War on Poverty, who recognized the potential of the 
VISTA program to become a transformative force in American society. According to 
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War on Poverty planner Stephen J. Pollak, the most progressive members of the War on 
Poverty Task Force - people like Robert Kennedy, Richard Boone, and David Hackett -
were the strongest proponents of including the VISTA program in the federal antipoverty 
effort.26 
Edgar May, another War on Poverty task force member, argued more than a 
decade after the War on Poverty ended that the VISTA volunteers had undoubtedly been 
"agents of change." During an interview in 1981 May described how a VISTA volunteer 
could have inevitably become a force for social change in his or her community: 
It didn't take the VISTA volunteer a hell of a long time, whether he was in 
Harlem or in the South Side of Chicago or in Appalachia or in a Navajo 
reservation . . . to figure [out] who the bad guys are in these dramas. . . . In the 
latter, for example, it didn't take him long to figure out that if the white people 
have got a municipal water system, and the Indians have got to travel in the same 
county five miles to get enough water in a bunch of five-gallon cans, then there's 
something the matter with the public system, and if you're down there to do 
something about poverty, you begin showing up at the water authority meetings, 
and you say things that they really don't want to hear. That's when the genie's out 
of the bottle. Yes, they're agents of change. We didn't need social workers. We 
didn't need a lot of people to teach little kids how to read.27 
May's description of how the local context in which the VISTA volunteers were placed 
played a significant role in determining the tactics they would use to attack poverty 
26
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applied to many VISTAs who came to Houston in the 1960s. Although the national 
legislation had within it the seeds of possibilities for the VISTA program to become a 
vehicle for social change, it was in the grassroots implementation of the program that 
these seeds were fertilized and allowed to grow. Many volunteers, as they began 
discovering that the roots of many of the problems of the poor were tied to their relative 
powerlessness and were exposed to a wide array of ideas about social change through 
their sponsoring agencies, became more radical and confrontational the longer they lived 
in Houston's impoverished neighborhoods. 
The first VISTA volunteer arrived in Houston in late February 1966, and a steady 
stream of them trickled into the city over the next several months. By the end of April, 
the city had twenty VISTAs who were actively working in the targeted areas. Faced with 
the extreme deprivation of many of Houston's poor neighborhoods, most of the VISTA 
volunteers upon arriving immediately set out to provide desperately needed social 
services. They established after-school tutoring sessions in their homes, set up 
information centers directing young people to employment centers and the Job Corps, 
and held informal meetings with neighborhood residents to come up with solutions to the 
most pressing problems in these impoverished areas. What is evidenced by the following 
narrative of the volunteers' activities in Houston's poor neighborhoods, however, is that 
the VISTAs modified much of their antipoverty philosophy and tactics after spending just 
a few months in the target neighborhoods. Whereas initially many VISTAs focused on 
the delivery of services, within a short period of time most of the volunteers shifted to an 
emphasis on community organizing and empowerment of the poor. Actual on-the-ground 
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experiences and the influence of Poteat and the EF-LAC project activists, therefore, 
shaped the VISTA volunteers' philosophy and methods in significant ways.28 
Michael Hayward, a 21-year-old former Navy seaman from Indiana, completed 
his VISTA training early in 1966 and was assigned to work in an African American 
neighborhood in northeast Houston in the old Fifth Ward. Immediately Hayward 
recognized the stark reality in the neighborhood: crowded and inadequate schools with 
skyrocketing dropout rates, desperately poor housing, exploitative white business owners, 
absentee landlords, a general lack of any sense of community spirit, churches aloof from 
community issues, a prevalence of low-paying unskilled jobs, and persistent racism 
among business owners and hiring officials. Most distressing to Hayward was a pervasive 
sense of hopelessness among the area's residents. 
After finding a house to rent in which to live and to provide a central meeting 
place for community organizations he hoped to create, Hayward spent his first few days 
trying to make contacts with influential members of the community in churches, bars, and 
pool halls. After assessing some of the most significant needs of the community, 
Hayward began with a service-delivery approach. One of the most pressing issues, 
according to neighborhood residents, was not necessarily unemployment but the lack of 
jobs that paid well and offered opportunities for advancement. Hayward began expanding 
an existing training program to equip black workers with the necessary skills to become 
machine operators for various types of mechanized industry. In order to build some 
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community spirit, Hayward also began to organize Little League baseball teams in the 
neighborhood both to keep the young people occupied and to create a sense of 
cohesiveness among the neighborhood's youth.30 
After a few months in the neighborhood, however, Hayward learned from 
residents that the problems of poverty did not necessarily stem from inadequate services 
but from a lack of power among poor residents. In order to remedy this power imbalance 
between the city's poor people and local public officials and institutions, Hayward and 
several residents began using the tactic of community organizing to empower the 
neighborhood's poor people. A group of African American workers who belonged to 
several union locals under the AFL-CIO umbrella worked with Hayward to pressure 
union leaders to commit themselves to addressing problems like hiring discrimination 
and unequal access to union membership. Although this commitment produced few 
tangible results, Hayward and the union members recognized that the process of 
organizing and putting pressure on a large and powerful institution showed many poor 
residents that they could organize and use their collective power to effect change. Just a 
few months after arriving in the Fifth Ward, Hayward was convinced that the 
organization of the community was "essential if the work of the [VISTA] volunteers is to 
be of lasting value." Only through organized action, Hayward argued, could poor 
residents begin to challenge the urban structures that kept them mired in poverty.31 
Hayward also began laying the groundwork for the future use of the tactic of 
community organizing to empower the poor. He convened periodic neighborhood 
meetings during which residents could get to know each other and select leaders who 
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would serve as advocates for the interests of the neighborhood at city hall and other 
bureaucratic institutions. Hayward believed that the organization of neighborhood 
residents into a self-conscious bloc was the only way reforms and improvements to the 
neighborhood would remain permanent. At these meetings Hayward encouraged 
neighborhood dwellers to voice their concerns about the condition of their neighborhood 
and to come up with some solutions to the problems.32 
Winifred Pollack, the VISTA volunteer who helped organize neighborhood 
residents to protest the Houston School Board's exploitation of poor homeowners in 
Houston, also arrived in the city in 1966. Like Hayward, Pollack gradually shifted from a 
focus on social service delivery to community organizing and empowerment tactics. 
Whereas Michael Hayward lived and worked in a predominantly African American 
neighborhood, Pollack worked in a majority Mexican American neighborhood in the 
industrial section of the Fifth Ward. Despite the different racial makeup of the two 
neighborhoods, Pollack identified many of the same problems when she arrived, such as 
poor public educational facilities, few community organizations, general idleness among 
neighborhood residents, alienated churches, and horrible condition of rental properties. 
Pollack was struck by the visible inequality in the neighborhoods, particularly with 
regard to the quality of schools and the level of services provided by the city. One of the 
junior high schools in the area was very old and overcrowded and in obvious need of 
repair. Just across town, however, was a school in a white neighborhood that was brand 
new and often had empty classrooms because it was so large. City services were almost 
nonexistent; Pollack was appalled when she discovered that in the Fifth Ward few streets 
had proper lighting and the roads were almost impassable because of huge potholes. 
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There was also a clear lack of drainage, as evidenced by puddles in many roads that had 
been there so long that they were full of tadpoles. After quite a rough start due to her lack 
of transportation or any prearranged community contacts, Pollack slowly began building 
a network of concerned residents to combat the negative effects of the neighborhood's 
poverty.33 
Like Hayward, Pollack initially set out to solve the immediate needs of 
neighborhood residents, and this required social programs. One of the first issues Pollack 
and neighborhood residents attempted to tackle was the lack of material needs of those 
living in destitute poverty. She gathered a group of members from the two churches in the 
neighborhood and organized a collection and distribution system providing food and 
clothing to families in need. Clothing was a particular concern once Pollack realized that 
many families were not sending their children to school because they did not have 
adequate clothing for them. Pollack also set up a tutoring project in her home and began 
organizing recreational activities in which schoolchildren could take part after school and 
on weekends. To meet the needs of a group of unemployed women, she set up a training 
center in which neighborhood women taught each other secretarial and other office 
skills.34 
After spending the first few months trying to provide much needed services in the 
neighborhood, Pollack began modifying her philosophy and tactics to attack poverty in a 
more direct way. Like Hayward, Pollack came to believe that only through community 
organizing could any real positive changes occur in her neighborhood. Accordingly, she 
arranged meetings of neighborhood residents to discuss their common interests and make 
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decisions about actions to take. One of these actions was the organized protest of the 
Houston School Board. Through community organizing and the achievement of small 
victories, Pollack hoped to help empower poor residents to take control of their own 
lives. In addition to organizing protests to address specific neighborhood problems, 
Pollack also tried to unite residents to make a concerted effort to gain power. While 
organizing residents to protest, Pollack discovered that there was mutual dislike and 
distrust between Mexican Americans in her neighborhood and African Americans living 
in surrounding areas. Pollack quickly realized that only a united community of poor 
residents could effectively challenge the institutions that had such a profound effect on 
their lives. To encourage a more united community in the Fifth Ward, Pollack focused 
much of her energy toward alleviating tensions between the Mexican American 
population in her immediate vicinity and the African American population in the 
surrounding neighborhoods. At the local community center on the edge of her 
neighborhood, which was frequented mostly by young African Americans, Pollack 
organized a fiesta event to bring members of the two groups together and open channels 
of communication. She also included black residents who lived close to the Mexican 
American neighborhood in the organizational meetings in order to get a wide array of 
perspectives on what needed to be done, and she helped ease the tension created when an 
African American family bought a house in the Mexican American neighborhood by 
scheduling discussion groups where residents had an opportunity to air their particular 
concerns. This was a clear attempt by Pollack to bridge racial divides within the 
community and organize residents along class lines. As she told an interviewer, 
improving relations between the two groups would "show them that they will both gain if 
they work together."35 
Whether the designers of the War on Poverty intended it or not, Pollack saw no 
way of addressing issues of poverty without taking race and racism into consideration 
simultaneously with economic factors, and this determination ultimately meant 
challenging the white power structure. While Pollack claimed that she had no 
preconceived intentions of becoming involved in local politics, increasingly she saw her 
role as one of initiator of organized action on behalf of poor residents in order to show 
them how to attain "real power" to challenge the "white establishment." While she 
entered Houston's Fifth Ward determined to provide services to poor residents, her on-
the-ground experiences convinced her that community organization and empowerment of 
the poor were the most effective avenues through which to attack the ills of poverty. 
Stuart Buman and Donald Szeszycki were two VISTAS assigned to an area in 
northwest Houston known as South Heights, a rather oddly placed low-income and 
predominantly African American area surrounded by a white middle-class neighborhood 
on the north side and River Oaks on the south side, one of the wealthiest areas in the 
entire city. Buman was a graduate of the University of North Dakota with a degree in 
public administration who was especially interested in politics and social problems, and 
Szeszycki was a high school graduate from Chicago who had spent the previous year in 
the United States Army stationed in Germany. Buman and Szeszycki, like other VISTAs 
in Houston, attempted to establish service programs in their target neighborhoods such as 
tutoring and recreation centers. They quickly realized, however, that residents had no 
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desire for those types of services. Neighborhood residents were suffering from chronic 
unemployment and underemployment, and they wanted Buman and Szeszycki to help 
with this most pressing problem of poverty.37 
Unlike the Fifth Ward where the major employment problem was not a lack of 
jobs but a lack of skilled and well-paying jobs, in South Heights the biggest issue was 
persistent unemployment. Buman and Szeszycki began a recruiting effort for the Job 
Corps in their neighborhood as a way to channel unemployed workers into training 
programs that would prepare them for skilled jobs in Houston's factories and plants. The 
VISTA volunteers also created job training facilities to provide typing, general office, 
and secretarial skills, and they assisted the neighborhood residents open an employment 
club for teenagers to find work outside of school hours to supplement their family 
incomes. Buman and Szeszycki also initiated a neighborhood clean-up project, a voter 
registration and education drive, a campaign for the construction and funding of a public 
health facility, and a neighborhood center that would serve as a staffed day care center for 
working parents. Only by living in the target neighborhood and ascertaining what types 
of programs residents wanted could these VISTAs initiate service programs that residents 
would approve of.38 
Like Hayward and Pollack, Buman and Szeszycki quickly concluded that the 
delivery of services alone was inadequate for solving the problems of poverty. Soon after 
they initiated these modest service programs they began receiving criticism from a wide 
array of established interests in the neighborhood. This criticism came from traditional 
charities that wanted to continue their discriminatory practices, middle-class 
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organizations like the Heights Community Council whose members felt their authority 
threatened, a conservative city councilman who represented the area and was fearful of 
political organizing, middle-class business interests who were paranoid about possible 
demonstrations and boycotts, and even Houston Action for Youth leaders who wanted 
their organization to be the sole poverty agency in the neighborhood. All of this 
resistance from established interests in South Heights convinced Buman and Szeszycki 
that poor residents must organize and use their power to attack the effects of poverty on 
their daily lives. And like Winifred Pollack, Buman and Szeszycki worked to ease racial 
tensions between the black children in their neighborhood and the white children in the 
adjacent areas by organizing mutual sports and recreational events and community 
meetings. By creating lines of communication between the children, Buman and Szeszcki 
hoped to bridge the racial divisions between their parents and create biracial alliances 
based on class.39 
By the end of 1966, Poteat and EF-LAC project activists were supervising more 
than twenty VISTA volunteers in the city. VISTA volunteers in other parts of Houston 
contributed to the operation of Head Start centers and other tutoring programs, taught 
classes to help Latin American immigrants on their way to obtaining American 
citizenship, and administered youth education programs. One volunteer, a registered 
nurse, opened a free health clinic funded by donations from area businesses, while 
another VISTA created a public information center and held voter education classes that 
focused on local issues that were important to area residents. Finally, all of the VISTA 
Gipson, "Report," HCHR VISTA Collection. 
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volunteers working with the EF-LAC project began organizing neighborhood residents in 
order to empower them to claim a voice in the decisions that affected their lives.40 
In Houston, a broad range of ideas and philosophies shaped the intellectual 
ground upon which the War on Poverty operated. This local ideological environment 
included Prophetic Christianity, religious ideas about Christian missions in the nation's 
urban centers, ecumenism, participatory democracy, and the Saul Alinsky method, all of 
which were outside the paradigm of New Deal-Great Society liberalism that shaped 
national policy. Yet these ideas were integral to the implementation of the federal 
antipoverty program in Houston and therefore defined the War on Poverty just as much 
as the moderate liberalism that drove national policymakers. The story of the 
implementation of the War on Poverty in Houston offers further proof of the importance 
of the local context, particularly in the realm of ideas. 
Although the EF-LAC project was small and meagerly funded, Poteat and 
grassroots antipoverty activists were able to create a local intellectual and political 
environment conducive to a radical interpretation of the community action concept. In so 
doing, they provided an important model for how the War on Poverty could be 
implemented in Houston that differed sharply from the vision offered by local public 
officials and the conservative members of the city's official community action agency. In 
fact, this alternative interpretation of the concept of community action offered by Poteat 
and other grassroots antipoverty activists had an immediate effect on the official 
community action agency in Houston. Initially the majority of H-HCEOO Board 
members had conservatively interpreted the meaning of community action. Once Poteat 
and grassroots activists affiliated with the EF-LAC project began implementing their own 
40
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vision of what the War on Poverty could become in the city of Houston, however, several 
members of the H-HCEOO Board took notice. And when William Ballew, himself a 
believer in the Saul Alinsky method and very much impressed with Poteat's use of 
VISTA volunteers in Houston, assumed the chairmanship of H-HCEOO, the War on 
Poverty in the city took a decidedly more radical turn. 
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Chapter 3 
Implementing a Radical Vision for the Community Action Program: 
William Ballew and the Saul Alinsky Method in Houston, 1966-1967 
If the first twelve months of the War on Poverty in Houston had been little more 
than a minor skirmish, the year 1966 proved to be a much more eventful and conflict-
ridden episode. Precipitating this dramatic shift was a change in the leadership of the 
Houston-Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization (H-HCEOO), the city's 
official community action agency. William Ballew, a prominent Houston attorney with a 
reputation of being a champion of the rights of the city's underprivileged population, 
replaced Leon Jaworski as board chairman in January. This change in leadership ushered 
in a new direction for the organization because of Ballew's radical interpretation of the 
concept of community action. Following the example set by Reverend Wallace B. Poteat 
and grassroots antipoverty activists affiliated with the Ecumenical Fellowship's Latin 
American Channel (EF-LAC) project, Ballew placed heavy emphasis on community 
organization and empowerment of the poor in order to challenge the local public officials 
and institutional bureaucracies and upset the status quo that kept poor residents locked in 
a cycle of poverty. Ballew and his supporters in H-HCEOO began implementing a radical 
Community Action Program in Houston through a three-pronged attack on poverty that 
included the creation of a robust Legal Services program in the city, the expansion of 
crucial social service programs in many of Houston's poor neighborhoods, and, most 
importantly, a clear focus on organizing poor residents to challenge local officials and 
institutions in an effort to bring about lasting social change in the city. Meanwhile, 
Houston Action for Youth (HAY) leaders continued to implement their conservative 
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interpretation of community action by focusing on the delivery of small-scale social 
services through the city's traditional welfare agencies and refusing to entertain any 
suggestion of organizing residents or challenging the status quo. By the spring of 1967, 
OEO officials were clearly favoring Ballew's approach to community action and 
encouraging H-HCEOO members to continue its application in Houston. 
The radical direction the War on Poverty took in Houston beginning in 1966 
showed that local circumstances continued to dictate the shape and contours of the 
federal antipoverty program. For a brief moment between the fall of 1966 and the spring 
of 1967, grassroots antipoverty activists in Houston were able to shape national War on 
Poverty policies by implementing their own radical interpretation of the community 
action concept and locating sympathetic allies in Washington. Ballew and other H-
HCEOO members implemented a radical Community Action Program that called for the 
organization and empowerment of Houston's poor communities, and this approach 
showed some encouraging signs of effectiveness in forcing the city's public officials and 
local institutions to begin responding to the demands of poor residents. While HAY 
leaders continued carrying out a conservative vision of community action, Ballew and his 
staff were proving that if given the chance to succeed, a radical Community Action 
Program could be effective in winning some small victories in the fight against poverty. 
Armed with a radical ideology that placed human rights above property rights and called 
for the empowerment of the poor, Ballew and other H-HCEOO members not only 
challenged HAY's conservative approach to community action and the local power 
structure's resistance to change, but also exposed the fallacies and naivete of the liberal 
dream of a War on Poverty that would neither challenge entrenched middle-class interests 
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nor confront city governments or other pillars of local power. By illustrating very vividly 
that the problems of the poor were often structural and institutional in nature, H-HCEOO 
leaders, through their implementation of a radical interpretation of the community action 
concept, showed that confrontational tactics could be effective in addressing the needs of 
the poor. 
The first step in the transition of H-HCEOO into a radical community action 
agency was the change in leadership that occurred in January 1966. Leon Jaworski made 
it clear to Houston Mayor Louie Welch and Harris County Judge Bill Elliott when the 
two men approached him to head up the city's new antipoverty organization in 1965 that 
due to his rather busy schedule, he would only be able to assist in getting the new agency 
started. Jaworski told the mayor and the county judge that once the H-HCEOO Executive 
Committee named the members of the Board of Directors and the organization became 
operational, he would resign as chairman in order to pursue other activities. In early 
January 1966 Jaworski was satisfied that H-HCEOO was operating effectively, and as 
promised, he tendered his resignation to Welch and Elliott. President Johnson had 
recently appointed Jaworski to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, and Texas Governor John Connally had appointed him to his 
committee on public education in the state. Because of these added responsibilities, in his 
resignation letter the 61-year-old Jaworski asked to be immediately relieved of his duties 
as chairman of H-HCEOO.1 
1
 Leon Jaworski to Louie Welch and Bill Elliott, 10 January 1966, Box 265, Folder Houston-Harris County 
Economic Opportunity Organization - Correspondence, Leon Jaworski Papers, Texas Collection, Baylor 
University Library, Waco, Texas (hereafter cited as Jaworski Papers); Leon Jaworski to Houston-Harris 
County Economic Opportunity Organization Board of Directors, 10 January 1966, Box 265, Folder 
Houston-Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization - Correspondence, Jaworski Papers; Noe 
Perez, "Jaworski Quits Local Antipoverty Group," Houston Chronicle, January 11, 1966; Bo Byers, 
"Jaworski to Head Group To Study Texas Education," Houston Chronicle, January 6, 1966. 
98 
Jaworski's resignation brought Houston attorney William Ballew into the position 
of H-HCEOO chairman and signaled dramatic changes for the poverty program in the 
city. Ballew had been a member of the Houston Community Council's Board of Directors 
for several years and had chaired the organization's task force that studied the 
possibilities of implementing the Economic Opportunity Act in Houston in 1965. The 
Community Council appointed Ballew as the first vice-chairman of the antipoverty 
committee created for the city in 1965, and when Jaworski resigned in January 1966, 
Ballew was the logical choice for his successor. Not only did he have ample experience 
with welfare and antipoverty efforts in the city, but Ballew was also an early advocate 
among Community Council members for the implementation of the new federal War on 
Poverty in Houston and had remained a strong proponent of an active antipoverty 
program in the city. The composition of the H-HCEOO Board and Executive Committee 
also changed at the beginning of 1966 as some of the wealthier and more conservative 
members resigned and Ballew replaced them with poor residents from the target 
neighborhoods. For example, George Bush resigned from the H-HCEOO Board in mid-
January in order to launch his campaign to capture the Republican Party's nomination for 
Congress representing the newly created Seventh Congressional District on the west side 
of Houston. As a federal inspector commented about the new leadership of the poverty 
program in Houston, "the course and pace of Houston's War on Poverty may have 
changed for the better." The next few years would indicate that whether or not the 
changes Ballew brought to the War on Poverty in the city were viewed with acclaim or 
hostility depended on one's philosophy for attacking poverty; this proved to be a 
contentious issue in both Houston and Washington.2 
2
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99 
Though observers of the War on Poverty in Houston would be divided over how 
the programs developed over the next several years, there was one issue on which almost 
everyone involved could agree in early 1966 - the election of William Ballew as the new 
head of H-HCEOO certainly meant a dramatic shift in the focus and direction of the War 
on Poverty in Houston. While most of the early H-HCEOO organizers appointed by city 
officials had a conservative interpretation of community action and were cautious about 
maximum feasible participation of the poor, Ballew firmly believed that community 
organization and mobilization with the goal of empowerment of the poor to challenge the 
city's elected officials and institutions were the most important parts of the War on 
Poverty. This was fundamentally a different definition of community action from the one 
adopted by Jaworski and other H-HCEOO members when they created the organization 
the previous year. It is doubtful that very many of these conservative members of the H-
HCEOO Board were aware of Ballew's radical political views because they unanimously 
elected Ballew to replace Jaworski. They would find out soon enough exactly what the 
new chairman had in mind for the War on Poverty in Houston.3 
The story of Houston's official community action agency illustrates that terms 
such as "community action" and "maximum feasible participation of the poor" had no 
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real meaning outside of the local context in which the War on Poverty was implemented. 
Federal legislators and War on Poverty policymakers ambiguously defined these terms, 
and as a consequence grassroots implementers of the poverty program were responsible 
for interpreting the meanings of these concepts and for giving them clear definitions for 
local foot soldiers in the poverty war. When Mayor Welch and County Judge Elliott 
created Houston's first incarnation of the city's community action agency in 1965, it was 
clear that the two men interpreted these concepts very narrowly and intended to keep the 
War on Poverty small and focused on improving the city's infrastructure and delivering a 
few social services. Leon Jaworski, H-HCEOO's first chairman, agreed with Welch and 
Elliott's assessment, and for the first few months of the poverty war members of the 
city's community action agency simply gathered data and had no intention of expanding 
the War on Poverty beyond Welch's and Elliott's narrow vision. William Ballew had a 
radically different interpretation of the meaning of concepts like "community action" and 
"maximum feasible participation," and his tenure as H-HCEOO chairman provides 
further evidence that the local context in Houston, particularly the grassroots intellectual 
environment that existed in the city, profoundly determined the shape of the War on 
Poverty. 
As soon as Ballew took over as H-HCEOO chairman, it became apparent that not 
only did he have a radically different interpretation of community action, but like Poteat 
and EF-LAC project activists, he was also a believer in the Saul Alinsky method. To 
remove any doubt about his antipoverty philosophy and commitment to community 
organizing, Ballew required that all H-HCEOO Board members carefully read Alinsky's 
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Reveille for Radicals, a book published in 1946 that laid out Alinsky's blueprint for the 
organization of poor communities to challenge urban power structures. 
In February 1966, one month into Ballew's tenure as head of H-HCEOO, Alinsky 
brought his radical message directly to Houston's poverty workers when he spoke on the 
campus of the University of Houston about his experiences organizing several poor 
communities and how these organizational tactics could be used in the federal War on 
Poverty. The main shortcoming of the national antipoverty effort, according to Alinsky, 
was that it "looks at deprivation only in terms of money and not of power. . . . To expect 
to funnel federal funds through local administrations is like giving an employer money to 
funnel into the organization of labor unions that someday might strike against him." 
Alinsky argued that the only way to make the War on Poverty successful in eradicating 
poverty in Houston was to organize poor people into powerful blocs that could confront 
the city's public officials and force them to address the needs of impoverished 
neighborhoods. Apparently this suggestion that poor people should organize to claim 
power and control over their own lives was too much for some audience members to 
withstand. After just a few minutes of Alinsky's speech, one woman in the front row 
jumped out of her seat and shouted, "Well, that's enough for me!" and walked out of the 
auditorium. About twenty-five others followed her, including about a dozen Ku Klux 
Klan members in full regalia. When asked about Alinsky's visit a few days later, Mayor 
Welch stated, "I don't think extreme philosophies of either side are needed in this 
community. Any philosophy which sets class against class is, in my opinion, un-
4
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American." Ballew undoubtedly faced an uphill battle in following the Alinsky model of 
community organizing in Houston.5 
In the spring and summer of 1966, Ballew personally launched a public relations 
campaign in Houston to explain how the Alinsky method would be applied to the 
implementation of the War on Poverty in the city. During a speech delivered to a group 
of Houston businessmen during the summer of 1966, Ballew echoed Alinsky's 
sentiments and argued that the grassroots antipoverty activists were "fast replacing the 
Civil Rights movement as the number one domestic effort of our people." Ballew 
continued, "Its basic concept is radical, yes, even revolutionary; but so was the beginning 
and the development of our American democracy and economy. . . . Recall the labor 
movement in America. Most manufacturers did not improve wages and working 
conditions until workers in America organized and became a political and economic force 
in our country." Ballew argued that just like the labor movement, poor people in the 
United States must be organized to put pressure on and if necessary to force 
confrontations with the city's local elected officials to make sure their needs are 
addressed. For this reason, argued Ballew, "the war on poverty cannot be a mere 
extension of existing social and welfare programs. Existing agencies, for all their decent 
efforts and good intentions, were not getting through to the poor." Instead, Ballew 
pledged that H-HCEOO would encourage poor people themselves to plan, develop, and 
implement antipoverty programs in their own communities, even though this plan was 
"not necessarily welcomed by existing power structures." This goal would be reached 
through community organization, a tactic Ballew referred to as "our single most 
5
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important program. This is more than an extension of social and welfare services; it is a 
new departure - it is grass roots involvement of the poor in their own programs and 
decisions in connection with meeting their needs in the community. . . . When these 
people meet in their civic organizations and clubs, get to know each other and articulate 
their needs, requests are bound to be made upon the county courthouse, the city hall for 
services, etc. As labor organizers in the 20s and 30s were labeled agitators, or worse, 
community organizers today in the war on poverty may be likewise reviled. If we are 
wise, we will exercise extreme patience and understanding while these people go about 
their work." 
Ballew was committed to the Saul Alinsky method and to a confrontational 
antipoverty philosophy, but he still needed a way to turn the War on Poverty into a 
vehicle for social change in the city. As he was searching for a way to implement his 
vision in Houston, Ballew increasingly turned to Reverend Poteat and the EF-LAC 
project activists who were using federal VISTA volunteers to organize the poor. Near the 
end of September 1966, Ballew arranged an informal meeting between himself, Poteat 
and other EF-LAC project activists, and their recently arrived VISTA volunteers. Ballew 
reported being struck by the effectiveness of the city's VISTA volunteers who, after 
being in the city for only a few months, were organizing residents around important 
issues and empowering them to make demands on local officials and institutions. While 
H-HCEOO's current community organizers were mostly social workers who traveled 
daily into Houston's poor neighborhoods and were under strict supervision from the H-
HCEOO Board, the VISTA volunteers lived in the neighborhoods where they worked 
6
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and enjoyed the freedom to pursue courses of action they deemed necessary for the 
empowerment of the residents. The result was a suspicion of H-HCEOO community 
organizers, while residents seemed to trust the VISTA volunteers. Ballew concluded that 
"we are doing it precisely wrong" and that H-HCEOO administrators must reevaluate the 
purpose of the organization and the role of their community organizers.7 
After witnessing how Poteat and EF-LAC activists were using the VISTA 
program to bring about social change in Houston, Ballew decided to commit the majority 
of H-HCEOO's resources to the organization and empowerment of Houston's poor. In 
early November 1966, Ballew sent a confidential memorandum to H-HCEOO Executive 
Director Charles Kelly in which he stated, "Since money . . . is not only in short supply 
but is also restricted in many cases, our effective area of operation is in community 
organization, development and action. Our primary effort, I repeat, is in the 
neighborhoods and our primary responsibility is placing good people there as community 
organizers and neighborhood developers. This is essential." Just like the VISTA 
volunteers in the city, Ballew argued that H-HCEOO community organizers should live 
in Houston's poor neighborhoods with the residents they were attempting to empower 
through community organization. Community organizers, therefore, should be chosen 
based on whether or not they could commit to this new focus. "This requires a special 
commitment," Ballew continued, "not normally found in some social worker types who 
want a good paying job and spend too much time protecting that job. In the war on 
poverty, we are all expendable." Like the VISTA program, Ballew also advised giving 
individual community organizers as much freedom as possible to carry out their efforts. 
7
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"Once we have good people working in the neighborhoods," Ballew stated, "we should 
give them as much independence and responsibility as possible." The ultimate goal, 
according to Ballew, was to get community organizing activities initiated quickly in order 
to begin empowering the poor to make demands on the public officials and local 
institutions that affected their daily lives.8 
As Ballew laid out his plans for the course of the War on Poverty in Houston, and 
particularly after he saw how Poteat and EF-LAC project activists were using VISTA 
volunteers, he remained steadfast in his commitment to Alinsky-style community 
organization and maximum feasible participation of the poor despite some opposition. 
Although some conflict did arise with other board members, Ballew was able to lead H-
HCEOO in a more activist direction focused on organizing poor communities to 
challenge the city's public officials primarily because he located an important ally in the 
regional OEO office. William Crook, regional director of the southwest division of OEO 
and who would later become national director of the VISTA program in 1967, strongly 
supported the use of community organizing and favored more activist community action 
agencies like the one Ballew was trying to build in Houston. Ballew arranged for Crook 
to speak at H-HCEOO's first annual dinner meeting in 1966, and Crook used the 
occasion to highlight the centrality of the Community Action Program to the overall War 
on Poverty in cities like Houston. Though the program had come under fire from mayors 
of some of the nation's largest cities, and despite the fact that Welch had tried to avoid 
creating a community action agency in Houston, Crook argued that community action 
"contains whatever hope we have for a successful conclusion to the war on poverty." In 
response to those who opposed the idea of community organization, Crook pointed out 
8
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that it was the only part of the federal antipoverty effort that attempted to restore the 
initiative to local citizens and for this reason should be welcomed rather than feared. 
According to Crook, the ideas fueling the Community Action Program, including the 
prospect of organizing and empowering the poor, "is as valid a form of democratic 
decision [making] as the Constitution of the United States. It is as much a part of the 
tradition of this land as the old New England town meetings. . . . It is the philosophy of a 
free people applied practically to a local situation." Rather than bowing to the irrational 
fears of local politicians, Crook implored those present at the H-HCEOO meeting to 
expand the Community Action Program and the use of community organization in 
Houston and use it to bring about lasting change in the city's poor communities.9 
Effecting lasting social change in Houston's poor communities was, of course, 
Ballew's ultimate and abiding goal throughout his time as H-HCEOO chairman, and he 
attempted to realize this goal in three significant ways between the spring of 1966 and the 
spring of 1967. First, Ballew placed heavy emphasis on the establishment of a Legal 
Services program for the poor in Houston because he firmly believed the legal system 
was one of the best vehicles for empowering poor residents. Second, he sought the 
expansion of those social services he believed were absolutely necessary for a decent 
standard of living in the city's poor neighborhoods and were also capable of bringing 
about institutional reform. Finally, and most importantly, Ballew redirected H-HCEOO's 
board and staff toward a clear focus on community organizing in an effort to empower 
poor Houston citizens to confront local institutions and the city's public officials. 
9
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Through this three-pronged attack on the root causes of poverty, Ballew hoped to effect 
lasting change in Houston. 
Upon taking control of the Community Action Program in Houston, Ballew made 
it a priority to assist in the creation of a massive and far-reaching Legal Services program 
in the city. H-HCEOO officials designated the Houston Legal Foundation as the delegate 
agency to administer the Legal Services program. After the Supreme Court began 
handing down a series of decisions in the early 1960s upholding the rights of citizens 
accused of a crime to be provided an attorney if they were unable to afford one, a group 
of Houston attorneys began raising money to create an organization that would provide 
attorneys free of charge to needy Houstonians. After securing a sizeable grant from the 
Ford Foundation, these attorneys formed the Houston Legal Foundation to operate a 
public defender program in the city and named retired District Judge Sam Johnson as the 
organization's director. By the spring of 1966 Johnson was able to secure a service 
commitment from more than 3,000 attorneys in the city, enabling the Houston Legal 
Foundation to begin providing legal defense to Houston residents who were without the 
means of hiring a lawyer.10 
It quickly became apparent to members of the Houston Legal Foundation, 
however, that a significant number of Houston's poor residents had not been charged 
with any crime but desperately needed legal assistance of a civil nature. Director Sam 
Johnson began exploring the idea of creating a civil division that would supply attorneys 
to poor residents in civil cases involving divorce and child custody issues, property 
10
 John Moore, "Houston Lawyers' Plan to Defend Poor Watched," Houston Post, May 1, 1966; Dick 
Raycraft, "Legal Aid Available for Needy," Houston Chronicle, February 13, 1966. This series of Supreme 
Court decisions included Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), Massiah v. United States (1964), and Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966). 
108 
disputes, and consumer credit problems. More than doubling the number of clients the 
Houston Legal Foundation would serve required a substantial increase in the level of 
funding, and Johnson decided to seek War on Poverty money through the newly created 
Legal Services division to accomplish his goal of expanding the foundation's services in 
Houston. In March 1966 Johnson submitted a request for $700,000 to OEO to initiate the 
Houston Legal Foundation's civil law division and begin providing legal services to all of 
the city's poor residents who were in need." 
Ballew was very enthusiastic about bringing the Houston Legal Foundation into 
the city's War on Poverty during the spring of 1966, and over the next year he worked to 
make the foundation live up to his vision of using the War on Poverty to empower 
Houston's poor. First and foremost, however, the Houston Legal Foundation would 
provide an important service to those living in poverty. The poor seldom had access to 
legal counsel, advice, or representation in cases involving divorce, child custody, and 
other domestic legal issues. Attorneys working through the Houston Legal Foundation 
would help remedy this situation by providing free legal services in neighborhood law 
centers. Ballew certainly understood the value of providing these much needed legal 
services in Houston's poor neighborhoods, but even more attractive was the potential of 
the Houston Legal Foundation to empower the city's poor residents. By providing legal 
educational programs and attorneys who could help the poor initiate lawsuits, the 
Houston Legal Foundation could help level the playing field when it came to legal 
matters. For example, the Houston Legal Foundation could make poor residents more 
aware of their legal rights and provide attorneys to represent the poor in their dealings 
with landlords, the local welfare office, the police, local businesses, employers, and any 
" Donnie Moore, "Legal Aid Fund for Poor OK'd," Houston Post, April 26, 1966. 
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other individual or institution affecting their lives. As Ballew recognized, in addition to 
providing an important service, the Houston Legal Foundation could also contribute to 
empowering the poor to deal more equally with the city's public officials and institutions. 
And as the program grew larger and as poor neighborhoods became more politically 
organized, the Houston Legal Foundation could also pursue institutional reform through 
the legal system. 
The Houston Legal Foundation's application for OEO funding laid out plans for 
one the most far reaching legal services programs in the entire country. Clinton 
Bamberger, national director of OEO's Legal Services Program, commented on the 
foundation's funding application during an address he delivered to the southwest regional 
OEO office in March 1966. Bamberger told his audience that attorneys working in 
conjunction with legal services programs around the country not only provided legal aid 
to poor citizens but also served as agents of change in their communities. He stated, 
"Some may think it curious to consider lawyers as leaders of what may be called a social 
revolution. Yet no role could be more true to the traditions of our profession. It is and has 
been for centuries the task of lawyers to change the status quo. It is fallacious to think of 
lawyers as guardians of tradition. Rather, we are the guardians and watchdogs of orderly 
change. . . . Lawyers have been the architects - as well as the artisans - of social reform; 
to redesign, reform and create not only legal institutions but social, economic and 
political institutions as well." Bamberger praised the Houston Legal Foundation for living 
up to these expectations and reminded his audience that in order for the Houston program 
to be successful, the attorneys "must be free to challenge even the local government and 
the community action agency if the cause warrants and the client's interest demands." 
110 
Bamberger was confident that Houston's program would become "one of the most 
comprehensive and extensive programs in the country." These statements undoubtedly 
bolstered Ballew's confidence in the Houston Legal Foundation because Bamberger 
shared his vision of a strong Legal Services program in Houston that could potentially 
upset the city's traditional balance of power by providing a more equal footing for the 
poor in the legal arena.12 
With Ballew's assistance and encouragement, the Houston Legal Foundation 
quickly established an extensive Legal Services program in Houston. OEO approved the 
foundation's application in April 1966 and granted the organization more than $700,000 
to create its proposed civil law division. According to the plan, the public defender 
program would continue to be funded by the grant from the Ford Foundation, but the two 
programs would work in conjunction with each other. Once the Houston Legal 
Foundation had received the funds, members began establishing neighborhood law 
centers in several of the target communities in the city. Although the foundation began 
with only three neighborhood centers, over the course of the next several months the 
Houston Legal Foundation established a law center in each of H-HCEOO's target 
neighborhoods with two attorneys assigned to each center. According to Judge Johnson, 
the attorneys working for the Houston Legal Foundation were allowed to accept any civil 
case whatsoever except for personal injury lawsuits, which were fee generating cases that 
a private attorney would most likely accept. The only other limitation was that the person 
12
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receiving legal aid from the Houston Legal Foundation must be considered living below 
the poverty level. Houston Legal Foundation attorneys envisioned themselves accepting 
cases involving disputes with landlords, unfair contracts for home repairs, adverse rulings 
on Social Security and welfare benefits, and an array of other cases where the relative 
powerlessness of poor residents would otherwise hamper their ability to resolve these 
legal issues in a satisfactory way.13 
By the fall of 1966 the Houston Legal Foundation had accepted more than 700 of 
these types of cases. In September, however, the Houston Legal Foundation reached a 
turning point in the development of the Legal Services program in the city when local 
circumstances forced attorneys to decide whether they would become a catalyst for social 
change in Houston. The question that prompted this development was whether Houston 
Legal Foundation attorneys would be allowed to handle civil rights cases. As Houston's 
public schools reopened that fall, Mrs. Melvyn Davis and her school-aged son Darrell 
walked into a Houston Legal Foundation neighborhood office and complained that the 
Houston Independent School District had not allowed the black student to attend a 
predominantly white school in the city, despite recent court rulings ordering Houston's 
public schools to desegregate. Davis wanted to sue the school district to allow her son to 
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attend the school that year, but attorneys at the neighborhood center soon discovered that 
she earned too much income to qualify for free legal services through the foundation. The 
attorneys subsequently turned down her case for that reason, but the matter was 
complicated a few days later when HLF Director Judge Johnson reviewed the denial of 
services. Johnson stated to the press that even if the mother had qualified for free legal 
services, attorneys at the neighborhood center would have refused this particular case 
because national legal services program requirements and federal War on Poverty 
policies forbade the Houston Legal Foundation from accepting cases involving alleged 
civil rights violations. Johnson reasoned that since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the 
United States Attorney General the authority to initiate lawsuits of this kind and since the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 prevented any War on Poverty agency from 
duplicating the duties or services of other government agencies, the Houston Legal 
Foundation could not legally prosecute civil rights cases because that would indeed be a 
duplication of services and duties.14 
Judge Johnson's pronouncement to the Houston press set off a flurry of activity 
among War on Poverty officials in the southwest regional office and in Washington, and 
it was undoubtedly an unsettling development in Ballew's effort to use the Houston Legal 
Foundation to bring about social change in Houston. The issue finally reached the desk of 
14
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Anthony Partridge, Deputy General Counsel for OEO in Washington, in October. 
Partridge disagreed with Judge Johnson and offered his legal opinion that the Economic 
Opportunity Act did not prevent local legal services programs from accepting civil rights 
cases because the clause of the act in question only prohibited the duplication of services 
offered by the federal government. The Houston Legal Foundation, however, was a 
private nonprofit organization, and despite the fact that it received funding from the 
federal government, it was not technically a federal agency. The national OEO office 
forwarded Partridge's opinion to Southwest OEO Regional Director William Crook, who 
notified Judge Johnson and other members of the Houston Legal Foundation that their 
organization should indeed accept cases involving civil rights laws. OEO officials in 
Washington stressed that the situation in Houston had received national media attention 
and that the outcome would have consequences for legal services programs all over the 
country. In response, Crook informed Ballew that not only was the Houston Legal 
Foundation allowed to accept civil rights cases, but the organization's attorneys were in 
fact required to accept these cases to fulfill their obligations under War on Poverty 
guidelines. Judge Johnson agreed to comply, but it was evident he was bristling under 
this latest criticism. "It's like being a bird dog," Johnson said of leading the Houston 
Legal Foundation in the wake of the civil rights controversy. "If you get too far ahead of 
the hunter, you get shot. If you stay too close, you get kicked." Despite Johnson's 
uneasiness and much to Ballew's satisfaction, Houston Legal Foundation attorneys were 
further encouraged to act as agents of change rather than restrict themselves to handling 
only cases of family law.15 
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By the beginning of 1967, the Houston Legal Foundation seemed to be off to a 
promising start toward fulfilling Ballew's hopes for a Legal Services program in Houston 
that could not only provide important services to the poor, but also possessed the 
potential to bring about social change in Houston. In just a few months, the Houston 
Legal Foundation had opened eight neighborhood law offices in the city's poor 
neighborhoods, served hundreds of clients, initiated a legal education program, and 
opened the door to pursuing civil rights cases to speed the pace of school desegregation 
in the city. The fiasco over whether or not Houston Legal Foundation attorneys could 
accept these kinds of cases, however, should have indicated to Ballew that the H-HCEOO 
Board would need to keep pressuring Houston's Legal Services administration to 
continue pursuing cases that had the potential to empower the poor. Without this pressure 
and support from Houston's community action agency, the Houston Legal Foundation 
might not be as willing to pursue such a confrontational strategy.16 
After successfully initiating an active Legal Services program in Houston through 
the Houston Legal Foundation, Ballew turned his attention to the second component of 
his vision for the Community Action Program in the city - the expansion of services in 
poor neighborhoods that both were needed to ensure a decent standard of living and also 
had the potential to encourage institutional reform. Ballew first worked to expand the 
Head Start program in the city. During the previous year the small and relatively 
unorganized Head Start program administered by Houston Action for Youth and the 
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Neighborhood Centers Association was able to show some positive results despite the 
uncoordinated nature of the operation. A team of researchers from the University of 
Texas in Austin published a study in February 1966 in which they compared low-income 
first-grade students in several Houston elementary schools who had participated in a 
Head Start program the previous summer with similar students who had not been enrolled 
in a Head Start center. The results showed that those first-graders who had been 
participants in the Houston Head Start program exhibited great improvement in reasoning 
skills, social competence, and verbal knowledge. Dr. Alberta Baines, the Houston school 
official who administered part of the Head Start program the previous summer, 
commented on the report by stating, "The evidence is in classrooms in our district this 
year. We have noted great change in both the children and their parents when compared 
with those who did not choose to participate in Head Start last summer. I believe it is fact 
to say that the average IQs of our children in the program were raised several points and I 
am convinced that at least 40 percent - 1200 of 3000 in Houston public school classes -
moved toward the middle class level in classroom performance." Now that the city of 
Houston had a central community action agency in H-HCEOO, many Head Start 
proponents were hopeful for a more organized program for the summer of 1966 that 
would reach many more underprivileged preschoolers in Houston.17 
Ballew undoubtedly recognized the potential for institutional reform that Head 
Start offered. Not only did the preschool program provide an important educational 
service to low-income families, but it also held possibilities for educational reform in 
Houston's schools, particularly with regard to desegregation efforts. Federal program 
guidelines prohibited racial segregation in Head Start centers, and since most of the 
17
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centers were located in Houston public school buildings, many local reformers hoped to 
use Head Start to expose the irrationality of attempts to keep the city's schools 
segregated. Armed with the report showing the success of the Head Start program in 
Houston, Ballew and other supporters persuaded the city's school board to approve a plan 
that nearly doubled the capacity for the number of students who would be able to enroll 
in Head Start during the summer of 1966. Members of the H-HCEOO Board of Directors 
and the Houston school board collaborated on a plan for an expanded program that would 
reach more than 6,000 preschool age children in sixty schools all across the city and 
county. Though several OEO officials in Washington expressed some reservations about 
using the Head Start program to promote desegregation efforts in Houston, Southwest 
Regional OEO Director William Crook convinced the national office to approve H-
HCEOO's $1.4 million Head Start funding request by pointing to Mayor Welch's recent 
display of goodwill toward the poverty program in Houston, the apparent restiveness of 
residents of the target areas anxious to see concrete programs implemented in their 
neighborhoods, and Sargent Shriver's pending visit to Houston. In early June OEO 
announced its approval of H-HCEOO's request, and the Head Start program was once 
again underway in Houston. As with the Legal Services program, the success of using 
Head Start to encourage reform in Houston's educational system and to promote 
desegregation efforts depended on reformers like Ballew keeping the pressure on the 
local school board and on local Head Start administrators.18 
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Contrary to the charge Ballew's critics later leveled at H-HCEOO that the 
organization completely neglected social service programs in Houston, Ballew and the H-
HCEOO Board expanded some programs in several of Houston's poor neighborhoods 
that they deemed vital to the overall War on Poverty effort in the city. Ballew attempted 
to take seriously all elements of the community action concept, and a significant part of 
community action was the expansion and coordination of social services available to the 
poor. In March 1966 OEO approved funding for a parent education program to be 
administered by H-HCEOO and Houston's Family and Children's Service Center in the 
Fourth Ward to deal with an array of family problems through family counseling 
discussion groups. According to the program description, topics of discussion would 
include family budgeting, teenage problems, job seeking, and the availability of 
educational and welfare services in the area. H-HCEOO members also began 
administering a summer youth recreation program in 1966 that reached 6,000 young 
people in Houston between the ages of six and eighteen. The stated goal of the program 
was "to channel their energies during school vacation into constructive rather than 
destructive channels." The recreation program operated out of twenty-six community 
centers spread out all over the city and provided activities such as organized sports 
competitions and trips to Houston's many cultural attractions. In July Houston's Alley 
Theatre, a small theater company started by a high school drama teacher in the 1940s and 
funded by the Ford Foundation, treated 600 of the program participants to a free 
production of "Winnie the Pooh." A few weeks later all of the youths involved in the 
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program got to see the Houston Astros play the New York Mets in an afternoon baseball 
game in the newly opened Houston Astrodome.19 
Ballew's third component of his three-pronged attack on poverty in Houston 
placed much more emphasis on including poor residents living in the target 
neighborhoods in the development and implementation of antipoverty programs and, 
most importantly, to organize communities, politicize and empower poor residents, and 
force institutional change in the city. To increase the participation of poor residents, H-
HCEOO obtained an OEO grant of $1.7 million in June 1966 to establish thirty fully 
staffed neighborhood centers all across the city. Through the neighborhood centers H-
HCEOO would be able to hire neighborhood residents to staff the centers and offer 
meeting rooms for neighborhood organizations and periodic workshops to bring residents 
into the decision-making processes of the poverty program and allow them to play a role 
in determining program policy. As the OEO press release stated, these neighborhood 
centers in Houston "will greatly enhance the concept of community action,. . . increase 
the scope of services to be performed, and will provide direct participation of target area 
residents in the selection of programs designed to help them help themselves." H-
HCEOO members estimated that 300,000 poor Houston residents would greatly benefit 
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from the creation of these neighborhood centers in addition to the more than 250 staff 
employees that H-HCEOO promised to hire directly from the target neighborhoods.20 
As an extension of his efforts to carry out the directive of maximum feasible 
participation of the poor, Ballew strove to begin organizing Houston's poor communities 
in order to reform local institutions and challenge the status quo. Poteat and EF-LAC 
project activists had had a profound impact on Ballew earlier in the year with their use of 
VISTA volunteers to organize poor neighborhoods in order to empower poor Houston 
residents to make demands on local public officials and institutions, and by mid-1966 
Ballew was itching to use the H-HCEOO staff to experiment with Alinsky-style 
community organization. During the summer of 1966 Ballew and H-HCEOO Executive 
Director Charles Kelly hired a community organizing specialist from Chicago to 
administer a four-week training program to prepare an army of H-HCEOO community 
organizers to go into Houston's poor neighborhoods and begin organizing residents.21 
In order to give H-HCEOO's community organizing effort clear direction, as well 
as to build some credibility in the poor neighborhoods, Ballew appointed Reverend Earl 
Allen as director of community organization. Allen was a native Houstonian, a local 
Methodist minister, and director of the Wesley Foundation at Texas Southern University, 
Houston's all black university located in one of H-HCEOO's target neighborhoods in the 
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Third Ward. Allen certainly had plenty of experience with community organizing. He had 
been a regional representative of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in Dallas while 
he attended seminary at Southern Methodist University, and in that position Allen had 
organized a month-long civil rights protest in 1964 to desegregate downtown restaurants 
and cafeterias. Like Ballew, Allen had read Saul Alinsky's work on community 
organizing and was committed to the idea of empowering the poor in Houston to confront 
the city's public officials and institutions. "I wanted to change the status quo," Allen said 
in a recent interview, "so I was abrasive and not afraid of confrontation." In hiring Allen 
to focus solely on community organizing, Ballew sent a clear message that neighborhood 
organization, community empowerment, and even protest activity would be a major 
thrust of H-HCEOO's effort to implement the War on Poverty in the city of Houston.22 
Beginning in the fall of 1966, Ballew began shifting the majority of H-HCEOO's 
resources and energy into community organizing. In November Ballew asked Allen to 
head up an H-HCEOO project called Operation Discovery, which Ballew had designed in 
order to begin applying some of Saul Alinsky's ideas about community organization in 
Houston's poor neighborhoods. Because Ballew was an Alinsky disciple, he understood 
perfectly well that power relations were at the heart of the problems of poor people. 
Ballew often could be heard during these months in the fall of 1966 repeating a phrase he 
had picked up from one of his aides: "Poverty isn't the absence of money; it's the 
absence of power." Operation Discovery was meant to rectify the imbalance of power 
22
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between Houston's poor population and the city's institutions by organizing the poor into 
powerful groups of citizens with the ability to put pressure on city hall, local welfare 
agencies, and other representatives of the city's power structure. During the month 
leading up to its launch, Ballew decided to give Operation Discovery top priority and 
reassigned several key staff members to Allen's special task force dedicated to 
community organizing.23 
As soon as Allen took charge of the community organization task force and 
Operation Discovery, he immediately recognized that the staff would need to be retrained 
in Alinsky-style community organizing. For example, Allen discovered that many H-
HCEOO staff members lacked even the basic skills needed to relate to poor Houston 
residents on a personal basis. In order to define clear goals and objectives for his staff, 
Allen issued a memorandum in early December in which he stated that the purpose of 
Operation Discovery was to determine an effective method for organizing Houston's 
poor residents so as to allow them to take control of their own lives. Rather than simply 
gathering more statistical information about the target neighborhoods, Operation 
Discovery was an attempt to find what was "both a relevant and a realistic approach to 
achieving the maximum feasible participation of the poor in the total decision-making 
process in Houston-Harris County. More specifically, Operation Discovery is the vehicle 
we have chosen to determine what are the quickest and best possible methods for 
23
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perfecting indigenous organization^] within the poverty areas of Houston-Harris County 
through which the poor can 'help themselves.'" What is evident from these kinds of 
statements is that Allen had an extremely broad interpretation of the meaning of 
community action and maximum feasible participation of the poor. Allen certainly agreed 
with both Ballew and federal War on Poverty planners that poor residents should be 
involved in the planning and implementation of antipoverty policies and programs in 
their own communities, but he carried this edict even further by arguing that poor 
Houston residents should also enjoy full participation in the social, political, and 
economic life of the city. In short, Allen advocated the New Left philosophy of 
participatory democracy and believed that the Community Action Program called for the 
use of community organizing in order to restore to Houston's poor population a degree of 
power over their own lives.24 
Operation Discovery allowed Allen to design a comprehensive plan for 
organizing the poor communities of Houston, and the plan itself was an excellent 
illustration of how differently Allen and his community organization team viewed both 
the causes of and the possible solutions for poverty compared to the traditional welfare 
agencies and many social workers. The traditional view of poverty posited that poor 
people themselves were the cause of their own poverty because they had failed to adapt 
to an advanced industrial economy with an increasing number of highly skilled jobs. In 
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order to remedy this, welfare agencies and social workers sought to change the individual 
behavior of poor people. Other antipoverty activists, however, including Allen and a few 
national War on Poverty planners, believed there were structural limitations that severely 
reduced the power poor people had over their own lives. Institutional racism, 
discrimination, complex and aloof municipal bureaucracies, cumbersome local welfare 
service agencies, and a lack of educational and employment opportunities were just a few 
examples of the structural forces that oppressed poor people and that were completely out 
of their control. One of the solutions to poverty, therefore, which was included as a small 
but significant component of the Community Action Program within the federal War on 
Poverty, was community organizing with the ultimate goal of empowering the poor. 
According to Allen and other community organization proponents, Saul Alinsky had been 
correct; the only effective solution to the problem of poverty was to restore power to poor 
communities through organization.25 
In his plan for community organization in Houston, Allen argued that there were 
myriad reasons why poverty existed, but four significant factors stood out above the rest: 
1) inadequate housing; 2) inadequate educational opportunities and facilities; 3) 
inadequate health facilities; and 4) inadequate employment opportunities. To begin 
addressing these inadequacies, Allen, as a good Alinsky disciple, instructed his 
community organization staff first to enter a poor neighborhood and develop a profile of 
the community that would present a "realistic picture' of the particular area and uncover 
specific problems that needed to be resolved. Once the community organizer had 
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identified the major problems of a particular neighborhood, Allen instructed them to draw 
the attention of neighborhood residents to a "gut issue," which was a specific situation 
that served to dramatize a particular problem. For example, specific gut issues stemming 
from the problem of inadequate housing in poor neighborhoods could be rat infestation, 
high rents, unresponsive landlords, a lack of trash cans, or a wide array of other issues 
that would serve to dramatize the larger problem of inadequate housing. Allen told his 
community organizers to rally residents around this gut issue and bring those citizens 
who were concerned about this particular issue together in order to work on possible 
solutions and initiate any necessary action. Allen stated, "Your job is to dissect a poor 
community and find out what's buggin' it. You have to build a concern for participation -
find a gut issue, but find one which can be solved quickly. We need victories. Victories 
build confidence." By bringing residents together to work on common problems in the 
community, according to Allen, organizers would be able to identify leaders within the 
community and could begin developing this leadership to tackle future problems and 
issues. This process could be repeated for a series of gut issues until the neighborhoods 
were organized into action groups capable of successfully confronting the city's public 
officials and dedicated to solving the problems of the community. Allen stated that these 
various action groups should eventually be brought together to form neighborhood 
councils that would try to deal with problems affecting the entire neighborhood. 
Similarly, these neighborhood councils would eventually be brought together to form 
area councils that would be sufficiently large and diverse to address problems affecting 
an entire area of Houston. Allen argued that once these area councils had been formed, 
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community organizers should work to strengthen each organizational group so they 
would be able to carry on without the leadership provided by the professional organizer. 
Ballew was so impressed with Allen's plan for community organization that he 
immediately assigned a 140-member staff to Allen's community organizing department. 
Ballew and Allen decided to focus H-HCEOO's first community organizing efforts on a 
large African American neighborhood northeast of downtown Houston known as 
Settegast. Allen himself had once been a resident of Settegast, so he knew firsthand that 
residents of the area had registered various complaints to the city government for several 
years about the poor and unsanitary living conditions in their neighborhoods but had very 
little success in getting any of their grievances addressed. In many ways the Settegast 
area was an attractive location to experiment with community organizing. As Allen 
stated, Settegast had clear geographic boundaries that would allow organizing efforts to 
be concentrated where they were needed most and there existed several indigenous 
community groups in the area that could be mobilized to put pressure on local institutions 
and on the city's public officials.27 
H-HCEOO staff members already had broad knowledge about the Settegast area. 
The H-HCEOO Board's interest in this section of Houston began in the summer of 1966 
when staff members conducted an extensive survey of the neighborhood that resulted in 
the publication of "The Settegast Report," a study commissioned by H-HCEOO 
Executive Director Charles Kelly to gain a better understanding of the problems and 
Earl E. Allen to All H-HCEOO Personnel, memorandum, 21 December 1966, Box 59, Folder Houston 
Texas CAA 1968, OEO CAP Records of the Director, Subject Files, 1965-1969, Record Group 381, 
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issues in one of the city's poorest neighborhoods. At one time Settegast had been a haven 
for lower-middle-class African Americans who wanted to own their own homes, but by 
the mid-1960s the neighborhood had deteriorated primarily because it failed to keep pace 
with standard city improvements through the years such as modern sewage systems and 
paved roads. By 1960 the median income in Settegast was little more than half of the 
average income for Harris County, and despite the fact that homeownership rates 
remained high, housing conditions were among the worst in the city. During the summer 
of 1966 Kelly sent a team of researchers and interviewers into the Settegast area in order 
to ascertain the root causes of poverty in that part of the city, and what they discovered 
shocked many people who were completely unaware of the magnitude of deprivation in 
TO 
the area. 
Authors of the report identified four major areas of concern in Settegast, the first 
of which was the rampant profiteering and exploitation of area residents by unscrupulous 
businessmen, especially those in the homebuilding and home mortgage lending 
industries. H-HCEOO interviewers found that neighborhood residents were "too trustful" 
of representatives from these types of businesses who scoured the area selling 
substandard homes and offering loans that could never be paid off. Because homes were 
already being built before the Settegast area was officially incorporated into the city of 
Houston, homebuilders were not required to conform to Federal Housing Authority 
(FHA) standards, and as a result most of the homes did not qualify for FHA mortgage 
insurance. Surveyors found that more than 30 percent of the homes in Settegast were in a 
Houston-Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization, "The Settegast Report: A Program for 
Community Development," 31 August 1966, Box 59, Folder Houston Texas CAA 1968, OEO CAP 
Records of the Director, Subject Files, 1965-1969, Record Group 381, NARA. 
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deteriorated or dilapidated condition, and they reported that as a result "the cost in human 
suffering is high." 
Surveyors found that even though 80 percent of respondents in Settegast owned 
their own home, "the term ownership must be used in the loosest possible sense." 
[emphasis in original] H-HCEOO staff discovered that mortgage lenders in Settegast had 
found a way to take advantage of residents who could not afford to make a large down 
payment to purchase a home in the area. Lenders had devised a "contract for deed" 
arrangement whereby a prospective homebuyer was allowed to make payments each 
month until an agreed upon amount had been collected by the lender that would be used 
as the down payment. Once this amount was reached, the buyer would acquire the title to 
the property and the balance of the total purchase price would be financed through a 
mortgage loan. Although on the surface this arrangement appeared to offer new 
homebuyers the means to make a down payment when they would otherwise be unable to 
afford it, H-HCEOO surveyors found that in reality many of these contracts for deed 
were designed in such a way that borrowers found it impossible to reach the agreed upon 
amount because of a multitude of hidden fees and exorbitant finance charges. For 
example, the surveyors interviewed one prospective homeowner whose contract price 
was $6,100 and called for monthly payments of $52. After paying this amount every 
month for almost nine years, the total payments equaled $5,608. According to the 
contract, however, the unpaid balance on the contract remained at $5,800. Mortgage 
lenders were clearly exploiting Settegast residents, who were often unable to decipher the 
contract terminology and unaware of their own legal rights.30 
29
 Ibid. 
30
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The second major area of concern that the H-HCEOO staff found in Settegast 
involved the closely related issues of poor health and sanitation services. The most 
shocking discovery was that there were absolutely no healthcare facilities in Settegast or 
in any of the surrounding communities. There was not a single doctor or dentist who 
practiced in the area, and if residents needed medical attention, they were forced to travel 
twenty miles to Ben Taub Hospital, which was the nearest public health facility to the 
Settegast community. Many residents lacked the means of transporting themselves or 
family members to the hospital, and since ambulance services were only available to 
those who could pay for them, most Settegast residents simply received no medical 
attention when they were sick or injured. With regard to sanitation in Settegast, surveyors 
also found open sewage ditches and a complete lack of drainage facilities, which 
provided extremely favorable environments for the breeding of rodents and other vermin. 
They estimated that the size of the rat population in Settegast was easily three times as 
large as the human population in the area. The water supply in Settegast was also a major 
problem because nearly 70 percent of residents received their water from shallow wells 
that were often contaminated from septic tanks and sewage backups from outhouses. 
Though no official study had been conducted, H-HCEOO staff believed that the 
extraordinarily high rate of kidney and bladder diseases among Settegast residents was 
directly connected to the contaminated water they drank on a daily basis.31 
The third major area of concern was a general lack of educational and 
employment opportunities. H-HCEOO interviewers found that a majority of Settegast 
31
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residents desperately wanted a Head Start program initiated in their neighborhood, and 
many more expressed a desire for some type of day care program so their children would 
not be left at home alone. Surveyors also found that there was no community library in 
the area. While more than two-thirds of residents lacked a high school education, 
interviewers found that most were not content to remain uneducated; many expressed a 
strong desire for an adult education program in their community. The authors of the 
report concluded that an adult education program would be impossible without an 
adequate library. Surveyors also recognized the need for a consumer education program 
in Settegast to alert residents to the premium prices they were paying for consumer goods 
in neighborhood stores. There were no supermarkets in the area, so H-HCEOO staff 
conducted a shopping survey in Settegast and compared prices with those paid at 
supermarkets just outside the neighborhood. The results were surprising. The prices for 
nearly every item most families bought on a regular basis were considerably higher at the 
local neighborhood stores than at the nearby supermarkets. With minimal transportation 
options, Settegast residents were forced to use their limited income to buy overpriced 
goods from local grocers. Surveyors also found that there was no adult or youth 
vocational training program in Settegast, even though nearly 70 percent of the residents 
stated they wanted these types of programs for their neighborhood. 
The final problem area in Settegast discovered by H-HCEOO surveyors was 
insufficient transportation options for residents. Interviewers found that poor residents 
constituted the largest group of Houstonians who needed access to public transportation, 
but they were also in the group who resided in parts of the city often neglected by urban 
transportation planners. Surveyors discovered that public transportation in Houston was 
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inadequate, slow, and expensive, and in Settegast it was also incredibly inefficient, 
inconvenient, and time consuming. Three main bus lines served the city of Houston, all 
of which radiated out from downtown. For Settegast residents, this often meant they had 
to take a lengthy bus ride into downtown Houston just to transfer to another bus line that 
would take them to their destination that was often closer to Settegast than it was to 
downtown. All riders on Houston's buses paid a $1 roundtrip fare, but for many Settegast 
residents this amounted to more than their hourly take-home pay.33 
H-HCEOO's "Settegast Report" exposed a neglected area of Houston many 
people in the city were totally unaware of and revealed a degree of deprivation most 
thought had been eradicated during the post-World War II economic boom. Settegast 
residents suffered from a number of problems, not the least of which stemmed from the 
indifference of the city's public officials to their problems and the exploitation committed 
by business and real estate developers of the relatively powerless and uneducated 
community. When the H-HCEOO Board of Directors reviewed the report, they were 
presented with two options for how to address the problems in Settegast. Since there was 
a clear lack of services being provided in the neighborhood, H-HCEOO staff could have 
implemented federally funded service projects in Settegast by coordinating local agencies 
to improve housing conditions, clean up the water supply, help people with their 
mortgage payments, assist residents who needed medical attention, recruit the 
unemployed into programs like the Job Corps, or a whole array of ways to deliver needed 
services to the area. If the traditional welfare bureaucracy in Houston had targeted the 
Settegast area, residents could have reasonably expected those service-oriented 
33
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organizations to begin providing these types of social welfare programs in their 
neighborhood. 
Earl Allen was able to convince the H-HCEOO Board of Directors, however, that 
the delivery of services to Settegast residents would only provide a temporary solution to 
their problems. What was needed in the area, argued Allen, was community organization 
to bring about lasting social change capable of producing permanent improvements in the 
lives of Settegast residents. Only by organizing the residents of Settegast could they be 
mobilized and empowered, which would enable them to make demands on the city 
government, local businesses, and other institutions to remedy the problems associated 
with poverty in the neighborhood. Allen believed that only by empowering area residents 
to put pressure on and make demands of the local power structure could the people of 
Settegast begin to see their problems addressed. Ballew agreed with Allen that Settegast 
could be used to experiment with an Alinsky-style community organization project, and 
he was able to convince enough H-HCEOO Board members to agree to a ninety-day 
demonstration program in the area. With H-HCEOO Board approval, in the last two 
months of 1966 Allen placed eighty members of his community organizing staff in 
Settegast with the hopes of proving that his philosophy of community organization would 
be effective in addressing the problems of the poor in Houston.34 
The community organization tactics developed by Ballew and Allen produced 
almost immediate results. When Allen's community organization staff began searching 
for a gut issue in Settegast in November, it was clear that the grotesquely unsanitary 
water supply in the area would serve as a very effective issue to dramatize the problem of 
34
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inadequate city services in this poor section of Houston. Organizers discovered that the 
majority of homes in Settegast were served by backyard water wells, which frequently 
became contaminated with bacteria and parasites because disease-carrying sewage was 
seeping into the wells from septic tanks and outhouses. Armed with this information, H-
HCEOO community organizers and a large group of Settegast residents walked into a 
city council meeting and demanded that Mayor Louie Welch extend city water services to 
their neighborhoods. Faced with this delicate political issue and clearly not wanting to 
appear to deny Houston residents sanitary drinking water, Welch immediately ordered 
city workers to place emergency water spigots on the city's fire hydrants in Settegast to 
provide clean water to the residents. Welch also quickly drew up a plan to extend city 
water services to the area with a minimum of funds that would need to be provided by 
Settegast residents and instructed one of Houston's city attorneys to investigate the 
possibility of filing a lawsuit against the company that knowingly sold water from 
contaminated wells to unsuspecting families in Settegast. Ballew immediately claimed 
victory for this exercise in Alinsky-style community organization and pointed out that at 
the urging of community organizers, residents "went to City Hall and demanded a city 
water supply to replace their contaminated one. They got it." The event produced such a 
surprising victory that a Houston Post reporter covering the story declared that the "dawn 
of a quiet revolution may have broken over Houston" when the Settegast group arrived at 
City Hall to begin receiving a redress of grievances that were a long time coming.35 
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Ballew and Allen even encouraged the community organizers to help plan and 
participate in organized protest activities to bring attention to the plight of their 
communities. While some Settegast residents were putting pressure on Welch and the 
Houston City Council to address their water problems, others began staging 
demonstrations at their local schools protesting the lack of sanitary conditions there. Not 
only was there contaminated water coming into many of the schools, but there simply 
was not enough water pressure for the use of drinking fountains or even to flush toilets. 
Many students and teachers had to bring thermoses to school filled with enough water for 
the entire day. After protesting for several weeks with no response from the all-white 
Northeast Houston School District Board, several Settegast neighborhood councils, 
which had been formed with assistance from Allen's staff, launched a write-in campaign 
to get elected to the board two African American residents who promised to address these 
problems. These two candidates lost by a very narrow margin, but nevertheless these 
neighborhood councils were successful in encouraging more residents to assume an 
active role in the administration of their local schools. A Houston Post reporter 
commented, "With almost 1,000 Settegast votes to reckon with, it is doubtful that the 
school board out there will ever be quite the same again." The protests also had an effect 
on Welch - he ordered his staff to obtain water samples from Settegast schools to check 
for contamination.36 
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After achieving some success getting city officials to address the problem of 
sanitation in Settegast, Allen's community organizers focused on the absence of medical 
treatment facilities. Rather than establishing a temporary federally funded health clinic or 
hospital in the area, members of Allen's staff began organizing neighborhood residents to 
put pressure on the Harris County Hospital District to build and maintain a permanent 
branch of the public hospital system in Settegast. One H-HCEOO organizer argued that 
the proposed Settegast healthcare facility would set an example for the rest of the city and 
become the first of several clinics established in poverty neighborhoods. One H-HCEOO 
staff member in the area stated, "These clinics would help decentralize charity medicine 
in Harris County and make services available to the poor in outlying areas, many of 
whom have no means of transportation to Ben Taub," the central general hospital in 
Houston. As Allen's staff began organizing residents into pressure groups, Harris County 
Hospital District officials responded slowly but generally favorably to the idea of creating 
a branch of the city's charity hospital in Settegast. By early January the hospital district 
board had placed the issue on the agenda for their meeting that month.37 
In order to make sure members of the Harris County Hospital District would 
address the absence of healthcare facilities in Settegast, H-HCEOO community 
organizers and neighborhood residents held a rally in downtown Houston near where the 
meeting was taking place to demand the creation of a branch of the charity hospital in 
their neighborhood. The strategy worked - the hospital district voted to establish a branch 
Minutes of Houston-Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization Executive Committee, 19 
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of the charity hospital in Settegast immediately. Hospital district member Quentin Mease, 
a prominent African American civic leader in Houston and executive director of the 
downtown YMCA, was especially receptive to the idea of establishing branch hospitals 
in poor neighborhoods, and he worked tirelessly to obtain the approval of the Settegast 
Clinic. Located inside a building donated by the Houston City Council, the new Settegast 
Clinic opened during the last week in January and served 175 poor residents in its first 
week of operation. The staff consisted of hospital district employees and volunteers from 
the Houston Medical Forum, an organization made up of African American doctors in 
Houston. In the wake of the clinic's opening, Ballew expressed optimism about the 
course of the War on Poverty in the city. The opening of the Settegast Clinic was "a 
breakthrough event," Ballew told Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough, and clear evidence 
that the "War on Poverty in Houston is beginning to go."38 
After some early successes, Ballew encouraged the spirit of organized protest to 
carry beyond the neighborhood of Settegast. For example, H-HCEOO community 
organizers and a group of residents from a mostly African American neighborhood on the 
west side of town called Blossom Heights organized a twenty-mile protest march to call 
attention to the fact that their children were bused that far to attend school when an all-
white school was just two miles from their homes. In the Sunnyside neighborhood, a poor 
area south of downtown, H-HCEOO community organizers found that residents had 
38
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recently formed the Sunnyside Housing Committee through which they were attempting 
to put pressure on the Houston City Council to prevent slumlords from building 
inadequate and unsafe housing in that part of the city. Members began showing up at 
Houston City Council meetings in October to demand a change in the city's building 
code and an end to land zoning practices that allowed unscrupulous residential builders to 
erect high-density, low-quality housing that had a tendency of turning older 
neighborhoods into "instant slums." When H-HCEOO community organizers arrived in 
Sunnyside, they did not have to search for very long to find a major gut issue. With the 
help of the organizers, Sunnyside Housing Committee members launched a protest 
campaign against the real estate developers who were beginning to build slum housing in 
the area. In November 1966 approximately fifty people marched in front of the proposed 
building sites carrying signs that read "Don't Move In" and "I Wouldn't Let My Dog 
Live in These Shacks." Clarence White, leader of the protest, told members of the press 
to spread their message all across the city of Houston. "This is pathetic," White 
exclaimed. "What kind of kids could you raise in those shacks? This is what breeds 
crime. People say, 'Why so much crime among the Negroes?' Then they come out here 
and help build crime." Addressing the other marchers, White pointed out that the slums 
were being built by two real estate developers - one white and one black, although the 
race of the guilty parties was of no real importance. White continued, "It doesn't matter 
what color your skin is. If you're moving shacks into Sunnyside, we're your enemy." 
Other marchers told the reporters that this protest was only the beginning of their effort to 
take control of their own neighborhood.39 
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The involvement of H-HCEOO employees in protest activities provoked many 
questions from city officials and Houston residents about the proper role of poverty 
workers and community organizers around the city. In response to these questions, 
Ballew defended both the organizers' actions and the use of protest demonstrations. "It 
seems to me our organizers are going to have to be with the people and work with them," 
argued Ballew to a Houston Post reporter. "As long as the protests are peaceful, I see 
nothing wrong with our people taking part in them." Federal OEO officials helped bolster 
Ballew's confidence in Allen and the use of Alinsky-style community organization. 
During an official inspection of the War on Poverty in Houston conducted in February 
1967, members of an OEO inspection team concluded in their report that one of the ways 
Ballew had improved the antipoverty effort in Houston when he became H-HCEOO 
chairman was the hiring of Earl Allen and the increased focus on community organizing. 
One OEO inspector noted that the success of the community organizing effort was 
apparent all over the city and that Allen's community organization staff was "reaching 
someone in Houston since they are creating a great deal of foment." Another inspector 
commented that Allen was "bright, imaginative, and knowledgeable about the process of 
community organization" and possessed the necessary competence to iron out any 
problems that naturally arise from trying to organize the poor. This kind of 
encouragement from federal War on Poverty administrators undoubtedly made it easier 
for Ballew to answer local criticism of the Alinsky method in Houston.40 
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It was clear by the spring of 1967 that Earl Allen's community organizing efforts, 
particularly in the Settegast area, were paying dividends to poor residents. Ballew could 
finally boast that the Community Action Program being carried out by H-HCEOO was 
waging a concerted attack on the root causes of poverty in Houston and was enjoying a 
degree of success and a series of small but important victories. The organization's 
neighborhood centers were bringing poor residents into the administration of the poverty 
program, and Allen's staff was organizing residents into powerful blocs capable of 
forcing the city's elected officials and institutions to respond to the needs of poor 
communities. The Saul Alinsky method seemed to be working quite satisfactorily during 
Ballew's first year as H-HCEOO chairman, primarily because he enjoyed a tremendous 
amount of support from his staff and OEO officials in Washington. Ballew's organization 
was not the only agency attempting to implement a Community Action Program in 
Houston, however, as Houston Action for Youth (HAY) members continued to compete 
with H-HCEOO leaders to make their organization the sole community action agency in 
the city. 
While H-HCEOO members focused on community organizing in an attempt to 
empower poor communities to challenge Houston's public officials and local institutions, 
HAY directors continued to use a service-delivery approach and employed professional 
social workers in their attempt to eradicate poverty in one small section of the city on the 
north side of town. In January 1966 HAY contracted with Houston's Day Care 
Association to administer a small Head Start program in their target neighborhood that 
would reach approximately ninety preschoolers. In April HAY members teamed up with 
HCEOO and HAY," February 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, Houston, Harris County, Texas, Jan-Mar 1967, 
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the Texas Employment Commission to seek out neighborhood residents considered 
unemployable and begin training them for unskilled and low-skilled jobs in the city. The 
assumption driving the program, of course, was that Houston's unemployed citizens 
lacked jobs simply because they were unaware of how to locate them. A representative 
from the Texas Employment Commission (TEC) stated that "it's quite possible that we 
can tap a labor supply that heretofore we were not able to reach." There is no evidence 
that the HAY-TEC program developers ever considered the role of institutional racism 
and discrimination, or the lack of power poor citizens had over their own lives, in their 
unemployment status. Soon after HAY and TEC initiated the program, many 
neighborhood residents began complaining about the attitudes of the HAY canvassers 
who were seeking out the unemployed. It seems a paternalistic and condescending 
attitude had taken hold among the HAY staff. One antipoverty activist who worked in the 
target neighborhood but was not affiliated with HAY commented that several residents 
"say some of the canvassers act as though they are afraid of getting dirty when they enter 
the neighborhood."41 
HAY members also administered traditional services that dated back to the 
organization's founding mission to address problems of juvenile delinquency in Houston. 
For example, HAY continued funding homeless shelters for runaway youths, family 
counseling services, home management programs, counseling services for troubled 
youths, day care and nursery services, and neighborhood activity centers. In addition to 
these services, HAY launched a new program in the spring of 1966 called Operation 
Medicare Alert. When OEO officials realized late in 1965 that only a few eligible elderly 
41
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persons across the country had registered for Medicare benefits, planners developed a 
program to increase the number of older Americans enrolled in the new federally funded 
hospital insurance program. OEO officials exported this new program to local community 
action agencies in January 1966, and HAY personnel decided to participate in its 
implementation in their target neighborhood. With a $7,500 grant from OEO, HAY staff 
members knocked on doors in their target neighborhood in search of elderly residents 
who had not yet signed up for Medicare benefits. By the end of March, they had assisted 
more than 1,000 residents apply for Medicare.42 
Ballew realized that although the services offered by HAY administrators were 
indeed helpful to poor residents, the fact remained that HAY leaders were doing virtually 
nothing in Houston's poor neighborhoods to address the problem of powerlessness. 
Indeed, there were fundamental philosophical differences between the way each 
antipoverty organization approached the War on Poverty and particularly the Community 
Action Program. The federal OEO inspection team that visited Houston in February 1967 
recognized the clear dichotomy between HAY's nearly total focus on the delivery of 
social services to the exclusion of community organizing and H-HCEOO's devotion to 
community organization and reluctance of the organization's leaders to administer 
programs or services. OEO officials unanimously agreed that H-HCEOO was more 
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successful than HAY in attacking the root causes of poverty and in making a real 
difference in their target neighborhoods. One OEO inspector stated in her report that H-
HCEOO was clearly the stronger antipoverty organization and that Earl Allen's efforts to 
provide a way for the poor to identify their own needs and exert pressure on the city's 
public officials were proving fruitful. Because H-HCEOO community organizers were 
successful in "creating ripples" in the power structure, they had been able to achieve 
some small victories and cause some changes to occur. The inspection team concluded 
that Ballew's pronouncement that the city's white power structure was "afraid of us" 
might indeed be true given the responsiveness of local institutions to the various protests 
and demonstrations that H-HCEOO had been involved in over the previous few months. 
Another OEO inspector stated that H-HCEOO more clearly resembled a legitimate and 
effective community action agency and that Allen's community organization effort was 
enjoying some success in mobilizing the poor communities of Houston and empowering 
poor residents to exert pressure on the city's institutions. While they expressed some 
concern about the lack of service programs offered by H-HCEOO, OEO officials 
concluded that Ballew's agency, and especially Earl Allen's community organization 
efforts, were showing clear signs of effecting needed change in Houston.43 
The OEO inspection team's assessment of HAY's antipoverty activities in 
Houston, on the other hand, was in sharp contrast to their evaluation of H-HCEOO. 
43
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Though OEO officials recognized that HAY's social service programs were well 
administered, they nevertheless reported that the majority of these programs were in the 
"low-priority category." One federal inspector was especially concerned that HAY only 
operated in one fairly isolated part of the city and that even in this small area, HAY 
directors had been unable to perform any comprehensive community planning. While a 
few of the programs provided social services that residents desperately needed, the 
inspection team reported that the programs were "geared toward alleviating the 
symptoms of poverty rather than effecting its causes." Though HAY enjoyed a good 
reputation among the traditional welfare and social service organizations in the city, 
unfortunately it had "minimal success in mobilizing those resources" to initiate a 
concerted and unified assault on poverty. Another federal inspector commented that 
HAY's Board of Directors was "primarily a rubber stamp" and had very little control 
over the actual operations of the agency. More alarming to the inspection team, however, 
was the assessment that although HAY had been operating in Houston for five years, it 
"has had almost no impact" on the plight of the poor in the city and had the reputation of 
being a "nice program" that did not "rock the boat." To make matters worse, federal OEO 
inspectors discovered that many African American and Mexican American residents of 
HAY's target neighborhood considered HAY Director Helen Lewis to be quite 
prejudiced in her decisions concerning the poverty program.44 
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The relatively safe and non-confrontational tactics of HAY sharply contrasted 
with the direct-action approach of H-HCEOO under Ballew's leadership, and federal 
OEO inspectors clearly favored Ballew's radical interpretation of the community action 
concept because it seemed to offer an effective method for attacking the root causes of 
poverty in Houston. While HAY's professional staff delivered a few social services in 
one isolated community in the city, H-HCEOO members organized poor residents into 
powerful blocs capable of making demands on the city's officials and institutions. Ballew 
recognized the fact that when the federal War on Poverty funding inevitably dried up, 
most of HAY's service programs would disappear and the agency itself would return to 
being a small-scale traditional welfare organization with a severely limited impact on 
poverty in Houston. By bringing about lasting social change in the city, Ballew and other 
H-HCEOO leaders hoped to address the needs of the poor by empowering residents to 
take control of their own lives. As any good Saul Alinsky disciple would have argued, 
Ballew operated on the idea that community organization and empowerment of the poor 
held the keys to effecting significant and permanent change in Houston's poor 
neighborhoods and attacking the root causes of poverty in the city. 
Although Ballew's radical interpretation of the community action concept 
delivered some significant victories in Houston's poor neighborhoods in the fall of 1966, 
it is clear in hindsight that there were several external factors that allowed H-HCEOO 
members to implement their radical vision uninhibited, despite the city's "pervasive 
conservatism" that Houston historian David G. McComb described. First, the 
overwhelming support Ballew received from OEO officials in Washington was essential 
13 February 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, Houston, Harris County, Texas, Jan-Mar 1967, OEO Inspection 
Division, Inspection Reports, 1964-67, Record Group 381, NARA (third quotation). 
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for H-HCEOO leaders to continue implementing a radical Community Action Program in 
Houston. In the days before a conservative mood took hold in Washington in 1967 that 
resulted in the decision to allow public officials to take control of the Community Action 
Program, OEO officials were often openly supportive of radical and confrontational 
community action agencies around the country. When OEO officials began retreating 
from this radical interpretation of the community action concept in 1967, however, it 
produced a negative effect on antipoverty organizations like H-HCEOO whose leaders 
had depended on support from Washington. Second, for a few months during the fall of 
1966, Ballew implemented his radical vision in a relatively friendly environment free of 
vocal opposition from Houston's elected officials, primarily because H-HCEOO staff 
members initiated their activities quickly and the city's public officials had little time to 
devise an attack on Ballew and Allen's methods. By the spring of 1967, however, the 
situation had changed as Houston's mayor and police chief began cracking down on 
Ballew's activities, particularly with regard to community organization. Finally, during 
the fall of 1966, Ballew enjoyed the support of the majority of the H-HCEOO Board and 
staff, and this undoubtedly emboldened him to implement his ambitious program without 
restraint. During the following year, however, as local elected officials launched an attack 
on H-HCEOO and OEO officials backed away from their open support of Ballew's 
radical vision, H-HCEOO Board and staff members began defying Ballew's leadership. 
While Ballew had all three of these things working in his favor as 1966 drew to a close, 
the spring of 1967 brought significant changes to the situation in Houston that threatened 
to undo Ballew's radical Community Action Program and completely destroy the 
reputation of the Saul Alinsky method in the city. 
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Chapter 4 
The War Within the War on Poverty: 
Houston's Public Officials and the Taming of the Community Action Program, 1967 
For several months in the winter of 1966-1967, William Ballew encountered few 
obstacles in his quest to implement a radical vision for Houston's Community Action 
Program based on the Saul Alinsky method. Ballew helped launch a comprehensive 
Legal Services program, expanded certain social services in the city's poorest 
neighborhoods, and most importantly dedicated much of H-HCEOO's resources to 
community organizing. With the hiring of Earl Allen to supervise a 140-member 
community organization staff, Ballew made a clear statement that H-HCEOO would 
place a heavy emphasis on empowering poor communities to challenge Houston's public 
officials and effect lasting social change in their neighborhoods. For a brief moment it 
appeared that the Saul Alinsky method would be efficacious in the city as Ballew, Allen, 
and the community organization staff achieved a series of small yet significant victories 
ranging from improved city sanitation services to the creation of a badly needed health 
clinic in one of Houston's most impoverished neighborhoods. Ballew was able to make 
Houston's radical Community Action Program a success mainly because he enjoyed a 
supportive environment for the implementation of his vision and little organized 
opposition from local elected officials or other conservative defenders of the status quo. 
Between September 1966 and February 1967, OEO officials in Washington and Austin 
provided almost unconditional support for Ballew's radical vision during a time when 
Houston's public officials had yet to devise their own plan for resisting the rapidly 
increasing number of demands being made upon city officials by poor residents. 
During the spring of 1967, however, many of Houston's public officials, 
particularly Mayor Louie Welch, United States Congressman George Bush, and Police 
Chief Herman Short, launched a concerted assault on H-HCEOO and its leaders in order 
to reassert some degree of control over what was occurring in the city and specifically 
over the activities of Allen's community organization staff. Welch and Bush had been 
active participants in the creation of H-HCEOO in 1965 and had handpicked several 
members of the organization's Board of Directors and Executive Committee. When 
William Ballew became H-HCEOO chairman in January 1966, however, he distanced the 
organization from city officials and curtailed any influence Welch and Bush might have 
previously enjoyed over the poverty program in the city. Since he was a believer in the 
Saul Alinsky method, Ballew cut H-HCEOO's ties with the city's public officials 
because he planned to organize Houston's poor residents to challenge that very structure 
and make demands on city officials. Only by liberating H-HCEOO from the constraints 
of Welch and Bush could Ballew effectively implement his radical vision for the 
Community Action Program in Houston. Police Chief Short, on the other hand, who had 
a reputation as a notorious racist, seems to have opposed the idea of a War on Poverty in 
the city from the very beginning and was prepared to attack H-HCEOO's activities as 
soon as he could gain Welch's approval. By the spring of 1967 Welch and Bush found 
themselves completely alienated from the poverty program in Houston and were growing 
increasingly alarmed at the speed with which Ballew, Allen, and the community 
organization staff had mobilized many of the city's poor neighborhoods to engage in 
collective political action. Beginning in February 1967, Welch, Bush, and Short worked 
together to attack the community organization strategy developed by Ballew and Allen 
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and to discredit the organization that had left the three of them out of the poverty program 
in Houston. 
A series of events during the spring of 1967 provided members of Houston's 
public officials with the ammunition they needed to attack Ballew's radical vision for the 
city's Community Action Program. Welch, Bush, and Short, growing more impatient 
with the community organization strategies developed by Ballew and Allen, exploited 
these events in order to discredit the Saul Alinsky method and reassert their control over 
the War on Poverty in the city. While Ballew, Allen, and the H-HCEOO community 
organization staff had won some small yet important victories by organizing poor 
residents all over the city and helping empower them to make demands on the city's 
public officials and local institutions, their efforts in Settegast, where they had enjoyed 
their greatest achievements in the spring of 1967, backfired when several powerful 
figures in the neighborhood revolted against H-HCEOO's efforts in the area. The turmoil 
this revolt caused in Settegast provided the city's public officials with ammunition to 
attack H-HCEOO's activities in the area. On the heels of the Settegast revolt, several H-
HCEOO staff members became involved in a disturbance on the campus of Texas 
Southern University that became known as the "TSU Riot." With the accompanying 
media coverage, several of Houston's public officials launched a public attack on H-
HCEOO by appealing to widespread fear and paranoia about the threat of urban rioting -
the specter of another Watts or Newark or Detroit - and associating H-HCEOO's 
activities with events at TSU. Finally, as the fallout from the Settegast revolt and the TSU 
riot pushed the H-HCEOO Board of Directors into a defensive position and persuaded 
them to attempt to rein in some of their community organization efforts, an uprising 
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erupted among the H-HCEOO staff that split the agency into two competing factions. To 
complicate matters even further, OEO officials in Washington and Austin decided in the 
spring of 1967 that they could no longer fund two separate community action agencies in 
Houston, meaning H-HCEOO and HAY would have to merge to form a single 
organization. Meanwhile, a citywide backlash formed against the practices of H-HCEOO 
community organizers, who were now viewed by many simply as troublemakers. This 
backlash, coupled with sustained attacks from the city's public officials, forced the H-
HCEOO Board of Directors into an even more defensive posture as a conservative 
philosophy began to take hold among the board members. 
These four events during the spring of 1967 - the Settegast revolt, the TSU Riot, 
the H-HCEOO staff uprising, and the forced merger of H-HCEOO and HAY - were the 
precipitating factors that forced the H-HCEOO Board of Directors on the defensive and 
opened up a space for Houston's public officials and conservative defenders of the status 
quo to attack H-HCEOO's activities. This sequence of events ultimately resulted in the 
abandonment of Ballew's radical vision for community organization and empowerment 
of the poor and allowed Welch, Bush, and Short to reassert their control over the poverty 
program. In only four months the concerted attack waged by Welch, Bush, and Short 
tamed H-HCEOO's activities in Houston, and by the end of May 1967 the environment 
in which H-HCEOO operated in Houston had changed dramatically. Just a few months 
after Ballew, Allen, and the H-HCEOO community organization staff achieved some of 
their greatest accomplishments, the H-HCEOO Board of Directors, in response to the 
attack from the city's public officials, quickly retreated from its radical interpretation of 
the community action concept, forced Ballew out of office, reined in the activities of 
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Allen and his community organization staff, and committed themselves to a conservative 
program of social service delivery. Ballew's experiment in the Saul Alinsky method in 
Houston thus ended just as it was beginning to achieve some small but important 
victories. 
In Settegast, where Allen's community organization staff had experienced the 
most success, H-HCEOO's activities produced a backlash from Houston's public 
officials that was aided by several conservative business and religious leaders in the 
neighborhood. These indigenous conservative forces managed to use the mounting 
criticism of Allen's community organization staff voiced by the city's public officials to 
ignite a revolt among some poor Settegast residents against many of H-HCEOO's 
activities there. Though the marches, rallies, and other protest activities had produced 
tangible results for Settegast residents, they also undoubtedly alerted Houston's public 
officials that area residents had organized and were prepared and equipped to make 
demands for city services. The quest to obtain a branch of the general hospital in 
Settegast resulted in the final victory for residents that did not also produce a 
counterattack from public officials or disapproving Houstonians. About the same time as 
the new Settegast Clinic opened its doors to area residents, H-HCEOO community 
organizers faced a major setback in their efforts to empower poor residents to use their 
constitutional right to vote. 
As soon as Earl Allen's community organization staff arrived in Settegast, they 
began registering area residents to vote. In order to register as many new voters as 
possible, H-HCEOO staff members went door-to-door with voter registration forms and 
assisted neighborhood residents with filling them out correctly. As soon as an entire 
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section of Settegast had been canvassed, community organizers delivered the voter 
registration forms to the Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector, who would add the new 
voters to the rolls. From the very beginning of the voter registration drive, H-HCEOO 
community organizers faced the accusation that since they were not official deputies 
authorized to register voters, their actions were illegal. The Republican Party Chairman 
for Harris County, who was instrumental in the effort to break the hold of the Democratic 
Party in Houston and across the South, issued a statement in January 1967 criticizing H-
HCEOO's voter registration efforts and claimed that the community organizers in 
Settegast were violating the Texas Election Code. George Bush, the newly elected 
Republican Congressman from Houston, also publicly questioned the legality of the voter 
registration drive in Settegast. For Bush, of course, the prospect of a large group of new 
voters who were poor and mostly nonwhite had political implications that struck close to 
home. As Bush stated in a letter to a Houston business acquaintance, "I have heard that in 
Houston they undertook a voter registration drive but restricted it to the Negro areas. 
This, of course, would not bode well for yours truly at the polls. But, more importantly, I 
don't believe this has anything to do with the alleviation of poverty." H-HCEOO 
Executive Director Charles Kelly and Earl Allen responded to Bush's public criticism of 
the voter registration drive by pointing out that community organizers were not actually 
registering voters but simply assisting neighborhood residents fill out the forms correctly 
and delivering the completed forms to the appropriate office. Kelly pointed out that the 
forms that H-HCEOO community organizers had been taking door-to-door in Settegast 
were the exact same forms that were printed daily in the Houston newspapers. Not only 
were the community organizers clearly following local election laws, but the voter 
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registration drive also had the prior approval of the Harris County Tax Assessor-
Collector's office.1 
On the morning of January 17, 1967, Republican fears of the addition of 
thousands of new voters, many of whom were expected to vote Democratic, were allayed 
when an arsonist set fire to the H-HCEOO community center in Settegast and destroyed 
more than 2,000 completed voter registration forms that had yet to be turned over to the 
tax assessor-collector. Also destroyed in the fire were records from an H-HCEOO 
investigation into home contract sales in Settegast, which had uncovered the unfair 
"contract for deed" arrangements that were prevalent in the area. Houston arson 
investigators determined that the fire had been set deliberately, and in a more shocking 
discovery they concluded that there had been no forced entry into the community center 
building. In other words, whoever set the fire had in his or her possession a key to the 
center. Though Houston Police investigators questioned a few suspects, they were unable 
to find the person or persons responsible for the fire. Appalled by the inconclusiveness of 
the investigation, Charles Kelly issued a public statement in which he declared there was 
considerable evidence that the motive for the fire was the destruction of the voter 
registration forms and announced that he had requested a full investigation from the 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, citing a violation of the Settegast residents' civil rights 
and an attempt to deny a citizen's right to vote.2 
The controversy surrounding H-HCEOO's voter registration drive in Settegast, as 
well as the arson that it provoked, caused some neighborhood residents to begin 
criticizing the activities of Earl Allen's community organization staff. In the wake of the 
arson came an event that further divided .the Settegast community and served to 
undermine Earl Allen's community organizing efforts in the area. In January 1967 a 
deputy constable appeared at the doorstep of Settegast resident Betty Gentry, who was 
pregnant, to carry out an eviction order. The deputy constable ordered Gentry out of her 
home and began removing her belongings from inside the house. Gentry claimed that 
when she protested the eviction order, the deputy constable "shoved, cursed, and 
handcuffed" her and "unfairly booked [her] for aggravated assault." A few hours later, as 
news of the altercation spread throughout the neighborhood, hundreds of angry Settegast 
residents showed up at Gentry's home and staged a spontaneous protest that lasted until 
the early morning hours the next day. 
Later that evening more than 2,000 Settegast residents met at a local Baptist 
church and signed a petition calling for the immediate dismissal of the deputy constable 
who evicted Gentry and vowed to protest at City Hall until their demand was answered. 
Earl Allen immediately recognized this as a "gut issue" that could be used to mobilize 
Settegast residents to confront the city's public officials about the problems of unfair 
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housing contracts and police brutality. As Allen later explained, "Eviction wasn't the real 
issue. The real issues are lack of adequate housing which permits profiteers to insist on 
unfair terms, and the intimidation of the poor by police. But the people are concerned 
because a pregnant woman was roughed up. We had to help them to do something right 
then. Once mobilized they can get at other issues." The way Allen and his community 
organization staff chose to assist the residents mobilize to protest the treatment of Mrs, 
Gentry was to help them secure transportation to downtown Houston to carry out a 
protest at City Hall. H-HCEOO representatives contracted with Pioneer Bus Company to 
provide three buses, but in anticipation of criticism the arrangement never allowed for 
federal money to be used for the protest or the buses. Settegast residents would pay the 
bill themselves by raising money in the community in support of Betty Gentry.4 
Approximately eighty Settegast residents boarded buses a few days later headed 
toward City Hall in downtown Houston. Though the protest did not result in the dismissal 
of the deputy constable, it did force a response from city and county officials. Precinct 
One Constable W. H. Rankin, the deputy constable's immediate supervisor, told the 
protesters that Gentry was "agitated during the eviction proceedings" and at some point 
during the scuffle she struck the deputy constable. "We can't allow our men to be beaten 
and abused," argued Rankin. "We only serve the papers after the court has decided on the 
eviction." Earl Allen himself could not have portrayed the situation more succinctly and 
accurately. Betty Gentry was not simply roughed up by one county constable, but rather 
4
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she was the victim of an intricate web of oppression that included unscrupulous 
profiteers, local city ordinances, the courts, and law enforcement officials. Protesting the 
treatment of Gentry was simply an avenue through which to confront the structural and 
institutional problems facing Settegast residents. As Allen had hoped, the protest at City 
Hall and the response by local officials were excellent illustrations of how a "gut issue" 
could alert poor residents to major problems like inadequate housing, unfair business 
practices, and police brutality.5 
Even though H-HCEOO staff members had been careful not to use any federal 
funds to provide buses for the protest at City Hall, controversy soon arose because the 
Pioneer Bus Company overcharged the Settegast group and sent the bill directly to H-
HCEOO. Community organizers initially believed they would need eight buses for the 
protest but at the last minute decided they only needed three. An H-HCEOO official was 
supposed to cancel the five extra buses, but because of a miscommunication, the 
cancellation never happened. As a result, Settegast residents were charged for eight 
buses, and the amount was more than they could afford. Local public officials finally had 
some potent ammunition with which to attack the community action agency's protest 
activities. When Mayor Welch and Congressman Bush erroneously charged H-HCEOO 
with using federal funds to stage the protest, the local newspapers repeated the charge 
and provoked a firestorm of criticism aimed at the organization. Though H-HCEOO 
Executive Director Charles Kelly repeatedly assured the public that no federal poverty 
5
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funds had been used for the protest, the damage had been done and the reputation of Earl 
Allen's community organization effort in Settegast suffered a major setback.6 
The controversy surrounding the voter registration drive and the protests at City 
Hall prompted some Settegast residents, who were mostly conservative leaders in the 
community and had been critical of Allen's methods since the community organization 
staff arrived in Settegast, to begin voicing their opposition to H-HCEOO and Earl Allen's 
community organizing efforts in their neighborhood more loudly. Several ministers and 
older residents complained that H-HCEOO organizers were bypassing existing 
community leadership and attempting to create a new force for change that was both 
more confrontational and less effective than groups that had already been established in 
the neighborhood. Local precinct judges voiced their displeasure about Allen's voter 
registration campaign because they believed there were adequate block workers and 
deputies to register everyone in Settegast who wanted to vote and that H-HCEOO 
workers' efforts were a wasteful duplication of services. Other residents of the area 
showed up at an H-HCEOO Board of Directors meeting in February 1967 to complain 
about being disrespected and even threatened by H-HCEOO staff members in Settegast. 
One neighborhood resident told the H-HCEOO Board that staff members in Settegast had 
accomplished some good things, "but I'm saying OEO is not doing the job it was 
6
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designed to do. It is causing neighbor to look funny at neighbor. OEO people shouldn't 
have a superior attitude and look down on people."7 
In the wake of the demonstration at City Hall against the treatment of Betty 
Gentry, members of the Settegast Civic Club, an organization that had existed longer than 
the poverty program and included several business and religious leaders, expressed fear 
that protest activity in Settegast was going too far and that Earl Allen and his staff were 
encouraging violence. Reverend Rancier Worsham, a prominent Baptist minister in 
Settegast, publicly disagreed with the way Allen and H-HCEOO staff members handled 
the eviction situation. Worsham stated, "I would have preferred to talk things over with 
the offended person and the constable before making a commitment. Then we would 
know how important it was. Instead, teen-agers have been stirred up by [H-HCEOO] staff 
. . . and are going off half-cocked." Another Settegast resident, who had been involved in 
the campaign to get pure drinking water for the neighborhood from the city, commented 
that there was danger of "a year's hard work being lost, with people trying to start 
trouble." A neighborhood resident who had been active in the effort to improve public 
schools in Settegast objected to the request by H-HCEOO community organization staff 
members for parents to keep their children out of the schools so they could join the 
protest at City Hall and said, "It seems to me this stirs people up, that it hinders the 
community instead of helping it." A rumor that the H-HCEOO Board was going to bring 
Stokely Carmichael, the Black Power advocate and head of the Student Nonviolent 
7
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Coordinating Committee, into Settegast to help organize poor people also contributed to a 
feeling among the established leaders that their authority was being threatened.8 
Earl Allen responded to these complaints and criticisms with characteristic poise. 
"Poverty communities are highly organized," he argued, "and the leaders feel threatened 
when the organization starts to change." These changes, according to Allen, were 
absolutely necessary to address the problems of poverty in Settegast in any meaningful 
way. "The problem is that the present structure isn't adequate for changing the situation," 
he continued. "If it was, we wouldn't have a poverty community. Either the leaders don't 
represent enough people or their methods haven't proved effective. People in these 
communities are apathetic, not because they don't want to change their situation, but 
because they're hopeless, deprived of dignity and frustrated from years of methods which 
don't work." Allen reiterated that his goal was to organize the Settegast community and 
create an environment where new and vigorous leadership could arise to help solve the 
problems of poverty. As for the charge that his staff was fomenting violence in Settegast, 
Allen responded that there "is more danger of violence in a leaderless community than in 
one with effective leadership." Despite Allen's reassuring comments about his 
community organizing activities in Settegast, in March a large group of Settegast 
Saralee Tiede, "Settegast - A Powderkeg or a Community on the Move?," Houston Chronicle, January 
22, 1967 (quotations). There is some evidence that Mayor Louie Welch and his aide Blair Justice 
encouraged and exploited this animosity between Settegast residents and H-HCEOO community 
organizers; see Blair Justice to Louie Welch, memorandum, 21 February 1967, Box 33, Louie Welch 
Papers, Houston Metropolitan Research Center, Houston Public Library, Houston, Texas (hereafter cited as 
Welch Papers); and Blair Justice to Louie Welch, memorandum, 23 September 1966, Box 33, Welch 
Papers. 
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residents picketed H-HCEOO's neighborhood office and accused Allen's staff of 
"destroying our community" and "organizing children against their parents."9 
Under Ballew's leadership, H-HCEOO had provided unequivocal support for Earl 
Allen and his community organization staff since the fall of 1966. Faced with the 
prospect of public demonstrations against H-HCEOO that might threaten the entire 
poverty program, however, the board changed course and launched an investigation into 
the activities of the community organization staff in Settegast. Though the investigation 
panel found no specific violations of OEO policy in Settegast, in order to cool down the 
immediate tensions Executive Director Charles Kelly nevertheless ordered the removal of 
the entire community organization staff from the area and reassigned them to other parts 
of Houston. Kelly issued a tepid statement with his decision that hardly justified 
removing the staff from the area. He explained, "Some people seem to be unhappy with 
the way the kids are acting. Perhaps our staff has been involved in encouraging kids to 
become involved in community problems. I don't know. Some people just don't want 
their kids doing what they're doing. That is, being concerned with . . . improving things 
in the community." Despite the vague explanation he provided, it was clear that one of 
the factors motivating Kelly to reassign the community organization staff was to prevent 
further protests against H-HCEOO and its activities around the city. His decision had the 
opposite effect, however, as approximately thirty young people staged a sit-in at the H-
HCEOO office the following day and demanded the return of Allen's staff to Settegast.10 
9
 Saralee Tiede, "Settegast - A Powderkeg or a Community on the Move?," Houston Chronicle, January 
22, 1967 (first and second quotation); "Protest Poverty Program," Houston Chronicle, March 2, 1967 (third 
quotation). 
10
 "EOO Staff Ordered Relocated," Houston Post, April 20, 1967 (quotation); Reid Beveridge, "Settegast 
Youth Stage Sit-In Over Transfer of EOO Staffers," Houston Chronicle, April 22, 1967. 
159 
By April 1967, residents of the Settegast area were deeply divided over the role of 
community organizing in the War on Poverty and the H-HCEOO staff had been pulled 
out of the area. More importantly, Charles Kelly and members of the H-HCEOO Board 
of Directors had begun a slight retreat from their determination to focus on community 
organizing and the empowerment of poor residents to challenge Houston's public 
officials and begin reforming its institutions, and this backing off from Ballew's radical 
vision greatly affected the way Ballew and Allen continued to implement their 
interpretation of the community action concept in Houston. The ordeal in Settegast, 
however, was only the first in a series of events that ultimately led to a complete retreat 
from community organizing and a subduing of H-HCEOO as a force for change in 
Houston. The three other major events that occurred during the spring of 1967 - the riot 
on the campus of Texas Southern University, the H-HCEOO staff revolt, and the forced 
merger of H-HCEOO and HAY - followed the conflict in Settegast and together drove 
Ballew, Kelly, and the H-HCEOO Board into a defensive position from which they never 
recovered. 
The troubled spring semester of 1967 on the campus of Texas Southern 
University had its roots in the change in university leadership that occurred the previous 
fall. The Texas legislature had created TSU in 1947 to serve as a supposed educational 
equivalent to the University of Texas. Located in the lower-middle-class African 
American neighborhood known as the Third Ward, TSU would serve African American 
students and thus allow higher education in the state to remain racially segregated. TSU 
had been presided over since 1955 by Samuel Nabrit, who during his eleven-year tenure 
as president attempted to expand the role of the university in the Houston community and 
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supported efforts to desegregate the city. For example, during the late 1950s and early 
1960s Nabrit commended TSU students who took the lead in efforts to desegregate 
public facilities in Houston, which included several demonstrations and sit-ins. When 
Nabrit resigned his position in 1966 to assume an appointment to the Atomic Energy 
Commission, his replacement as TSU president held a different view of the proper role of 
the university and its students. Joseph A. Pierce, Nabrit's successor who served as 
president of the university for only one year from the fall of 1966 to the spring of 1967, 
was described by Houston historian Dwight Watson as "deferential to whites" and intent 
on controlling the TSU student population. Many TSU students characterized Pierce as 
"reactionary, rigid, and inflexible." As Watson argued, Pierce's "heavy-handed 
leadership set the stage for confrontations between students and the administration."1' 
During the fall of 1966 a group of TSU students formed an organization they 
called "Friends of SNCC" and requested official university recognition as a campus 
organization. One of the requirements for securing official university recognition was that 
each organization obtain a faculty sponsor, and to meet this condition the Friends of 
SNCC chose Mach Jones, a seasoned civil rights worker who came to TSU as an 
instructor in the social sciences department during the fall of 1966. The TSU 
administration did allow the Friends of SNCC to hold meetings on campus, but despite 
the fact that the organization's members had found a faculty sponsor, administrators 
never officially recognized them as a campus organization. Above all, TSU 
administrators, especially Pierce, feared that the leaders of Friends of SNCC were trying 
11
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to stir up trouble on campus and were especially susceptible to the influence of outside 
agitators. In early March 1967, members of the Friends of SNCC led a rambunctious 
crowd of approximately 100 participants in a downtown march protesting police brutality 
against African Americans in Houston, increasing Pierce's skepticism of the 
organization. Friends of SNCC members held the protest in response to accusations of 
four African American gospel singers that Texas Highway Patrolmen had brutalized them 
during a traffic stop just outside the Houston city limits. During the march some of the 
participants shouted slogans like "Black Power" and "burn baby burn" as others carried 
signs reading "Whitey, the days for black nonviolence are over - are yours?" and 
"Welch, help stop police brutality or Houston will be a billion dollar graveyard." After 
the demonstration, TSU administrators met with Friends of SNCC and Mack Jones, their 
faculty sponsor, to inform them that their organization would no longer be allowed to 
meet on campus and that further discussions concerning university recognition were out 
of the question.12 
One week later TSU administrators further infuriated members of the organization 
by declining to renew Mack Jones's teaching contract for the next year. The firing of 
Jones rallied formerly uninterested students to the Friends of SNCC, and several 
members of the faculty called for an investigation into the administration's firing of 
Jones. The following few weeks were incredibly tense on the TSU campus as the Friends 
of SNCC led a series of class boycotts that spilled into the university's final exam 
schedule. On April 13, 1967, in the midst of the turmoil, Stokely Carmichael came to 
Houston to speak on the nearby campus of the University of Houston. Though Mayor 
12
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Welch and Houston Police Chief Herman Short were both fearful that Carmichael would 
incite TSU and University of Houston students to riot, Carmichael gave a rather moderate 
speech about the importance of reclaiming black culture and opposing the war in 
Vietnam. When asked about the demonstrations and class boycotts at TSU, Carmichael 
stated, "It was a long time coming," but opted not to lead a march to the TSU campus 
after his speech.13 
Though Carmichael's speech did not live up to the fears of Welch and Short, after 
Carmichael's visit to Houston the demonstrations and boycotts on the TSU campus 
intensified. The Friends of SNCC began with only two demands - that their organization 
be recognized by the university administration and that Mack Jones be reinstated as an 
instructor. By mid-April 1967, however, a campus-wide student uprising had gained 
momentum as the students' demands now included extended curfew hours, increased 
salaries for all faculty and university employees, removal of armed security officers from 
the campus, creation of a student court with authority equal to the dean of students, 
addition of black literature to the university library shelves, improved cafeteria food, 
freedom of student organizations to bring to campus any speaker of their choice, and 
removal of the dean of students from the local draft board. While the student movement 
was intensifying at TSU, the Houston police department began a surveillance operation 
on the campus designed to keep tabs on the student activists; Police Chief Short began 
securing arrest warrants for leaders of the boycotts. Short also increased the number of 
13
 Watson, Race and the Houston Police Department, 81; Blair Justice to Louie Welch, memorandum, 12 
April 1967, Box 33, Welch Papers; Blair Justice to Louie Welch, memorandum, 19 April 1967, Box 33, 
Welch Papers; Ken Fairchild to Louie Welch, memorandum, 27 April 1967, Box 33, Welch Papers; Joyce 
Jane Weedman and Ted D'Andriole, "Boycott at TSU Fizzles and Classes About Normal," Houston 
Chronicle, March 29, 1967; "Carmichael's UH Speech Will Go On," Houston Post, April 12, 1967; Donnie 
Smith, "Organize Black People" Carmichael Outlines Plans for Houston," Houston Post, April 14, 1967 
(quotation); "UH Hall Crowded for Carmichael Talk," Houston Informer, April 15, 1967; "Fear for 
Violence, Loss of Credits Return Calm to TSU," Houston Informer, April 1, 1967. 
163 
undercover and uniformed officers in and around the TSU campus, a move that further 
enraged the student demonstrators.14 
Through this increased police presence city officials learned about the 
involvement of Houston's poverty workers in the demonstrations at TSU. Carl Moore, a 
TSU student and part-time employee of Houston Action for Youth, had participated in 
the demonstrations on campus in early April. Police also discovered that Reverend Bill 
Lawson, who was the director of the Upward Bound program at TSU and often served as 
an informal advisor to H-HCEOO Board Chairman William Ballew, had provided 
blankets and food to students staging a sit-in at the city courthouse to demand the release 
of several activists who had been arrested at TSU. Most damaging, however, was the 
revelation that Pluria Marshall, a full-time H-HCEOO community organizer, actually led 
one of the major demonstrations at TSU during the month of April and supplied a 
bullhorn for student protesters making speeches on campus. Though Marshall had been a 
frequent critic of the antipoverty efforts of H-HCEOO and once called for the immediate 
resignation of Executive Director Charles Kelly, Ballew and Kelly had hired Marshall in 
December 1966 and placed him on Earl Allen's community organization staff. Police 
Chief Short eagerly turned over this information to Mayor Welch, who in turn demanded 
an investigation by the H-HCEOO Board and OEO officials in Washington.15 
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After the events in Settegast over the previous few months, H-HCEOO Board 
members were becoming more cautious in their approach to community organizing 
efforts and in their response to mounting criticism. After Houston Action for Youth 
officials terminated Carl Moore's employment for his participation in the TSU 
demonstrations, Ballew and Kelly decided that Pluria Marshall's actions also required a 
response from the H-HCEOO Board of Directors lest public officials use the incident to 
discredit their organization even further. Rather than firing him, Earl Allen convinced 
Ballew and Kelly that Marshall should be placed on an indefinite leave that would allow 
him to continue leading protest demonstrations at TSU without being affiliated with the 
poverty program in Houston. Marshall agreed that this arrangement provided the best 
solution to the problem. In his letter requesting a leave of absence from his community 
organizing duties with H-HCEOO, Marshall stated that an indefinite leave was necessary 
"in order to maintain communication with the [TSU] students to help them keep going in 
a rational direction. I feel that the respect that they have for me forces me to honor it and 
do whatever I can to help them." To prevent the appearance of being too soft on 
Marshall, Ballew and Kelly, in addition to accepting his request for a leave of absence 
from the organization, also docked Marshall's pay for the six days he abandoned his 
community organizing responsibilities to participate in demonstrations on the TSU 
campus.16 
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Kelly, Ballew, and Allen had underestimated the determination of certain local 
public officials to attack H-HCEOO. The disciplinary action against Marshall was not 
enough to satisfy Police Chief Short or Mayor Welch, and in response the two public 
officials launched an all-out assault on the organization. At one time Welch had been 
fairly indifferent to the city's antipoverty program. The protests in Settegast, however, 
had caught the mayor by surprise, and H-HCEOO's participation in the TSU 
demonstrations embarrassed him. Like officials in other cities, Welch was also fearful of 
race riots, which had been regularly convulsing the nation's large cities since 1965. As 
Welch saw it, although H-HCEOO would probably never intentionally incite a riot, their 
actions might inadvertently contribute to igniting a racial explosion in Houston. When 
Ballew and Kelly failed to fire Pluria Marshall, Welch initiated a public smear campaign 
against individuals associated with the organization in order to rein in their more 
questionable activities. In mid-April, just after Marshall had been granted his indefinite 
leave of absence, Welch began turning over information to local Houston radio station 
KTRH 740 AM concerning the involvement of H-HCEOO employees in the uprising at 
TSU. KTRH broadcasters ran a daily morning report for an entire week alleging that 
Moore, Lawson, and Marshall had violated OEO policy by being involved in the TSU 
protests and had used federal funds to help the demonstrators. As the week progressed the 
accusations got more intense. Citing two Houston police officers who worked for the 
Intelligence Division, the radio station reported that Pluria Marshall had admitted to a 
reporter that he used OEO funds to supply a bullhorn to the TSU protesters, and then 
Marshall to Edwin Becnel, memorandum, 7 April 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, Houston, Harris County, 
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Marshall threatened the reporter by saying he would be "whipped" if he mentioned 
anything about his confession on the air.17 
By the end of the second week of April 1967, Welch was turning over the full 
police records of certain H-HCEOO employees to KTRH producers. Although the radio 
station's broadcasters stopped short of stating the actual names associated with each 
police file, in many cases they provided just enough information so that nearly anyone 
who wanted to put the pieces together could figure out the individuals they were 
referencing. The radio station reported that one particular employee had been arrested for 
vagrancy and suspicion of being an army dissenter in Galveston in 1948, robbery by 
firearm in Philadelphia in 1955, and possession of narcotics in Illinois in 1957. The 
reporter also pointed out that this individual was known to wear Black Panther and SNCC 
buttons on the TSU campus and had been a leader in the Friends of SNCC organization. 
The radio station also aired the police record of Earl Allen, pointing out that he had been 
arrested in Dallas in connection with civil rights protests in the early 1960s and had been 
instrumental in the Settegast demonstrations at City Hall.18 
Seeing a battle between the community action agency and local elected officials 
developing quickly in Houston, OEO officials in Washington wasted no time sending a 
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representative from the Office of Inspection to investigate the allegations being made by 
Mayor Welch and Police Chief Short. On April 7, 1967, OEO Inspector James Simons 
arrived in Houston and immediately began a thorough inquiry into the accusations against 
War on Poverty workers in the city. Mayor Welch initially welcomed the investigation, 
but his attitude toward Simons and OEO changed when Simons turned up no evidence of 
wrongdoing on the part of H-HCEOO. Simons concluded that no federal funds had been 
used by any H-HCEOO employee to help the demonstrators at TSU and that the role 
played by Bill Lawson was entirely "constructive," meaning he helped prevent the 
situation from becoming any worse by keeping the protesters calm and level-headed. He 
also noted that Lawson had been instrumental in negotiating a truce between the 
university administration and the student demonstrators to allow for the class boycott to 
end in early April. As for the role played by Pluria Marshall, Simons found that if 
Marshall had provided a bullhorn for the protesters, he had definitely not used OEO 
money to buy it. He also concluded that the disciplinary action that Ballew and Kelly 
took against Marshall was appropriate for the situation. Simons concluded that no one 
involved had acted in a way that violated OEO policy and that no one "seemed upset over 
the involvement of OEO-funded groups except Mayor Welch and the Houston Police 
Department, who are thought to be opposed to most of the efforts of OEO in Houston." 
Once Simons sent his report back to OEO in Washington, the situation seemed to settle 
down in Houston. Another federal OEO official commented in mid-April that the 
"situation in Houston is presently relatively calm" and that "all is quiet on the Texas 
Southern University campus."19 
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Though it seemed that Simons's report settled the issue for H-HCEOO, the actual 
TSU "riot" was still weeks away. Despite the appearance of "quiet" on the campus of 
TSU, in reality students were still fuming about the heavy-handed leadership of Pierce 
and the increased police presence on the campus. During the second week of May 1967 
several TSU students were involved in a demonstration in the Sunnyside neighborhood 
protesting the way the city administered a garbage dump in the area. Protesters initiated 
the demonstration after a young African American boy in the neighborhood was able to 
get inside the dump and drowned in a water-filled pit. Houston police officers attempted 
to disperse the crowd on May 16 and arrested Reverend Bill Lawson, Earl Allen, and 
several other protesters on the charge of failure to move on at a police order. Lawson 
remembered that the police officers got quite rough with the protesters, further infuriating 
TSU students who had been demonstrating against police brutality for more than a 
month. When these students returned to the TSU campus later that night and reported on 
the actions of the Houston police at the Sunnyside dump, tensions that had been seething 
for several weeks exploded into anger and open hostility toward the increased police 
presence on campus. When police officers arrested a student who was addressing a crowd 
about police brutality at the Sunnyside dump protest, angry students began throwing 
bricks and rocks at passing police cars and white onlookers. Police Chief Short responded 
by assembling additional officers in full riot gear on the periphery of the campus, a move 
that further angered the already indignant student population.20 
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With the situation becoming more volatile by the minute, H-HCEOO officials 
decided to try to mend their relationship with city officials, particularly with Mayor 
Welch. Perhaps alarmed at the ease with which Welch carried out a public attack on the 
organization and possibly encouraged by OEO officials in Washington to hedge their 
bets, the H-HCEOO Board contacted the mayor's office and offered the services of their 
organization to help restore peace on the TSU campus. This was quite a turnabout for an 
organization that just a few months prior was totally committed to the organization and 
empowerment of poor communities to challenge the city's power structure, but the 
campaign conducted by the mayor and the police chief against H-HCEOO had a 
profound effect on the organization's leadership. The strategy seemed to work; Welch 
agreed to release Earl Allen and Bill Lawson from jail if H-HCEOO officials agreed to 
send them to the TSU campus to talk to the students. In the wake of this development, 
one OEO official in Houston remarked that H-HCEOO had begun to work actively and 
cooperatively with representatives of the mayor's office and with the police department, 
and that the mayor himself had "high praise for their efforts in this difficult situation." As 
the OEO official proclaimed, "This endorsement under these circumstances . . . 
represents a major turn around of opinion by the Mayor's office about OEO in 
Houston."21 
By the time Lawson and Allen arrived on the TSU campus, many students had 
already begun destroying property and had barricaded themselves inside one of the 
student residence halls. A rumor had been circulating on campus that a white man had 
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shot and killed a young African American boy in Northeast Houston. Although this 
rumor proved to be false, the story's circulation at TSU simply added more fuel to the 
fire already started. Police officers allowed Lawson and Allen to enter the hall to speak 
with the students, but to no avail. Moments after Lawson and Allen left the building, 
gunfire erupted on the campus. It remains unclear whether it was a student or a police 
officer who fired the first shot, but when it ended, Houston police officers had fired more 
than 5,000 rounds into the dormitory and one officer, Ronald Kuba, lay dead in a pool of 
blood. Police Chief Short initially reported that Kuba had been killed by sniper fire 
coming from the dormitory, but a later investigation concluded that Kuba had been struck 
by a ricocheting bullet fired from another police officer's gun. Police responded to 
Kuba's death by storming the dormitory and, as historian Dwight Watson has written, 
"they went berserk, destroying everything in their path." By night's end Houston police 
officers had arrested more than 500 students and turned the TSU campus into an occupied 
territory.22 
Though the H-HCEOO leadership had attempted to improve their relationship 
with the city's public officials, tensions remained as some city officials, particularly 
Police Chief Short, continued to attack the poverty program in Houston and blamed some 
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Houston in the wake of the TSU riot met with Short and reported that "it was very 
evident that the Chief was incensed that it cost the city of Houston a considerable sum of 
money to police demonstrations backed by OEO-Federal money." The inspector went on 
to state that Short "did not believe that the TSU demonstrations were anything but H-
HCEOO inspired, citing Pluria Marshall's part in the incidents." Though Marshall was 
not on the campus during the riot in May and the H-HCEOO Board attempted to restore 
peace on the campus the night of the riot, the police chief continued to believe H-
HCEOO employees were behind the turmoil. After the riot, Short sent Welch a 
photograph of a message spray painted on the wall of a TSU building: "Everybody 
Rejoice - We Killed a White, Racist, Punk-Ass, Blue-Eyed, Stringy-Haired, Pussy Eating 
COP!" Attached to the photograph was a personal note from the police chief that read, 
"Mayor, this is the 'great society' that deserves so much help." Clearly Short did not 
interpret H-HCEOO's overtures toward the city's public officials as altruistic, and he 
continued his assault on the poverty program in the city. 
Much like the events in Settegast, the TSU riot served to put H-HCEOO leaders 
on the defensive and forced them to put the brakes on their community organizers. 
Ballew and Kelly witnessed firsthand the power of the mayor and police chief and the 
weapons at their disposal if they chose to attack the poverty program. After the TSU riot, 
Kelly and the board forbade H-HCEOO staff members and community organizers from 
participating in protests or demonstrations in the city. In an even more shocking 
development, after the TSU riot the H-HCEOO personnel committee agreed to submit the 
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names of all current and prospective employees of the organization to Police Chief Short 
for pre-screening. If any employee or future employee was found to have a questionable 
police record, that person could be denied employment with the poverty program in 
Houston. Though this only partially satisfied Short, Mayor Welch was pleased with the 
new arrangement. In fact, Welch told an OEO inspector in late May that "H-HCEOO 
could be an effective organization" in Houston now that its leaders were willing to 
coordinate their activities with city officials. H-HCEOO had traveled a long distance 
from the idealistic days when Ballew first took the helm and committed the organization 
to the Alinsky model of community organization and empowerment of the poor by hiring 
Earl Allen and devoting nearly all of the agency's resources to his community organizing 
efforts. But Ballew and Allen were no match for Welch and Short. Alinsky had been 
right; power relations were at the very heart of the problems of the poor. When H-
HCEOO leaders decided to forge a friendly relationship with Houston's public officials, 
they circumvented their own power in the fight against poverty.24 
Satisfying local city officials largely ended the conflict with Welch and Short but 
it created an ever widening rift between the H-HCEOO Board on the one hand and 
community organizers and the poor themselves on the other. While the situation was 
heating up on the TSU campus, Earl Allen and his community organization staff began 
voicing their opposition to the new conservative mood of the H-HCEOO Board. OEO 
Inspector James Simons met with Allen and a few other dissident community organizers 
during the second week in April 1967 to investigate this troubling conflict between the H-
24
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HCEOO Board and its staff. Simons discovered that "mass disillusionment and 
bitterness" had overtaken many members of the community organization staff and poor 
residents of the target neighborhoods because both groups believed that H-HCEOO 
leadership was attempting to block their efforts at organizing the poor in Houston. Allen 
and other community organizers warned Simons that the present course of H-HCEOO 
would invariably produce a "violent expression" of frustration in the poor neighborhoods 
where the War on Poverty had raised the expectations of poor residents but failed to 
deliver on its promises. One H-HCEOO community organizer in Settegast told Simons 
that he was losing both the respect of the neighborhood residents and the credibility he 
once enjoyed as a representative of H-HCEOO. He exclaimed, "If I was hired to pacify 
angry folk with promises . . . I won't do it. . . . I'll starve first." With the firm belief that if 
H-HCEOO failed to change course soon there would be a violent uprising in Houston's 
poor neighborhoods, Allen and other community organizers met on April 8 and 9 to plan 
a demonstration and a public airing of their grievances at H-HCEOO headquarters.25 
On the morning of April 10, 1967, as the H-HCEOO Board of Directors was busy 
considering disciplinary action against Pluria Marshall for his participation in the 
ongoing TSU demonstrations, Earl Allen and approximately fifty members of his 
community organization staff arrived at H-HCEOO headquarters in downtown Houston 
and began a protest vigil that lasted all day. Allen issued a statement explaining that he 
and his staff were demonstrating against the H-HCEOO Board's waning support for 
community organization in Houston's poor neighborhoods and its lack of effective 
communication with the staff about what the priorities and goals of the community action 
25
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agency would be in Houston. Although Ballew was still chairman of H-HCEOO, he was 
rapidly losing support among members of the board due to the controversies in Settegast 
and on the TSU campus. To make matters worse, Ballew interpreted Allen's picketing of 
H-HCEOO headquarters as a personal insult that disregarded his support of community 
organizing over the past year. In response to Allen's demands, Ballew initially refused to 
negotiate with the demonstrators. H-HCEOO Executive Director Charles Kelly went a 
step further by suspending three community organizers involved in the protest 
indefinitely and docking the pay for all others present during the demonstration. When 
Allen promised continued protests outside H-HCEOO headquarters until the board 
addressed their demands, officials at the Southwest Regional OEO office in Austin 
pressured Ballew and other board members to call a special H-HCEOO executive 
committee meeting to hear the community organization staffs concerns. 
One week later Allen and other members of the community organization staff 
presented their list of grievances and demands to the H-HCEOO executive committee. 
After pointing out how several board members were attempting to defame the reputation 
of certain community organization staff members while criticizing their activities in 
Settegast and other areas where poor residents were being organized, the authors of the 
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list arrived at the crux of their disillusionment with H-HCEOO as an organization. The 
report stated that the "Board is afraid of conflict, and as a result of that fear has allowed 
criticism of the program to be turned into condemnation of the Staff. . . . The fear of 
conflict results in our Board's reacting in a manner which is diametrically opposed to the 
concept of maximum feasible participation of the poor." The board was missing the 
point, the protesters said, because the "inevitability of internal and external conflict is 
inherent in the concept of Community Action itself; therefore, it is naive to believe that 
one can conduct an effective Community Action Program without experiencing 
confrontation between the poor and the established power structures." H-HCEOO Board 
members "oppose the actions of our group," the protesters argued, "because they know 
that we are fighting to bring about the realization of a program that will afford to the poor 
the opportunity to enter into direct confrontation with those forces which have kept them 
in a condition of deprivation."27 
Several H-HCEOO Board members in recent months had also accused Allen and 
his community organization staff of attempting to use the poverty program in Houston to 
advance a Black Power agenda. The authors of the list of grievances and demands 
answered this charge directly: 
If Black Power means an attempt at forming a power base in Negro communities 
in an effort to afford to those residents the opportunities to control their destinies, 
then we advocate Black Power. 
If Brown power means an attempt at forming a power base in a Latin American 
community in an effort to afford to those residents the opportunity to control their 
27
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own destinies, then we advocate Brown Power. 
If White Power means an attempt at forming a power base in White communities 
in an effort to afford to those residents the opportunities to control their own 
destinies, then we advocate White Power. 
If Human Power means an attempt to bring together all ethnic groups in an effort 
to create a harmonious and cooperative society which benefits from the 
participation of all its members, then we advocate Human Power." 
The authors accused certain board members of using fears of Black Power and urban 
rioting in an attempt to discredit the community organization staff and diminish the 
effectiveness of its confrontational strategy. 
The authors concluded their statement of grievances and demands with a list of 
recommendations for the H-HCEOO Board of Directors. All of the recommendations 
boiled down to the demand that the community organization staff be allowed to continue 
using the tactics developed by Earl Allen free from interference by the board. The authors 
argued that the board should confine its actions to policy decisions and leave the 
operation of the community action program to the staff. In order to restore the confidence 
of the community organization staff as well as the poor residents themselves, the authors 
of the report demanded that "a statement be issued by the board endorsing the use of 
direct confrontation as a strategy for social change" and that the board dedicate itself to 
giving "support to employees engaged in activities in keeping with effective community 
action even when those activities are contrary to interests represented on the Board." The 
dissident staff members recognized that they would not be able to continue organizing 
28
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and empowering Houston's poor communities unless the H-HCEOO Board of Directors 
stood firmly behind their efforts. If Allen's staff continued to be hamstrung by the new 
conservative mood that had taken hold of the board, H-HCEOO community organizers 
realized they would continue to lose support and credibility in the target neighborhoods 
and a violent uprising would be a real possibility.29 
Allen failed to persuade the board. He no doubt expected that, but what he could 
not have predicted was the resulting conflict within the community organization staff. An 
OEO inspector from Washington noted in the week after Allen and his staff made their 
demands on the H-HCEOO Board that "due to a weak, ineffective executive director 
[Charles Kelly], two factions have evolved in H-HCEOO with diametrically opposed 
philosophies concerning community development." On one side of this philosophical rift 
was Earl Allen and his community organization staff, who the inspector described as 
displaying a "high degree of militancy" and being totally committed to "the use of direct 
confrontation as a strategy for social change." The opposing faction was led by Mrs. 
Keith Finlayson, an H-HCEOO community organizer who resigned in January 1967 and 
alleged that newly hired Director of Community Organization Earl Allen was 
"accelerating the conversion of [community organization] staff personnel to the Black 
Muslim faith" and "turning the poverty program into a militant Black Power 
Organization." Though it must have seemed unlikely that a Methodist minister like Earl 
Allen would oversee the conversion of his operation into a Black Muslim organization, a 
sufficient number of other H-HCEOO employees and board members believed her, even 
after the board investigated her allegations and found them to have no merit. Despite her 
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patently false allegations, the H-HCEOO Board refused to accept her resignation and 
simply reassigned her as a community organizer outside of the Settegast area and away 
from Allen's day-to-day operations. From that position Finlayson continued her assault 
on Allen's staff, and according to H-HCEOO Executive Director Charles Kelly, she also 
began providing information to the Houston Police Department and the local news media 
about the inner conflicts within H-HCEOO. By April 1967, when Allen and his staff 
revolted against the H-HCEOO Board, Finlayson had a solid group of supporters both on 
the H-HCEOO staff and on the Board of Directors. This group rejected the idea that 
community organizing should be the centerpiece of H-HCEOO's activities in Houston's 
poor neighborhoods and instead advocated for the development and coordination of 
social services for the poor. Rather than provoking the city's public officials, Finlayson 
and her supporters argued that the status quo should be preserved and city leaders should 
be consulted and brought into the poverty program if possible. As the OEO inspector 
noted in his report, this dichotomy within the H-HCEOO staff seemed to be a harbinger 
of things to come in the future of the organization.30 
While the H-HCEOO staff revolt was beginning to tear apart the organization 
from within, several of Houston's public officials continued their external assault on the 
poverty program in the city and exploited the staff divisions in order to shape the future 
of the organization. Despite Welch's gradually improving relationship with the H-
HCEOO Board, the mayor soon found himself in an ideal position from which to criticize 
the parts of the War on Poverty in Houston with which he disagreed. In March 1967 
Lyndon Johnson had appointed Welch to the National Advisory Council of the Office of 
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Economic Opportunity, and the mayor's first statement as a member of this council was 
to argue that some of the poverty programs needed to be ended, particularly the emphasis 
on community organizing. Welch told the Houston Post that protests were certainly not 
the intent of War on Poverty planners and that the "business of hiring buses to bus people 
to the wrong place in order to protest is certainly a waste of taxpayers' money." The 
protest at city hall, according to the mayor, was "misdirected and misguided and I hope 
will not recur."31 
In May 1967 Mayor Welch, unable to control the H-HCEOO community 
organization staff completely and concerned that Earl Allen's faction might emerge 
victorious, submitted a formal complaint to the OEO office in Washington; he 
characterized the complaint as a "series of questions that this office feels it can no longer 
delay in raising." Welch continued, "As the OEO in both Washington and Austin knows, 
there has been deep concern about the poverty program in the Houston area for some 
time but it has only been in the last few weeks that the problem has reached a point where 
this office must bring the sort of information and questions contained in the attached to 
the attention of those in authority on a national level." The mayor's concerns were 
predictably centered on the question of the proper role of a community action agency in 
the fight against poverty. Welch expressed his outrage that H-HCEOO community 
organizers had promoted conflict between poor residents and the city's government when 
"remedies through mediation and negotiation have not been exhausted." After praising 
the service delivery approach of HAY, the mayor denounced H-HCEOO's criticism of 
that approach and asked if "revolution" was the goal of H-HCEOO. Welch also expressed 
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his dissatisfaction with the involvement of H-HCEOO employees in protests in the city 
and in demonstrations on the TSU campus. The mayor stated, "Since it appears that the 
[H-HCEOO] program is based, at least in part, on that used by The Woodlawn 
Organization initiated by Saul Alinsky, is it the opinion of the OEO that confrontation 
and conflict are the only means by which the poor can be heard by 'the power structure' 
and mediation of problems is a method not open to the impoverished?" The mayor 
concluded his letter by reporting on the results of a survey conducted by his office that 
showed most poor residents in Houston were dissatisfied with H-HCEOO and the poverty 
program in general. OEO officials in Washington forwarded Welch's letter to the 
Southwest Regional OEO office, and Southwest Regional OEO Director Walter Richter 
promptly responded to Welch's concerns and attempted to explain OEO policy regarding 
the activities of the H-HCEOO community organization staff. While Richter encouraged 
Welch to accept some degree of conflict in Houston as the natural outgrowth of poor 
people taking control of their own lives, he nonetheless wanted to prevent the situation 
from threatening the survival of the entire War on Poverty being conducted in Houston. 
Accordingly, Richter tried to assure the mayor that OEO policy would never allow a 
community action agency to promote "revolution" and promised that the poverty 
program in Houston would strive to work closely with the city's elected officials to carry 
out a meaningful and effective attack on poverty.32 
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Republican Congressman George Bush had a similar reaction to the activities of 
H-HCEOO's community organization staff, and there is evidence to suggest that he and 
Mayor Welch had begun working together as early as February 1967 to launch a public 
smear campaign against H-HCEOO in Houston and to drive a wedge between community 
organizers and poor residents in Settegast.33 It was during that month that the mayor's 
office began supplying Congressman Bush with confidential information about individual 
H-HCEOO community organizers. Bush especially took issue with H-HCEOO's voter 
registration campaign in Houston's poor neighborhoods; poor and black residents were 
not the type of voters Republicans wanted to add to the roles in their effort to make 
inroads into the Solid South. When the Texas Attorney General ruled that H-HCEOO 
employees did not violate any voter registration laws with their actions, Bush called for a 
change in OEO policy that would forbid these kinds of voter registration activities. By 
March 1967 the freshman congressman was criticizing the poverty program in Houston 
so loudly that OEO officials in Washington sent an inspector to meet with Bush to 
discuss his concerns. During this meeting, Bush voiced his strong opposition to H-
HCEOO Chairman Ballew's confrontational philosophy and his emphasis on community 
organizing. Bush also charged that the H-HCEOO Board of Directors regularly hired 
community organizers who had police records, which was information he had received 
from Welch. As the OEO inspector wrote in his report, "It appears obvious that a number 
of Bush's concerns had been stimulated by the Mayor, particularly since he cited the 
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Mayor as the source of information concerning employment of persons with police 
records and extremist backgrounds." The OEO inspector concluded that Bush was not 
antagonistic to the poverty program in Houston but that he preferred the service delivery 
approach of HAY and was incredibly fearful that H-HCEOO's community organizing 
tactics would lead to a violent urban riot in Houston.34 
An important matter that further complicated this volatile situation, and one that 
Welch, Bush, and Short also sought to exploit in order to gain more control over the 
poverty program in Houston, was the increasing pressure exerted by OEO officials in 
Washington and Austin for H-HCEOO and HAY to merge into a single community 
action agency. All of the OEO inspectors who visited Houston in February 1967 agreed 
that the most desirable solution would be a merger of H-HCEOO and HAY into one 
community action agency for the city of Houston. According to OEO officials, even 
though each community action agency operated in a different part of the city, just the 
mere presence of two separate organizations indicated a failure to coordinate the poverty 
program in Houston. More importantly, an effective community action agency needed to 
be able to perform both functions - community organization as well as the coordination 
of social services. By merging Houston's two community action agencies, OEO officials 
hoped to create a single agency that could carry out both objectives and at the same time 
improve the deficiencies of each organization by using the strengths of the other.35 
34
 Blair Justice to Louie Welch, memorandum, 21 February 1967, Box 33, Welch Papers; James M. Simons 
to Edgar May, memorandum, 23 February 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, Houston, Harris County, Texas, Jan-
Mar 1967, OEO Inspection Division, Inspection Reports, 1964-67, Record Group 381, NARA; Peter 
Spruance to Edgar May, memorandum, 20 March 1967, Box 59, Folder Houston Texas CAA 1968, OEO 
CAP Records of the Director, Subject Files, 1965-1969, Record Group 381, NARA; E.R. Brown to Joseph 
Fagan, memorandum, 21 March 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, Houston, Harris County, Texas, Jan-Mar 1967, 
OEO Inspection Division, Inspection Reports, 1964-67, Record Group 381, NARA. 
35
 Office of Economic Opportunity, Office of Inspection, "Houston CAP," February 1967, Box 10B, Folder 
Inspection and Evaluation Reports, OEO, Southwest Region, Community Action Programs, District 
183 
Although the goal of a merged community action agency for Houston was clear, 
the method of achieving this goal proved to be more problematic. As one OEO inspector 
stated in her report, leaders of H-HCEOO and HAY shared a mutual distrust of each 
other. "HAY characterizes H-HCEOO as a rabble-rousing organization run by an 
ambitious Board Director and untrained staff, achieving little in the way of significant 
improvements for the poor and lacking the confidence of its constituency. H-HCEOO 
sees HAY as a paternalistic traditional social service agency, confining itself largely to 
providing some palliative services for the indigent with minimum interest in community 
organization and minimum impact on changing the lot of the poor." H-HCEOO seemed 
especially resistant to the idea of a merger between equals because its Board of Directors 
saw their organization as the legitimate community action agency for Houston and 
refused to enter into relationships with other antipoverty organizations unless the other 
agency agreed to give the H-HCEOO Board of Directors authority over its operations. 
For example, H-HCEOO refused to take part in the manpower and employment program 
administered in part by the Texas Employment Commission (TEC) because the TEC 
refused to place their operations under the authority of the H-HCEOO Board. 
Additionally, under Ballew's leadership the H-HCEOO Board had taken the focus off of 
the delivery and coordination of social services and had become devoted to the 
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organization of the poor as a means of addressing the problems of poverty in Houston. 
This emphasis on community organizing was not simply a tactical decision but rather a 
deeply held philosophical belief espoused most vocally by William Ballew and Earl 
Allen that the only sure way to attack the root causes of poverty was to organize and 
empower the poor to make demands on local public officials and begin to reform the 
institutions that affected their lives. For Ballew and Allen, this meant discarding the 
notion that the delivery and coordination of social services was an effective way of 
permanently addressing the needs of the poor. Instead, antipoverty activists should be 
working in poor neighborhoods to identify "gut issues" and organizing poor residents to 
come up with their own solutions to these problems. According to Ballew and Allen, 
poverty workers must be prepared to work with and support neighborhood residents even 
to the point of participating in protests and demonstrations against the city's public 
officials. With a firm belief in this philosophy, it seemed incredibly unlikely indeed that 
H-HCEOO and HAY would ever be able to merge and carry out a united antipoverty 
effort in Houston. 
This philosophical difference between H-HCEOO and HAY that had existed since 
the inception of the War on Poverty in Houston played a major role during the spring of 
1967 when Southwest Regional OEO officials finally insisted that the two organizations 
merge to form a single community action agency for the city of Houston. Although OEO 
36
 Marlene Futterman, "Inspection Report for HHCEOO and HAY," February 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, 
Houston, Harris County, Texas, Jan-Mar 1967, OEO Inspection Division, Inspection Reports, 1964-67, 
Record Group 381, NARA (quotation); Office of Economic Opportunity, Office of Inspection, "Houston 
CAP," February 1967, Box 10B, Folder Inspection and Evaluation Reports, OEO, Southwest Region, 
Community Action Programs, District Supervisors, Records Relating to City Economic Opportunity 
Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record Group 381, NARASW; Office of Economic Opportunity, Office of 
Inspection, "Houston-Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization and Houston Action for Youth, 
Inc.," February 1967, Box 10B, Folder Inspection and Evaluation Reports, OEO, Southwest Region, 
Community Action Programs, District Supervisors, Records Relating to City Economic Opportunity 
Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record Group 381, NARASW. 
185 
officials had been politely suggesting that H-HCEOO and HAY merge to form one 
community action agency for the Houston area since the fall of 1966, H-HCEOO's 
emphasis on community organizing and confrontational tactics did not mesh well with 
HAY's almost total dedication to the delivery and coordination of social services for the 
poor. When asked about a possible merger in January 1967, H-HCEOO Chairman Ballew 
pointed out that "each organization is approaching the poverty problem from vastly 
different viewpoints," and Earl Allen stated that H-HCEOO's "community organizers are 
not community flunkies. Our staff is not out to run people back and forth to Ben Taub 
[General Hospital], There are too many people looking for handouts already. Our idea is 
to get people to act for themselves, to involve people in the planning which affects their 
lives." HAY President Ed Bracher replied that HAY's approach "has shown itself to be 
effective" and argued that HAY had "a highly competent professional staff, which is not 
dominated by the opinions of lay people. . . . [H-HCEOO] seems to get groups together 
solely for the purpose of marching on City Hall over every issue." It was clear to 
Southwest Regional OEO officials that a merger between two groups with such strikingly 
different philosophies about how to solve the problems of poverty was going to be a 
difficult if not impossible process.37 
Federal OEO inspectors who visited Houston during February 1967 agreed that a 
merged community action agency was the ideal solution, but all of them also noted in 
their reports that the competing philosophies and preferred tactics of the two groups 
would make a merger extremely unlikely. One inspector reflected on the "major 
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philosophical differences" between the two organizations, while another pointed out that 
each organization was "operating separately and increasingly at cross-purposes" and 
argued that "initial steps to achieve greater coordination between the two agencies have 
in one sense only served to reinforce existing antagonisms." Another OEO inspector 
wrote in her report that directors of H-HCEOO and HAY are "mutually suspicious of 
each other, but she optimistically noted that "the strengths of each organization offset the 
weaknesses of the other." All of the federal inspectors agreed, however, that despite the 
major philosophical differences between the two organizations, the city of Houston 
desperately needed a single community action agency to carry out the War on Poverty 
and implement the full effect of the concept of community action. As one inspector 
concluded, "could they forget their rivalry and, through a consolidation, work together, 
concentrating on the determination of objectives, program priorities and organizational 
goals and on the mobilization and coordination of resources in the community, Houston 
would have a strong and viable community action program." Another inspector ended her 
inspection report by stating that "even at this time we can conclude from our observations 
in Houston that both the provision of social services and community organizing tend to 
become ends in themselves, to the detriment of the ultimate goal, unless programs 
contain elements of both community organization and social services." With a merger, 
the inspector argued, Houston's community action program could become a model to 
illustrate the need for both approaches and an understanding of the totality of the concept 
of community action.38 
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Southwest Regional OEO officials acted on these reports and began pushing more 
forcefully for a merger between H-HCEOO and HAY during the first few months of 
1967. William Finister, an analyst for the Southwest Region, suggested that the regional 
office use each organization's funding request as leverage to encourage each to agree to a 
merger plan. Finister noted that for the 1967 fiscal year, HAY had requested $2.2 million 
and H-HCEOO had requested $3 million, and he argued that "the easiest way to get them 
to merge would be to tell both CAA's that Houston will only receive X dollars this year 
with separate funding, but that if they merge Houston will get X + bonus dollars." 
Southwest OEO officials responded favorably to Finister's suggestion, and in late 
February they notified representatives from H-HCEOO and HAY that the two 
organizations must merge to create a single community action agency by April 30, 1967, 
and that no further grants would be made except to a single agency in Houston. 
Additionally, Southwest OEO officials warned that if H-HCEOO and HAY were unable 
to settle their differences and work together, a completely new community action agency 
might be created for the city of Houston.39 
County Economic Opportunity Organization and Houston Action for Youth, Inc.," February 1967, Box 
10B, Folder Inspection and Evaluation Reports, OEO, Southwest Region, Community Action Programs, 
District Supervisors, Records Relating to City Economic Opportunity Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record 
Group 381, NARASW (second quotation); Marlene Futterman, "Inspection Report for HHCEOO and 
HAY," February 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, Houston, Harris County, Texas, Jan-Mar 1967, OEO 
Inspection Division, Inspection Reports, 1964-67, Record Group 381, NARA (third and fourth quotations); 
Judith Segal to Robert A. Levine, memorandum, 13 February 1967, Box 10B, Folder Inspection and 
Evaluation Reports, OEO, Southwest Region, Community Action Programs, District Supervisors, Records 
Relating to City Economic Opportunity Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record Group 381, NARASW (fifth 
quotation); Jerome Sohme to Theodore Berry, memorandum, 9 February 1967, Box 17, Folder 
Administrative Texas 1967, OEO CAP Records of the Director, State Files, 1965-1968, Record Group 381, 
NARA; E.R. Brown to Marlene Futterman, memorandum, 13 February 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, 
Houston, Harris County, Texas, Jan-Mar 1967, OEO Inspection Division, Inspection Reports, 1964-67, 
Record Group 381, NARA. 
39
 William Finister, "Interim Report on Houston," February 1967, Box 17, Folder Administrative Texas 
1967, OEO CAP Records of the Director, State Files, 1965-1968, Record Group 381, NARA (quotation); 
James M. Simons to Edgar May, memorandum, 23 February 1967, Box 73, Folder CAP, Houston, Harris 
County, Texas, Jan-Mar 1967, OEO Inspection Division, Inspection Reports, 1964-67, Record Group 381, 
188 
During this controversy over the proposed merger, Congressman Bush and Mayor 
Welch both attempted to enter the fray in order to gain more control over the poverty 
program in Houston. In mid-March 1967 OEO officials in Washington met separately 
with Bush and Welch to address their concerns about the power struggle shaping up 
within Houston's community action program. Congressman Bush, who had already told 
OEO officials that he strongly opposed H-HCEOO's focus on community organizing and 
expressed his displeasure about the organization's voter registration drive in Houston, 
worried that HAY's service delivery approach would be lost in a merger of the two 
community action agencies in the city. Mayor Welch made it clear that he wanted more 
control over the activities of the merged community action agency than he had had over 
H-HCEOO, and OEO officials quickly recognized that Welch would use the increasingly 
negative public image of H-HCEOO "as a lever against present H-HCEOO leadership in 
a power struggle now going on for control of the Houston CAP program." During the 
meetings with Bush and Welch it also became apparent that the two politicians would 
continue working together to rein in Earl Allen and the rest of H-HCEOO's community 
organization staff, and they would be able to exert even more influence over the poverty 
program in Houston since President Johnson had named Welch to the National Advisory 
Council of OEO.40 
After the meetings, OEO officials concluded that the mayor and his allies, 
including Bush, would continue to battle H-HCEOO leaders for control of the community 
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action program in Houston and stated that the situation in the city would "remain warm 
for some time." They retained their faith in H-HCEOO Chairman Ballew, however, and 
noted that as head of the largest community action agency in Houston, Ballew had shown 
himself to be "liberal, savvy, and in all respects well-connected." OEO officials 
continued, "Bush and others may disagree with him, but I doubt that they will be able to 
push him around easily. Ballew himself senses the situation as one of an impending 
power struggle for the CAP program, where there is some need for increased self-
policing by H-HCEOO. He sees Mayor Welch as the principal antagonist, and he is very 
interested in learning who is responsible for the Mayor's appointment to the National 
Advisory Council of OEO." Although Welch and Bush had begun working together to 
control the War on Poverty in Houston, OEO officials remained confident that under 
Ballew's leadership, H-HCEOO would remain the dominant organization and would 
continue the work they had begun the previous year.41 
OEO officials underestimated the power of Welch and Bush, however, even if 
they correctly gauged the tenacity and determination of Ballew. The mayor had sinisterly 
yet brilliantly used information from the Settegast protest and the TSU riot to discredit H-
HCEOO's community organizing tactics not only among Houston residents uninvolved 
in the poverty program but also among some H-HCEOO Board members and poor 
residents themselves. There is evidence that Welch instructed members of his staff to 
cultivate animosity against H-HCEOO's community organizers in the Settegast area by 
illustrating how Earl Allen and his organizers had bypassed respectable, middle-class 
leadership in the neighborhoods and had turned young people against their elders. Welch 
41
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had also used information collected from Houston Police Chief Herman Short to launch a 
public smear campaign against individual community organizers employed by H-
HCEOO and had supplied this confidential information to a local radio station to be 
broadcast all over the city. By March 1967 Welch was able to secure the support of 
Congressman Bush, who was already opposed in principle to a massive antipoverty 
program funded by the federal government, especially if it meant poor people would be 
organized to challenge local power structures. With his appointment to the National 
Advisory Council of OEO, Welch enjoyed a rapidly increasing amount of influence over 
the poverty program in his city. Regardless of how dedicated Ballew was to the Alinsky 
model of community organization and empowerment of the poor, neither he nor his 
organization had the strength to challenge the city's public officials and expect to emerge 
victorious when those local officials were determined to undermine Ballew's entire 
antipoverty philosophy and were willing to use nearly all of the powerful weapons at 
their disposal.42 
Mayor Welch's assault on the H-HCEOO staff had a profound effect on the Board 
of Directors and on Executive Director Charles Kelly. After the turmoil in Settegast, 
Kelly and the board decided to pull the community organizers out of the neighborhoods 
and reassign them to different parts of the city. It was clear that many board members 
who had once supported Ballew's vision for dedicating H-HCEOO to organizing poor 
people to challenge local elected officials were now beginning to back off from that 
commitment. In the wake of the controversy in Settegast and the attacks by Mayor Welch 
and Police Chief Short, the H-HCEOO Board of Directors convened a special meeting to 
develop a new community development plan without the input of Ballew or Allen. This 
42
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new community development plan was a total repudiation of the Saul Alinsky method; it 
called for placing an experienced social service worker in each neighborhood to direct 
poor residents to the proper service agency rather than attempting to organize them. Earl 
Allen's community organization staff knew this shift would eventually mean an end to 
their methods of organizing the poor to challenge the city's public officials, and this 
realization was partly responsible for the staff revolt that took place in April 1967. 
Ironically, however, the demonstrations led by Allen at H-HCEOO headquarters served 
to push the H-HCEOO Board into an even more defensive position as Allen lost even 
more support among board members. With Southwest Regional OEO officials putting 
constant pressure on the H-HCEOO Board of Directors to approve a merger plan to 
create a single community action agency for Houston, many board members were fearful 
that Allen's protests would harm their efforts to bring about a successful merger with 
HAY.43 
From the very first suggestion that H-HCEOO and HAY should merge to form a 
single community action agency for the city of Houston, H-HCEOO Chairman Ballew 
opposed the idea on the grounds that H-HCEOO's community organization efforts would 
be drowned out by HAY's emphasis on the delivery and coordination of social services 
and its members' aversion to using confrontational tactics to challenge the city's public 
officials. For much of the time Ballew also had the support of the majority of the Board 
of Directors, many of whom had been willing to allow Ballew and Allen to experiment 
43
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with the Alinsky method even if they did not share the chairman's radical philosophy and 
his commitment to community organization. When Southwest Regional OEO officials 
began threatening to cut funding to both agencies in the spring of 1967 if no merger could 
be worked out and reeling under a heavy barrage of attacks from Mayor Welch and 
Police Chief Short, however, many H-HCEOO Board members became much more 
receptive to the idea of a merger with HAY. Not only did a majority of the H-HCEOO 
Board support a negotiated merger between the two organizations by April 1967, but a 
significant number of them were also willing to back off from their previous commitment 
to community organizing, as evidenced by the new community development plan many 
of them developed at the end of March. While a majority of H-HCEOO Board members 
began making overtures toward HAY officials for fear that failure to do so would mean 
extinction and possibly the end of community action in Houston, Ballew remained 
bitterly opposed to the idea of a merger. 
It became clear in early April 1967 that no successful merger between H-HCEOO 
and HAY could occur with Ballew as chairman of H-HCEOO, and several board 
members decided that Ballew would have to be removed as an obstacle to a successful 
merger. Sensing this development and recognizing that the H-HCEOO Board was 
beginning to move the poverty program in a much more conservative direction, Ballew 
announced that he would not seek reelection as chairman. During a meeting on April 10, 
1967, the H-HCEOO Board of Directors continued their conservative shift by electing 
Francis Williams, a prominent African American attorney in Houston and former head of 
the city's NAACP chapter, as the new chairman. Upon accepting the position, Williams 
separated himself from the previous leadership by pointing out that he was certainly no 
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radical. "My views are well-known," Williams told reporters. "I'm NAACP, not SNCC, 
not CORE, not Stokely Carmichael. I'm for negotiation, time-honored, tried and true 
methods." The new chairman vowed that his first priority would be to solve the twin 
problems of a merger with HAY and the staff revolt that was taking place, and he argued 
that both issues would be handled quickly and efficiently. Williams envisioned after the 
merger a single community action agency for Houston that would find out from poor 
residents themselves what types of social services they needed and help locate and 
coordinate these services for the poor in Houston. At no point during his talk with 
reporters did Williams touch on the subject of community organizing or confrontational 
tactics, despite the fact that this issue had caused a major rift within the organization that 
was still unresolved. Outgoing chairman Ballew stated that Williams was inheriting "a 
can of worms," and even Williams called the job he accepted "a hot potato." Williams 
continued, "But I didn't feel I could shirk it. Somebody has to bell the cat. Somebody has 
to try, because the program is of great importance to this city."44 
Williams immediately began working toward a successful merger between H-
HCEOO and HAY. Even before Williams officially began in his new position as H-
HCEOO chairman, Southwest Regional OEO officials began contacting him in an 
attempt to speed up the merger process. At the urging of Fred Baldwin, a Southwest OEO 
representative assigned to Houston, Williams called a meeting in late April 1967 between 
the boards of H-HCEOO and HAY in order to come up with a plan to merge the two 
organizations and create a single community action agency. During this meeting held on 
44
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April 20, 1967, representatives from H-HCEOO and HAY finally agreed to a merger plan 
that would combine aspects of each organization to create the Harris County Community 
Action Association (HCCAA). The plan called for every member from each agency's 
board and executive committee to be included on the new board of directors and that a 
fifteen-member steering committee, elected by the new board, oversee the merger 
process. In an effort to satisfy Mayor Welch, the plan also called for the mayor to appoint 
an additional twenty-five members to the Board of Directors of the new organization and 
one person to the steering committee. 
The most important negotiation associated with the merger, and the issue that had 
prevented any successful attempt at bringing the two organizations together in the past, 
was the role each staff would play in the new merged community action agency. Unlike 
Ballew, Francis Williams and a majority of the H-HCEOO Board members were now 
willing to compromise on this issue, and the concessions they made on this point had 
significant implications for the future role of community organizers in the newly created 
HCCAA. The merger plan stated that the former HAY staff members would continue to 
focus on delivery and coordination of social services for poor residents in Houston. The 
plan stated that they would "serve primarily as a community forum for planning, 
recommending policies and programs and conducting public hearings." Former H-
HCEOO staff, according to the merger plan, would continue to focus on community 
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organization, but with a strikingly different definition of community organization than the 
one Ballew and Allen had developed in the fall of 1966. Within HCCAA, community 
organization would be "defined as assisting groups to seek solutions, through orderly 
petitioning and public voice, to serious problems in poverty stricken neighborhoods that 
affect the rights of their residents as citizens, the conditions under which they live and 
work, and their needs for additional public and private support." Community organizers 
would still have a role to play in the new community action agency for Houston, but their 
stated goals and duties had been considerably revised so their activities would not be so 
challenging to the city's public officials. Although this compromise seemed to offer a 
way to pacify Welch and ensure the continuation of the War on Poverty in Houston, in 
reality it merely exacerbated the rift among the staff and heightened the tensions between 
poverty workers who held different beliefs about how to solve the problems of poverty. 
These tensions would continue to plague the new organization and hamper its ability to 
confront poverty in Houston in an effective and meaningful way, and after May 1967 
Williams would thoroughly mishandle these two competing factions within the 
organization.46 
By mid-May 1967 both H-HCEOO and HAY had approved the merger plan, and 
on May 16 the Harris County Community Action Association came into existence as 
Houston's single community action agency with Francis Williams as Chairman of the 
Board of Directors. Only a few months prior to the creation of HCCAA, the merger of H-
HCEOO and HAY seemed a remote possibility. The sharp philosophical differences 
between members of each organization reflected a significant disagreement about the 
46
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meaning of community action and the role of community organizers in the fight against 
poverty in Houston. As chairman of H-HCEOO, William Ballew had committed his 
agency to the Saul Alinsky model of community organization and empowerment of the 
poor and had adopted confrontational tactics to challenge the city's public officials and 
attempt to reform its institutions. HAY officials, on the other hand, were firmly 
committed to the non-confrontational aspects of community action, which included the 
delivery and coordination of social welfare services. The only way these two 
organizations could come together to produce a single community action agency was for 
one of them to back off from its firm commitment to their proposed solution for solving 
the problems of poverty. This is precisely what occurred. In response to sustained attacks 
from the city's public officials, H-HCEOO officials gradually abandoned Ballew's 
commitment to the Alinsky philosophy, and in the process they tamed their own 
community organization staff. Four events during the spring of 1967 - the Settegast 
revolt, the TSU riot, the staff uprising, and the forced merger of H-HCEOO and HAY -
worked to put H-HCEOO leaders on the defensive and opened up a space for several 
local officials to reassert their authority over the poverty program in Houston. By 
redefining the concept and goals of community organizing, H-HCEOO officials made 
their organization more acceptable to the HAY Board of Directors and to the city's public 
officials. Francis Williams and other H-HCEOO Board members who helped this process 
along probably ensured that the community action program would continue in Houston 
without additional attacks from Mayor Welch, Congressman Bush, or Police Chief Short, 
but in abandoning community organizing efforts, they also undercut the successes Earl 
Allen and his staff had achieved in the city and ensured they would not be repeated in the 
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future. As Ballew watched the organization he led for more than a year slip away, he 
noted that the new HCCAA Board could become simply "a debating society, and the 
executive committee can become a tool of local government." By this time, however, the 
majority of former H-HCEOO Board members had turned their backs on Ballew and 
committed themselves to a more conservative vision for the Community Action Program 
in Houston.47 
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Chapter 5 
Implementing a Conservative Vision for the Community Action Program: 
Francis Williams and the Defeat of the Radicals, 1967-1969 
In August 1967, Fred Baldwin, Community Action Program administrator for the 
Office of Economic Opportunity's southwest regional office, sent a lengthy memo to 
southwest OEO director Walter Richter updating him on the status of several community 
action agencies throughout the region. Baldwin provided very matter-of-fact details about 
community action agencies in Albuquerque, Dallas, and a few other locations, but he 
saved for last the "Houston situation," a term many OEO officials began using by the 
summer of 1967 to refer to recent events in the city. The Harris County Community 
Action Association (HCC AA), an organization born out of the merger between the 
radical and confrontational Houston-Harris County Economic Opportunity Organization 
(H-HCEOO) and the conservative Houston Action for Youth (HAY), had been through a 
troubling summer filled with ideological disputes, internal divisions, and negative 
publicity. Baldwin did not even feel the need to recount the recent events in Houston or 
to provide an analysis of the situation. Rather, Baldwin quoted from Leo Tolstoy's War 
and Peace in order to stress to Richter that the War on Poverty was larger than the 
"Houston situation" and to urge him to keep everything in its proper perspective. Baldwin 
quoted from Book VIII in which Tolstoy described the Battle of Borodino: 
Napoleon, standing on the knoll, looked through a field glass, and in its 
small circlet saw smoke and men, sometimes his own and sometimes 
Russians, but when he looked again with the naked eye, he could not tell 
where what he had seen was. He descended the knoll and began walking 
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up and down before it. Occasionally he stopped, listened to the firing, and 
gazed intently at the battlefield. But not only was it impossible to make 
out what was happening from where he was standing down below, or from 
the knoll above on which some of his generals had taken their stand, but 
even from the fleches themselves. . . . From the battlefield adjutants he 
had sent out, and orderlies from his marshals, kept galloping up to 
Napoleon with reports of the progress of the action, but all these reports 
were false, both because it was impossible in the heat of battle to say what 
was happening at any given moment and because many of the adjutants 
did not go to the actual place of conflict but reported what they had heard 
from others; and also because while an adjutant was riding more than a 
mile to Napoleon circumstances changed and the news he brought was 
already becoming false.1 
The imagery of a fierce and chaotic battle that Baldwin conjured in his quotation 
was certainly fitting to what had transpired in Houston since the merger. In order to 
facilitate a successful merger with HAY, members of the H-HCEOO Board of directors 
had moved in a more conservative and less confrontational direction by abandoning the 
Saul Alinsky method and ousting William Ballew, a dedicated Alinsky disciple, from the 
organization. While this strategy was adequate for making H-HCEOO more acceptable to 
Houston's public officials and led to a successful merger, a surprising number of radicals 
remained on the HCCAA staff, including Earl Allen. Nevertheless, this process of 
1
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moving HCCAA in a direction that was more conservative, more amenable to the city's 
public officials, less confrontational, and less committed to community organizing and 
the empowerment of the poor continued as Francis Williams led the antipoverty effort 
over the next two years as HCCAA Chairman and later as HCCAA Executive Director. 
Between May 1967 and the end of 1969, Francis Williams and his allies on the 
HCCAA Board and on the staff were victorious in defeating the radicals who remained in 
the community action agency after the merger, and in so doing they rendered the 
organization more conservative and established a close working relationship with the 
city's public officials, particularly Mayor Louie Welch. Yet Williams's efforts produced 
several unintended consequences, the most important of which was that his attempts to 
pull back the reins on HCCAA's more radical and confrontational activities alienated the 
two constituencies that had made the organization thrive - the poor who supplied the 
local support for the poverty program and the grassroots antipoverty activists who 
provided the bulk of the foot soldiers for the War on Poverty in the city. In the process, 
although Williams undoubtedly ensured the short-term survival of HCCAA, many of 
Houston's poor residents and grassroots antipoverty activists became disillusioned with 
the entire War on Poverty. As a result, during these two years there were no major 
victories for Houston's poor that came as a result of HCCAA's activities. By 1969 
HCCAA was a large and bureaucratic machine that dispensed an array of social services 
but lacked the support and confidence of the very people who had enabled the Houston 
antipoverty program to achieve a modest level of success in the past. 
The first step Williams and other conservatives took to change their new 
organization was calling for the creation of an entirely new board of directors and 
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executive committee. The new 150-member board would consist of fifty poor residents 
from the target neighborhoods, fifty individuals appointed by Houston's civic 
organizations, twenty-five appointed by the mayor, and twenty-five appointed by the 
county judge. The new twenty-four-member executive committee would be made up of 
eight individuals chosen by the poor, eight chosen by civic organizations, four chosen by 
the mayor, and four chosen by the county judge. Houston's public officials thus enjoyed 
control of one-third of HCCAA's board and executive committee. As the Houston 
Chronicle reported, having the mayor and county judge play important roles in the 
community action agency's planning and implementation of programs would ensure that 
HCCAA's activities would be "unlikely to raise hackles this year as it did last. . . . 
HCCAA looks like an organization built on the mistakes of its predecessors, neither as 
strict and structured as HAY, nor as apt to run amok as [H-HCEOO]."2 
Williams and his allies also decided that Charles Kelly remained entirely too 
committed to Ballew's radical vision to be allowed to continue serving as executive 
director of HCCAA, a position he had held with H-HCEOO since 1966. Instead, 
Williams and other conservative board members wanted the job to go to Franklin 
Harbach, the chairman of the Neighborhood Centers Association (NCA), who was 
nearing retirement. Williams hoped that Harbach would be able to lead the newly created 
organization through its first year or two and set it on a course resembling the liberal 
settlement-house style of the NCA. A federal OEO inspector overseeing the merger 
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described Harbach as a "1930s liberal who has been active in the settlement house 
movement," and a Houston Chronicle reporter referred to him as a moderate liberal who 
preferred "negotiation to head-on assault." Though Harbach declined the offer, citing his 
imminent retirement and his unwillingness to get involved in HCCAA's internal 
divisions, Williams's overtures toward someone like Harbach to head up the city's 
community action agency was illustrative of the more conservative direction he wanted to 
move the organization.3 
According to a federal OEO inspector assigned to Houston to oversee the merger, 
Mayor Louie Welch and County Judge Bill Elliott were eager to be brought back into the 
poverty program after being shut out by Ballew and other radicals on the board. Even 
before the conclusion of the successful merger between the two antipoverty 
organizations, several H-HCEOO Board members began forging a closer link between 
Houston's public officials and their agency. By the time the merger was complete, a 
federal OEO inspector could claim with confidence that there were significantly "closer 
working arrangements of H-HCEOO with Houston authorities." To make sure that his 
office would be consistently kept informed of the new community action's activities, 
Mayor Welch arranged for Carl Moore, a HCCAA employee, to act as an inside 
informant who would report to the mayor's aides on the actions of the HCCAA staff. 
Moore had been a HAY employee before the merger and was one of the individuals 
arrested on the Texas Southern University campus after the riot in mid-May. It is unclear 
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whether Moore was already an informant for the mayor and police chief before the riot, 
but after the riot the evidence is clear that Moore agreed to provide inside information 
about the poverty program to the mayor and his staff. In a special inspection report filed 
in August 1967, an OEO inspector identified Carl Moore as an informant and stated that 
"HAY strategy was to infiltrate the militants with informers and pass on all intelligence 
to the Mayor - through [mayoral aide Blair] Justice - to help the mayor put down any 
direct, concerted activity," such as poverty workers involving themselves in protests. 
With Moore working as an inside informant on the HCCAA staff, Welch believed he 
would never be unaware of the activities of poverty workers in Houston again.4 
Federal OEO inspectors were extremely skeptical about the renewed relationship 
between Houston's community action agency and the city's public officials, and several 
inspectors warned that Welch's eagerness to be involved in the War on Poverty in the 
city most certainly stemmed from his desire to control HCCAA's activities. As one OEO 
inspector stated, Welch's past behavior relative to the community action program in 
Houston showed that he was "capable of putting his name to biased and unsubstantiated 
allegations about OEO-related persons," and despite the closer working relationship, "we 
expect that output of this nature from the Mayor's Office may continue indefinitely." 
Welch had changed tactics, but it was clear that his ideas about the proper role of 
4
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Houston's community action agency remained the same as what they had been when he 
launched a concerted attack on Ballew and the radicals.5 
In June 1967 HCCAA received an OEO grant for $5 million to carry out its 
agenda for the next year, and through its programs and projects HCCAA leaders showed 
just how much more moderate and non-confrontational the agency had become since the 
days when Ballew implemented his radical vision for the community action program. In 
several areas of operation - the oversight of the Legal Services program, the 
administration of the Head Start program, the continuation of the Settegast Clinic, the 
implementation of various programs and services in poor neighborhoods, and the 
management of the community organization department - Williams and the conservative 
HCCAA Board of directors showed that their methods for attacking poverty in Houston 
were not only moderate but ineffective for attacking root causes of poverty. To make 
matters even worse, poor Houston residents began losing their confidence in the War on 
Poverty because of the impotent tactics and strategies of HCCAA under the direction of 
Williams and the conservatives.6 
One of the clearest examples of HCCAA's conservative shift and its impact on 
the fight against poverty in Houston was the organization's handling of the Legal 
Services program. By the summer of 1967 the Houston Legal Foundation had failed to 
produce an impressive record of providing legal aid to the poor and, more importantly, 
had not lived up to expectations set by Ballew and other OEO officials who hoped 
5
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Houston's program could produce transformative change in the lives of poor people and 
possibly reform the legal system that played an important role in keeping people in 
poverty. When he pushed for the creation of a large and robust Legal Services program in 
1966, Ballew firmly believed that legal aid for the poor would be an excellent vehicle to 
empower the poor to challenge the city's structural forces that kept them subjugated and 
mired in poverty. At its inception in Houston in 1966, an OEO official commented that 
the Houston Legal Foundation's proposed program represented the country's most far 
reaching and potentially socially transformative legal services program and frequently 
used the words "social revolution" and "agents of change" when referring to the program 
and its attorneys. When OEO officials stressed to HLF leaders the necessity of accepting 
civil rights cases in October 1966, Ballew most certainly was hopeful that the Legal 
Services program in Houston would attempt to challenge significant pillars of local 
power and reform institutions that affected the lives of poor people.7 
By July 1967, however, the Houston Legal Foundation had only three remaining 
fully operational neighborhood law offices, and even these offices were plagued with 
staff shortages and a general lack of awareness among poor residents about their 
existence. The types of cases that attorneys handled in these law offices did not possess 
the socially transformative potential for which Ballew had hoped when he advocated the 
program. Rather, more than 50 percent of the cases involved divorce, annulment, 
separation, child custody, paternity, and adoption. A handful of the remaining cases 
contained elements that may have had the potential for social reform, but the majority of 
them involved wage claims, bankruptcy, workmen's compensation issues, and other 
personal matters. There was also growing criticism coming from residents of Houston's 
7
 See Chapter 2 for a description of Ballew's vision for the Houston Legal Foundation. 
African American and Mexican American neighborhoods that the foundation was not 
adequately aggressive about pursuing civil rights cases. While the HLF provided much 
needed legal services to poor individuals in a limited area of Houston, the overall 
program was a far cry from what Ballew and other radicals had envisioned when they 
Q 
helped launch the Legal Services program in the city. 
A more urgent problem facing the Houston Legal Foundation was a very unstable 
financial situation caused by the HCCAA Board's neglect of the organization and its 
financial wellbeing. In September 1967 Judge Sam Johnson resigned from his position as 
the foundation's executive director to become a judge on the 14th Court of Civil Appeals 
and left the HLF without a permanent executive director for the rest of the year. During 
the last few months of 1967 the foundation fell into financial trouble caused mostly by 
improper spending. The southwest regional OEO office performed an audit of the 
organization that showed the HLF had spent $14,284 for items not permitted under OEO 
guidelines, including employee salaries that exceeded federal limits and expensive office 
equipment. Southwest regional OEO officials strongly urged HLF administrators to 
address their financial troubles or risk having their federal funding completely cut off. 
Without an active executive director and with little encouragement or direction from 
HCCAA, however, the HLF sank further into financial turmoil by the end of the year.9 
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The Houston Legal Foundation hired a new executive director in January 1968 
and finally ironed out its financial troubles the following month, but the organization's 
difficulties did not end there. A new set of problems erupted when OEO inspectors 
discovered that the HLF did not have enough representatives of the poor on its board of 
directors to meet federal guidelines for the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor. 
A federal OEO inspection during the summer of 1968 revealed that the HLF had no poor 
residents or even representatives of the poor on its board of directors; the twenty-one-
member board was instead made up of state and federal judges, local school officials, and 
lawyers. HLF administrators defended their exclusion of the poor by arguing that poor 
people were not qualified to determine policy for a legal aid organization. Federal OEO 
officials responded with another threat to cut off funding unless the organization's board 
of directors devised a plan to include poor residents in the decision making processes of 
the group.10 
With this latest threat of withholding funds, several HLF board members decided 
to use the Houston press to fight this battle with OEO officials. After a board meeting in 
which a majority of the members voted down a plan to add poor residents to the board, 
several members openly expressed their opposition to appointing poor people to the 
board to a Houston Post reporter who was writing a three-part series on the conflict. 
While one member compared placing poor residents on the HLF board to a medical 
surgeon including heart patients on his surgical team, Harry Patterson, chairman of the 
381, NARASW; Texas Office of Economic Opportunity, "Weekly News Memo #57," 14 February 1968, 
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board, stated, "We feel this is a professional organization that should be operated on the 
highest ethical concepts - and that non-attorney control would dilute this concept." 
Patterson also argued that the foundation was already in compliance because poor 
residents were currently represented by four members of the board, three of whom were 
African American and one of whom was Mexican American. Patterson did not mention, 
however, that three of these men were attorneys, one was the dean of the Texas Southern 
University law school, and none of them were either poor or elected by the poor.11 
Harold Scarlett, the Houston Post reporter following this story, provided great 
insight into what was at the root of this conflict. In the second part of his series, Scarlett 
argued that "a much deeper issues underlies this surface struggle" than the supposed 
problem of including the poor on the organization's board of directors. The real issue, 
according to at least one board member that Scarlett quoted, was "whether the Houston 
Legal Foundation is going to engage in law reform and social reform." It was clear to 
many observers that the organization had pledged itself to solving legal problems for 
poor individuals but had shied away from attempting to reform the legal system to work 
more fairly for poor residents and from filing any suits that would have far reaching 
implications, such as those involving civil rights or school desegregation. Some poor 
residents had even begun to complain that the foundation was created by powerful 
members of Houston's elaborate power structure to serve as "a pacifier [and] a remover 
of hangnails rather than a surgeon cutting out the deeply imbedded causes of poverty." 
Several board members retorted that the organization had an advisory board that poor 
residents could join if they wanted to have a voice in the operations of the foundation. 
Poor residents, however, complained that the advisory board was often ignored because 
" Harold Scarlett, "Legal Foundation In Crisis," Houston Post, July 21, 1968. 
the board's policy was "just to keep the lid on" any potentially volatile situation that 
might arise.12 HLF board members, as Scarlett pointed out, "do not feel social crusading 
is their proper function."13 These board members believed that including laymen on the 
board would "reduce the effectiveness of the board and distort the primary function of 
HLF, which is to provide legal services instead of participating in social reforms." HLF 
Board Chairman Patterson opposed the idea of placing poor residents on the board so 
strongly that he threatened to allow the legal services program in Houston to get canceled 
altogether rather than conform to the federal policy of "maximum feasible participation" 
of the poor.14 
By the summer of 1968 HCCAA leaders had been almost totally uninvolved in 
the administration of Houston's Legal Services program for more than a year. Near the 
end of the summer, however, at the urging of the southwest regional OEO office, 
HCCAA officials finally offered to end their silence and help negotiate a reconciliation 
between the two parties. The plan that HCCAA officials drew up, and the one eventually 
adopted by the HLF board, was indicative of how far the conservative boards of both 
organizations had gotten from Ballew's vision for a robust and socially transformative 
legal services program for Houston. Under the new arrangement, four representatives of 
the poor would be seated on the HLF board of directors with full voting power. These 
representatives would not be elected by the poor, but rather they would be appointed by 
the HLF advisory board, which in theory was composed of poor residents. The most 
12
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surprising part of the plan, however, was the edict that the advisory board would no 
longer have any authority to make recommendations to HLF board members on matters 
of policy or procedure or to initiate grievance procedures against the board. This action 
by the HLF board was a clear attempt to limit the role that poor residents would play in 
the organization, especially considering the four poor residents on the board would be 
outnumbered by the twenty-one other members and would have no one to appeal to for 
support within the organization. Russell L. Hayes, vice-chairman of the HLF advisory 
board, interpreted this action by the board as spite. "All I have to say," Hayes told the 
Houston Post, "is the action by the board . . . completely negates the power of the 
[advisory] board and cuts off the line of communication with the people."15 
By the time the HLF board of directors got around to outlining procedures for the 
placement of four poor residents on its board in September 1968, OEO officials had 
backed off from their commitment to the maximum feasible participation of the poor. On 
September 13 the regional OEO Legal Services administrator sent a letter to the new 
executive director of HLF informing him that his organization had fulfilled its agreement 
for including poor residents on the board, even though not a single poor person or 
representative of the poor had yet been appointed to the board. At no point during this 
ordeal did HCCAA officials try to intervene in a way that would have guaranteed poor 
15
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residents a place on the policymaking board of the Houston Legal Foundation, and the 
failure of both organizations to respond to the demands of the poor further alienated them 
from Houston's poor residents. By the end of 1968 poor residents were once again 
complaining that they were being left out of the administration of the legal services 
program. When Russell Hayes, vice-chairman of the HLF advisory board, appeared at an 
HCCAA meeting in October 1968 to voice the concerns of poor residents, the HCCAA 
Board chairman declared his comments out of order and quickly ended the meeting. The 
poor were rapidly losing their voice in the poverty program in Houston, and the first 
major setback was suffered within the Houston Legal Foundation. William Ballew had 
hoped that the HLF would implement a widespread legal services program in Houston 
that would challenge the status quo and launch a concerted attack on the root causes of 
poverty. Without constant pressure exerted by HCCAA leadership on the HLF board of 
directors, however, the legal services program in the city was allowed to evolve into a 
simple deliverer of services and most certainly had failed to become the socially 
transformative foundation Ballew had envisioned.16 
In a development similar to the ordeal with the Houston Legal Foundation, it 
became apparent after the merger that HCCAA leaders were not willing to pursue 
reforms using the Head Start program. In particular, the HCCAA Board was reluctant to 
push for change in the one area where the Head Start program actually had the greatest 
potential for reform, which was the desegregation of Houston's public schools. Racial 
segregation in public schools was the most logical issue reformers using the Head Start 
16
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preschool program targeted because they could demand compliance with federal 
desegregation orders before making funding available. In 1965 and 1966 the Houston 
Independent School District (HISD) had administered an almost completely segregated 
Head Start program in the city, but with each passing year OEO officials and local 
reformers pushed more forcefully for desegregation. By the spring of 1967, OEO officials 
decided to deliver on their promise to cut off all Head Start funding to organizations that 
refused to desegregate their programs. Because HISD board members refused to 
desegregate their facilities in preparation for the 1967 summer program, OEO officials 
warned HCCAA Board members that unless HISD complied with federal desegregation 
orders, a different organization would receive the $1.5 million grant to administer Head 
Start during the summer of 1967.17 
HCCAA Board members, mired in internal controversy caused by the merger 
negotiations and under continued assault from the city's public officials, were in no 
position to push for the desegregation of Houston's schools to comply with Head Start 
requirements. Rather than using their position as the governing body for the poverty 
program to demand that HISD take steps to meet federal desegregation requirements so 
as to avoid losing the Head Start program, HCCAA Board members simply agreed to 
fund a different agency to administer the program. In May, board members chose Aid to 
Culturally Deprived Children (ACDC), a Catholic organization run by a local priest and a 
handful of educators, to sponsor Head Start for the summer of 1967. Not possessing 
adequate resources to administer a citywide preschool program, ACDC's Head Start 
17
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suffered from low enrollment, an inactive parent program, and segregated facilities based 
on residential patterns in Houston and the unavailability of adequate transportation. 
ACDC Director Father Emile Farge blamed HCCAA for the low enrollment and lack of 
parent participation by pointing out that HCCAA Board members had failed to initiate a 
widespread recruitment effort as they had done in the past for HISD. "Recruiting for 
Head Start was supposed to start in March with 50 paid workers," proclaimed a reporter 
for the Houston Chronicle in agreement with Farge. "But the staff of what is now the 
Community Action Assn. was more concerned with merging their two anti-poverty 
agencies than with recruiting children." 
HCCAA Board members appeared equally indifferent about the problems of 
segregation that extended beyond the boundaries of the city into other parts of Harris 
County. During a routine inspection of Head Start centers in mid-summer 1967, federal 
OEO officials found that the summer Head Start programs in Aldine, Cypress-Fairbanks, 
Alief, and the one administered by the Northeast Houston Independent School District all 
operated in segregated facilities. Southwest regional OEO officials worked closely with 
Head Start sponsors in these areas to solve these problems and push for desegregation, 
but they received no assistance from HCCAA Board members or staff in their efforts. 
The conservatives who took control of HCCAA made it clear in the summer of 1967 that 
they were not interested in using the Head Start program to advance educational reform 
in Houston.19 
18
 Saralee Tiede, "A World of Wonder is Opening Up for Deprived Children: But Operation Head Start Has 
Fallen Short of Its Objectives," Houston Chronicle, July 16, 1967. 
19
 Office of Economic Opportunity, Office of Inspection, "Inspector's Field Report for Inspection of Head 
Start in Aldine ISD, Delegate of H-HCEOO," 29 June 1967, Box 10B, Folder Inspection and Evaluation 
Reports, Office of Economic Opportunity, Southwest Region, Community Action Programs, District 
Supervisors, Records Relating to City Economic Opportunity Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record Group 
381, NARASW; Office of Economic Opportunity, Office of Inspection, "Inspector's Field Report for 
214 
In the fall of 1967 HCCAA Board members - giving up any hope of educational 
reform in Houston - abandoned the Head Start program completely and opted instead to 
administer a year-round preschool program through their own day care centers located in 
the target neighborhoods. The new preschool program was significantly smaller than 
Head Start, serving only about one-fourth of the number of preschoolers previously 
enrolled in Head Start. While Head Start was a program that had the potential to further 
an educational reform agenda because it required the use of desegregated facilities, 
HCCAA's new preschool program was simply a service that could be delivered to poor 
residents in a limited area. As one HCCAA official explained it, the most important part 
of this new program was that it would allow parents to receive childcare while they 
worked. Though day care for children of working parents was an important service, 
especially because it often allowed single-parent families to have an income, the Head 
Start program was designed with much grander expectations and was often used by 
activists to push for significant changes in the country's educational system. By the fall 
of 1967, however, it was clear that HCCAA Board members were no longer interested in 
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social change or educational reform, and their abandonment of the Head Start program 
was further evidence of this shift. 
During the summer of 1968, as federal OEO officials once again convinced HISD 
to administer a summer Head Start program for fear of not having a program in Houston 
at all and with the hope bringing about school desegregation in Houston, HCCAA Board 
members remained aloof from the entire process other than to provide the standard 
paperwork needed for HISD to receive federal funding. Before OEO approved funding, 
Alfredo Garcia, Civil Rights Coordinator for the southwest regional OEO office, warned 
that Houston was an area where the Head Start program might once again run into 
segregation problems. OEO officials tried to impress upon HISD representatives that 
their program must strictly adhere to federal guidelines regarding desegregation of 
facilities, and HISD representatives made vague statements to the effect that guidelines 
would be followed. OEO agreed to fund HISD's summer Head Start program in 1968; 
but soon after the program began, it was clear that very little attempt had been made to 
ensure the program was administered in a desegregated environment. In June Garcia 
charged that HISD officials tried to conceal the segregated nature of their program from 
federal inspectors by not reporting the ethnic breakdown of the students and staff. Garcia 
ordered a thorough investigation of the HISD Head Start program that revealed not only 
racially segregated facilities but also that HISD had intentionally excluded hiring 
Mexican American staff members even though Mexican American students made up 20 
percent of the enrollees.21 
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There is no evidence that OEO officials took any significant action to force HISD 
to comply with desegregation requirements, and presumably this was partly due to the 
fact that HCCAA Board members refused to provide any support in pushing for 
educational reform in Houston. In the fall of 1968 the HCCAA Board of directors simply 
took control of all of Houston's summer Head Start programs and placed them in their 
day care centers rather than attempt to reform HISD segregation practices. Similar to the 
ordeal with the Houston Legal Foundation, Houston's Head Start program evolved into 
yet another service delivered to poor residents. Important as that service may have been, 
it did not produce any opportunities for educational reform as Ballew had envisioned. 
Without HCCAA administrators putting pressure on their delegate agencies to comply 
with federal guidelines, there was little hope that Houston's Head Start would attack 
educational inequality or affect its impact on the city's poor. 
In addition to abandoning the goals of social, legal, and educational reform, the 
new conservative HCCAA Board of directors also allowed one of William Ballew and 
Earl Allen's greatest accomplishments - the Settegast Clinic - to fall into financial 
trouble due to the new board's neglect. In the fall of 1966 Allen had organized Settegast 
residents and launched a protest campaign aimed at the Harris County Hospital District 
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demanding the creation and maintenance of a permanent health clinic in the 
neighborhood. When the hospital district agreed to these demands, Ballew and Allen 
believed they had proven the worth of confrontational community organizing tactics as an 
effective component of the fight against poverty. While the hospital district agreed to 
create a permanent branch of the charity hospital in Settegast, however, there was a 
misunderstanding about which organization would fund the clinic once it was established. 
Ballew and Allen believed the responsibility fell squarely on the shoulders of the hospital 
district board members, and Ballew undoubtedly would have used the community action 
agency to continue putting pressure on the hospital district to deliver on its promises of 
accessible healthcare to the residents of Settegast. Because of HCCAA's changed 
priorities after the merger, however, board members took very little action to ensure the 
hospital district would continue to fund the clinic after the initial ninety-day contract 
expired in the summer of 1967.22 
In June 1967, as the Settegast Clinic was rapidly running out of cash and with no 
prospects for additional funding on the horizon, the HCCAA Board of directors passed a 
resolution asking the Harris County Hospital District to fund the clinic on a permanent 
basis. A resolution, of course, does not have the same sense of urgency that a public 
demonstration has, and the hospital district responded by agreeing to fund the clinic for 
an additional ninety days until another agency could be located to provide permanent 
funding. A group of African American doctors began meeting during this time and 
decided to appeal directly to OEO to fund the clinic, but this solution could only be 
temporary because it was not OEO policy to fund these types of programs directly. 
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Several HCCAA Board members interpreted this appeal to OEO as a circumvention of 
their authority over poverty funds for the entire city and threatened to cut off funding to 
the clinic altogether. Although OEO agreed to fund the Settegast Clinic on a temporary 
basis and the Harris County Hospital District eventually accepted responsibility for the 
clinic on a permanent basis as part of its neighborhood clinic program, the HCCAA 
Board showed little interest in preserving this impressive accomplishment achieved under 
Ballew's tenure.23 
The HCCAA Board of directors initiated a handful of new projects and programs 
in 1967 that are also illustrative of the conservative turn they took after the merger and 
the clear move away from confrontation. In June 1967 the new HCCAA Board, in 
cooperation with the National Council on Aging, launched Project FIND, which was 
designed to use volunteers to seek out the aging poor and help them locate social services 
available to them. In September HCCAA Chairman Francis Williams announced the 
initiation of a parent and child program created "to strengthen parental skills in taking 
care of youngsters and also to help families on the poverty level overcome some of the 
social and economic problems they face." As part of this program, HCCAA established 
several Parent and Child Centers in target neighborhoods to work closely with parents to 
equip them with parenting skills. The HCCAA Board also helped create the Foster 
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Grandparents program in cooperation with Protestant Charities of Houston that "recruits, 
trains, and employs persons over age 60, with low incomes, to serve neglected and 
deprived children who lack close personal relationships with adults." The program's 
directors placed approximately sixty older persons in local Houston hospitals to provide 
care for children whose parents were either absent or unable to be at the hospital for 
lengthy periods of time. Francis Williams and other conservative members of the board 
also placed a heavy emphasis on establishing social service programs that resembled the 
work HAY had been doing before the merger, including Foster Care and Counseling for 
Troubled Youth, Family Life Improvement and Home Management, and a Generic 
Counseling Service.24 
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Though many of these programs were heartwarming and undoubtedly made a few 
poor people's lives more bearable, they were all clearly products of the conservative 
philosophy that had overtaken the HCCAA Board of directors in 1967. In designing these 
service delivery programs, board members never attempted to attack the root causes of 
poverty; they just tried to address the symptoms of poverty. Project FIND was simply a 
program for locating traditional social welfare services for the elderly poor, and programs 
such as the Parent and Child Centers and the other counseling service projects harkened 
back to the conservative tactic of attempting to change the behavior of poor people rather 
than addressing the structural forces that kept them locked in a cycle of poverty. These 
programs initiated by the HCCAA Board of directors in 1967, which consumed the 
majority of the organization's resources, showed just how far the implementers of the 
War on Poverty in Houston had gotten away from the Saul Alinsky method. 
By far the largest and most costly service program that the new HCCAA Board 
launched in 1967 was the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), which was 
designed in conjunction with the Texas Employment Commission to help locate jobs for 
unemployed and underemployed persons in Houston. Like HCCAA's other social service 
delivery programs, however, the CEP program had very little potential for reform. To 
make matters worse, CEP administrators, armed with a $5 million grant from OEO, 
squandered their resources, alienated the poor people that the program was designed to 
help, and failed to provide any tangible results for Houston's unemployed population. 
The main thrust of the program was job training, but HCCAA Chairman Francis 
Williams misled Houston's poor residents into believing that CEP would be able to 
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accomplish more than simply training residents for jobs by implying that CEP would 
attack employment discrimination and might even create new jobs. In the process he 
raised expectations for the program beyond what it was capable of delivering. After 
announcing the CEP program, Williams criticized the city of Houston's meager efforts to 
provide equal employment opportunities and insinuated that CEP would be able to 
address some of these problems. He stated, "What has been done has been so negligible 
that the man in the street doesn't know that they are doing anything." Williams failed to 
mention, however, that a job training program such as CEP was not designed to push for 
reform in hiring practices that would result in more jobs being available for the city's 
25 
poor. 
Due to bureaucratic wrangling over various contracts, the CEP program was slow 
to get started in Houston. In order to provide comprehensive job training for Houston's 
poor, HCCAA needed to enter into contracts with several delegate agencies, such as the 
Houston Independent School District and the Texas Employment Commission, in order 
to administer various components of CEP. The most problematic impediment to the 
initiation of the program was whether or not the HCCAA Board could enter into contracts 
with delegate agencies that did not require their own boards to include a significant 
number of poor residents or representatives of the poor. Under Ballew's direction, in 
1966 the HCCAA Board had notified all delegate agencies that HCCAA expected poor 
residents to compose one-third of each of their boards by July 1968. The new 
conservative members of the board, however, dispensed of this requirement despite the 
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opposition of a few remaining progressives on the board. To add insult to injury, 
conservative HCCAA Board members also passed a resolution to eliminate the 
Manpower Advisory Committee, a group of poor residents elected from the target 
neighborhoods to advise the HCCAA Board on how the manpower programs affected 
poor Houston residents. The new board members made it clear that they alone would 
administer the CEP program without interference from the poor, and several members 
spoke in favor of creating an advisory committee composed of representatives from 
Houston's business leaders rather than the city's poor communities. 
CEP administrators continued Francis Williams's tactic of falsely raising the 
hopes of Houston's poor by implying that there was an abundance of jobs in the city, and 
this inevitably caused CEP enrollees to become disillusioned once they graduated from 
the program and still could not secure employment. By the summer of 1968, it was clear 
to most observers that the most the CEP program could accomplish was to equip 
enrollees with skills for jobs that did not exist. CEP administrators simply had no power 
to create jobs in Houston or to force the city's employers to cease their discriminatory 
hiring practices. The CEP program came under a tremendous amount of criticism in late 
1968, and the HCCAA Board was never able to deliver on the promises its members 
made about what this job training program could realistically accomplish.27 
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The new HCCAA Board's conservative shift away from the radical philosophy 
and confrontational tactics developed by Ballew and Allen was clearly illustrated in the 
programs and projects in which its members engaged after the merger. Nowhere was it 
more evident that the new community action agency had abandoned the Saul Alinsky 
method, though, than in the new board's management of the community organization 
department and the remaining radicals on the staff. After Francis Williams and the 
conservatives successfully took control of the HCCAA Board and oversaw the merger, 
their most pressing problem was the fact that many radicals, including Earl Allen, were 
still on the organization's employment rolls. Both during and after the merger, the new 
board was completely averse to confrontation or controversy of any kind. In order to 
render the organization more conservative and more amenable to the city's public 
officials, Williams and other board members knew they would have to put controls on 
Allen and eventually defeat the radicals who remained in the organization.28 
As the first step in this process of controlling and eventually purging the radicals 
from HCCAA, Francis Williams assigned Hartsell Gray to supervise Earl Allen and his 
community organization staff. Gray had been an Episcopal minister in a congregation 
that United States Congressman George Bush attended in Houston and had played an 
important role in Bush's successful campaign for election to Congress in 1966. With 
Bush's help, Gray was appointed to the H-HCEOO Board of directors in 1965, and the 
two remained close friends after Bush moved to Washington in 1966, with Gray 
assuming the role of Bush's "inside man" who provided the freshman congressman with 
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information about the poverty program in Houston. Gray had been a conservative 
member of the H-HCEOO Board of directors and had served on the Personnel Committee 
when William Ballew and Executive Director Charles Kelly recommended hiring Earl 
Allen as director of community organization in the fall of 1966. Gray vehemently 
opposed hiring Allen because he disagreed with Allen's confrontational tactics, but the 
overwhelming majority of the H-HCEOO Board at the time was supportive of Ballew's 
radical vision and approved of Allen's hiring. Gray remained a foe of Allen and his 
radical community organization staff, however, and he was among the most outspoken 
board members who attacked Allen's methods in Settegast in the spring of 1967. During 
the merger negotiations in May 1967, Gray was a strong supporter of taming their 
organization in order to merge the two antipoverty organizations successfully. 
As part of the effort to rein in some of the activities of Allen's community 
organization staff and make the merger a success, Gray had been a significant contributor 
to the drawing up of a new Community Development Work Plan designed to 
professionalize Allen's staff and refocus them toward less confrontational activities. The 
new plan, which was carried over into the merged community action agency, called for 
the community organization staff to undergo retraining and changed their duties to 
include locating services for poor residents rather than organizing them to confront local 
elected officials or make demands on the city's institutions. During the merger 
negotiations Gray seized the opportunity to control the activities of Allen and his staff, 
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and both men saw the passage of the new community organization plan as the first step in 
taming the staff and eventually purging the radicals from the new community action 
agency. Gray and the other conservatives on the HCCAA Board were so confident that 
the new Community Development Work Plan would empower the board to control the 
activities of the community organization staff that they reinstated Pluria Marshall, who 
had been involved in protests and demonstrations on the campus of Texas Southern 
University in May 1967.30 
As soon as the merger was complete, the new HCCAA executive committee met 
in June 1967 to decide how to reorganize the two staffs from H-HCEOO and HAY and to 
determine which staff members to retain in the new community action agency. In a 
surprising change of course, Gray strongly urged the committee to allow Earl Allen to 
continue in his current position, now called Director of Community Development, 
because he was the only staff member who had personal contact with militant African 
American leaders in Houston. There was, however, one important stipulation; Gray 
insisted that the new executive committee appoint him as the Deputy Director of 
Resource Development and, most importantly, that they designate Gray as Allen's 
immediate supervisor. Gray was determined to control Allen and the other radicals on the 
staff, and he assured the committee that Allen's confrontational tactics would diminish 
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once Allen was put under Gray's close supervision. A majority of the HCCAA executive 
committee agreed, and in June 1967 Hartsell Gray - a man who had opposed hiring 
Allen, attacked his methods incessantly, helped rewrite the plan for organizing poor 
neighborhoods to make the tactics less confrontational, and was bent on controlling the 
radicals on the staff- became Allen's supervisor and responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the new community development plan. 
Federal OEO inspectors who evaluated Houston's new merged community action 
agency in the summer of 1967 were skeptical about the new arrangement. In a report sent 
to OEO officials in Washington, these inspectors expressed concern that the authors of 
HCCAA's new Community Development Work Plan had failed to define clearly the 
long-range goals of Allen's staff and that board members were unaware of the mission of 
the community development department. Most alarming to the federal inspectors, 
however, were their interactions with Hartsell Gray. One OEO inspector noted that Gray 
"is more sensitive to the voices of the locally elected officials than to any other 
community element," and because of this he "has attempted to cloak the efforts of the 
CAA under the mantle of 'moderate, liberal' leadership of Harris County . . . [and] has 
seen his task as a staff member to keep the dissident staff members quiet thereby 
neutralizing Earl Allen or forcing his resignation."32 
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Inspectors were uncertain about Gray's motivations for wanting to shape the 
future direction for the community action agency in Houston. Gray proclaimed himself to 
be a believer in the 'democratic process,' but few could determine what he meant by that 
term. Gray publicly supported increased participation by poor residents in the poverty 
program through elections but at the same time stated that ultimate control of the War on 
Poverty in Houston rested with local public officials. It was also evident to the federal 
OEO inspectors that Gray was willing to use sinister methods to "neutralize" Allen and 
his staff, and one OEO official described Gray as "the most Byzantine character in a 
Byzantine city." For example, federal inspectors discovered that in addition to Houston 
Police Chief Herman Short, Gray had also been providing much of the negative 
information regarding the activities of HCCAA employees to Bush and Welch, 
particularly with regard to the "TSU Riot" and the turmoil in Settegast. The inspectors 
agreed that the poverty program in Houston would be better off without Gray, but none of 
them believed it would be possible for the HCCAA Board to terminate his employment 
without Gray creating a major controversy for the organization through his connections to 
Bush and Welch.33 
Members of the federal OEO inspection team noted that in addition to 
impediments created by Gray, Earl Allen and his staff were also being attacked by other 
forces in the city. Inspectors concluded that Earl Allen and his staff were "capable, 
militant, and close to the mood of the 'folk,'" but their worthwhile efforts were being 
thwarted by pillars of the Houston establishment, including the "liberal political 
organization" and the "traditional business" interests in the city. "A fear of controversy," 
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continued the inspector, "seems as evident among 'liberal' [HCCAA] board members as 
among the conservatives. The legitimacy of CAP personnel being a part of community 
efforts to petition the power structure for redress of real grievances is in doubt. The word 
'demonstration' has taken on an awesome, fear-inspiring meaning within OEO 
organizations, in spite of the vital part demonstrations have played in the social 
development of our country and their central meaning to our democratic tradition." The 
federal OEO inspector continued, "[Earl] Allen believes that no meaningful community 
action can occur in a city like Houston without some confrontation between the 
impoverished citizens of the slums and the power structure. . . . As Allen . . . told me, 'In 
Houston there is no such thing as a peaceful demonstration.' All demonstrations are, a 
priori, non-peaceful and unlawful." The inspector concluded that Mayor Welch had taken 
full advantage of the HCCAA Board's defensiveness and the widespread fear of rioting 
by "planting stories that the CAP staff is 'Black Power infiltrated' and other such pot-
shots."34 
These developments that occurred in the first few months after the merger 
deepened the divisions within HCCAA, particularly between the board and Allen's staff, 
as Gray took it upon himself to purge the radicals from the organization. Despite changes 
on the board and modifications to the community development plan, Earl Allen and much 
of his staff remained firmly committed to the Saul Alinsky method and to the necessity 
for open conflict and confrontation with Houston's public officials. HCCAA leadership, 
however, had been growing more conservative since the merger, and most approved of 
Gray's attempts to control Allen and the other radicals who remained in the organization. 
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As soon as Gray took over as Deputy Director of Resource Development in June 1967, he 
immediately began circumventing Allen's authority over his community development 
staff, redirecting community organizers toward less controversial activities, and purging 
from the HCCAA staff the remaining radicals who refused to be controlled by Gray and 
the conservatives on the new board of directors. 
Serious difficulties began immediately after Gray assumed his new position as 
Allen's supervisor. As Allen was busy reorganizing his staff after a somewhat chaotic 
melding of staff members from H-HCEOO and HAY, Gray made his first move to 
undercut Allen's authority over his own staff. Stating that he did not trust Allen to 
administer any portion of the new community development plan, Gray arbitrarily 
reassigned forty-six of Allen's community organizers away from the neighborhoods 
where Allen had placed them and ordered them to work in several HCCAA neighborhood 
centers under the supervision of James Williams, a former HAY staff member. A few 
days later Gray removed twenty-three of Allen's community development specialists 
from the field and ordered them to undergo training in the central HCCAA office for 
several weeks. Gray readily admitted to a federal inspector that he intentionally diverted 
Allen's staff in order to get them out of the target neighborhoods, where many 
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conservative board members believed they were stirring up too much trouble and 
threatening the reputation of the poverty program.36 
Following the reassignment of the community development staff without 
consulting Allen, Gray began reprioritizing the duties of Allen's staff to focus on various 
"crash programs," such as recruiting for summer Head Start and the Neighborhood Youth 
Corps, advertising for the Job Fair planned in conjunction with Mayor Welch's office, 
and gathering resources for a summer youth recreation program. Several of these "crash 
programs" were very poorly planned, and when this lack of planning drew criticism from 
the HCCAA Board and from poor Houston residents, Gray used the negative publicity to 
attack Allen and his community development staff even more viciously. Gray had 
developed a habit of simultaneously demeaning Allen in board meetings and implying 
that Allen had lost his own authority over the staff while also giving the impression that 
Allen was deliberately attempting to radicalize staff members and carry out a Black 
Power agenda. Gray made statements to the board such as, "I tell Allen what I want, and 
he does it," while at the same time accusing Allen of allowing Black Power advocates 
and "SNCC types" to infiltrate the community development staff. According to a federal 
inspector, Mayor Welch and Congressman Bush, who by this time were on edge about 
the prospect of continued demonstrations, undoubtedly prompted Gray to attack Allen in 
this way. Welch was so concerned about Allen's activities in Houston's poor 
neighborhoods that he ordered undercover police surveillance of Allen and certain 
members of his staff. By mid-summer 1967 Gray had decided that the only way to satisfy 
36
 Ben Haney to Jack Tinkle, memorandum, 17 August 1967, Box 10B, Folder Inspection and Evaluation 
Reports, Office of Economic Opportunity, Southwest Region, Community Action Programs, District 
Supervisors, Records Relating to City Economic Opportunity Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record Group 
381.NARASW. 
231 
Welch and Bush and to rid the HCCAA community development staff of SNCC 
operatives was to force Earl Allen to resign as Community Development Director and to 
professionalize the staff by purging the militants and radicals from the organization. 
The "TSU 5" indictments handed down in the summer of 1967 provided Gray and 
his conservative allies with the ammunition they needed to begin ridding HCCAA of 
radical members on Allen's staff. In early June a Houston grand jury issued indictments 
against five Texas Southern University students, charging them with murdering Houston 
police officer Raymond Kuba and attempting to murder two other officers who were 
injured during the TSU Riot during the previous month. It is unclear whether the grand 
jury had access to police information showing that Kuba was killed by a ricocheting 
bullet fired by another police officer, but that revelation would have mattered very little 
since the grand jury charged the students not with firing the actual shots but with "setting 
in motion the violence that took the rookie officer's life and wounded the other two." As 
District Attorney Carol Vance explained, "One engaged in any riot whereby an illegal act 
is committed, shall be deemed guilty of the offense of riot according to the character and 
degree of such offense, whether the said illegal act was perpetrated by him or by those 
with whom he is participating. All persons are principals who are guilty of acting 
together in the commission of an offense." In an even more shocking affront to reality, 
grand jury foreman W. A. Ruhmann stated that the jury also found "that our law 
enforcement officials acted with due restraint. . . . With numerous rumors of police 
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brutality, we find that the law enforcement officers acted in the best interests of the 
community. We find that this trouble was caused or encouraged by a few agitators and 
troublemakers." After the grand jury issued the indictments, District Judge Fred Hooey 
denied bond to the group of students now referred to as the TSU 5. It took two weeks for 
attorneys provided by the NAACP to convince a judge to set bond for the five 
defendants, but in mid-June the TSU 5 were allowed to post bail and leave the Houston 
city jail. The trial was set to begin in July, but after a protest of the scheduled trial in the 
Third Ward near the TSU campus turned violent as several demonstrators broke store 
windows and set small fires, a district judge granted a continuance and postponed the trial 
of the TSU 5 until the fall of 1967.38 
HCCAA and the TSU 5 first crossed paths in early July 1967 when the HCCAA 
Board of directors launched Project Go, a temporary summer recreation program 
designed to "cool down the long hot summer" in Houston. With a $600,000 grant from 
OEO, HCCAA officials hired more than 400 young people to staff Project Go and 
employed them as recreation workers and neighborhood developers. A HCCAA Board 
member described the summer program as an attempt to provide constructive activities 
for Houston's youth and keep them from causing any trouble in the city. He stated, "We 
know from experience that summer trouble often starts because there are young people 
on the street with nothing to do. We propose to hire the troublemakers as the 
neighborhood developers, and keep them busy collecting data, helping the poor find jobs 
38
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and pointing out services to people who need them. This will help cool down the long hot 
summer." In early July, as HCCAA employees moved from the planning stages to the 
implementation of Project Go, program administrators decided to hire two rather 
prominent "troublemakers" in Houston who were then part of the TSU 5. That month 
they hired Trazawell Franklin and Floyd Nichols, both under indictment for the murder of 
Officer Kuba, to work in the summer recreation program.39 
The hiring of Franklin and Nichols did not cause any immediate problems for 
HCCAA as Project Go got off to a smooth start in mid-July. A small army of newly hired 
HCCAA staff members fanned out over the Houston area and provided recreational 
activities for children between the ages of one and twelve at parks and recreation centers 
located in the children's own neighborhoods. Mayor Welch's office even helped organize 
a citywide job fair to work in conjunction with Project Go to provide employment for 
teenagers who were too old for the summer recreation program. Several HCCAA Board 
members publicly applauded their own efforts to hire potential rioters and other 
troublemakers and turn them into productive citizens.40 
The problem started during the first week in August, however, when Hartsell 
Gray discovered that Franklin and Nichols had been hired as part of Project Go without 
his knowledge. Though the stated purpose of the program was to hire militant agitators 
and allow them to participate in the constructive work of the poverty program, Gray 
interpreted the employment of Franklin and Nichols as simply another step in Allen's 
39
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plan to fill his staff with Black Power advocates and troublemakers. Gray immediately 
notified Congressmen George Bush that HCCAA had hired these two men, and Bush in 
turn told Mayor Welch and Police Chief Short. By the time OEO officials were made 
aware of the situation in late July, Gray had already made the news public in an effort to 
discredit Allen and his staff even further.41 
Southwest Regional OEO Director Walter Richter rushed to Houston the next day 
to meet with Mayor Welch and to try to prevent the situation from inflicting an additional 
blemish on the poverty program in the city. At Welch's insistence, Richter strongly 
encouraged HCCAA Chairman Francis Williams to terminate Franklin's and Nichols's 
employment with the community action agency and to relieve them of their duties 
immediately. Since Williams was determined to give the poverty program a better image 
in Houston and was under increasing pressure from Gray and his allies to get rid of the 
militants in the organization, he complied with Richter's request and on the fourth of 
August fired Franklin and Nichols. In an effort to blunt the inevitable reaction from the 
militant black community in Houston, however, Williams also arranged for a local labor 
union to employ Franklin and Nichols for the rest of the summer. According to Williams, 
Franklin and Nichols accepted the decision without opposition and stated that they 
understood the reason for their termination and that they would happily assume their new 
positions with the labor union the following week.42 
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intended to be," continued Welch, "[which is] one that fights poverty and not a civil 
rights organization."43 
Many members of Houston's black community, however, were already fuming 
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guidelines said nothing about a person charged and not convicted. He stated, "The 
dismissal of these . . . students, based upon charges which have been preferred but not yet 
determined, is an excellent example of prejudgment. Moreover, the abuse of discretion 
evidenced by their discharge is precisely the type of behavior which the Negro 
community has come to expect, to resent and to protest by methods which are becoming 
increasingly more violent. . . . The termination of these students' employment with the 
OEO program, based upon charges which have not been submitted to trial contradicts the 
principle, embodied in our Constitution, that all persons shall be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty." Despite these pleadings, Shriver and southwest regional OEO officials 
never wavered in their support of the decision to terminate the employment of Franklin 
and Nichols.44 
Hartsell Gray used the momentum created by the firings to begin advocating for 
the complete elimination of the Community Development Program and the dismissal of 
Earl Allen and his entire staff. Gray was convinced that SNCC members had control of 
Project Go and that Franklin and Nichols were simply the first of many needed 
terminations on the HCCAA staff. He told a federal inspector that the only way he knew 
how to wrest control of the poverty program away from SNCC militants was to rid the 
organization of Earl Allen and his Community Development staff. Gray stated, "All of 
the problems in this community have been caused by HCCAA staff members," and in a 
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highly suspect accusation he claimed that Allen told his staff members that "the Negro 
must be taught to hate the Whites before some action can take place." However 
improbable Gray's statements may have been, the fact remained that because of the 
Project Go incident, by August 1967 he had enough support on the HCCAA Board of 
directors and executive committee to deliver on his threat to expel Allen and his staff 
from the organization.45 
By this time Earl Allen could read the handwriting on the wall, and near the end 
of the first week in August he tendered his resignation to the HCCAA Board of directors. 
Citing the firing of Franklin and Nichols, Allen stated that he could no longer administer 
the Community Development program for HCCAA because Hartsell Gray was bent on 
eliminating his entire operation in Houston. During a lengthy interview with Saralee 
Tiede of the Houston Chronicle, Allen said that his resignation from HCCAA should be 
interpreted as "the admission of a militant Negro professional that he cannot work in the 
politically charged atmosphere of the antipoverty program" and reiterated his 
commitment to the use of confrontational tactics to empower Houston's poor. He 
continued, "Numbers are usually the only strength poor people have. It's a very 
honorable technique in the whole scheme of things for creating a bargaining atmosphere 
and it should not be denied the folk who have no alternative." The HCCAA Board of 
directors and Allen's superiors in the organization had become so conservative and so 
afraid of open conflict, he argued, that he could no longer carry out his plan for 
community development. "My powers to hire and fire staff were curtailed," Allen 
45
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exclaimed, "while criticism often resulted in staff being transferred over my objection. 
The result of criticism was always an order to cool it. As a result the staff was frustrated 
and demoralized. We were always getting ready, never really getting in to do something." 
Allen argued that the problems he faced in the poverty program were systemic problems 
with the entire antipoverty effort. He stated, "There is a basic contradiction in the war on 
poverty. The agencies charged with affecting [sic] change are themselves threatened by 
change." Allen's solution, therefore, was to create a privately funded independent 
antipoverty organization capable of changing the status quo and free of ties to the existing 
order in Houston. He promised that his new organization would be dedicated to 
empowering poor people and minorities in the city, and he said its motto would be "Don't 
burn, baby, let's build, because we have the tools."46 
Before launching their own antipoverty organization, Allen and his supporters 
wanted to create a forum where HCCAA staff members could register their displeasure 
with the agency and the way it conducted the War on Poverty in the city. On August 8, 
1967, Allen and approximately 100 community development staff members staged a 
protest at HCCAA headquarters demanding Allen's reinstatement with increased 
authority over the community development program and the rehiring of Project Go 
employees Trazawell Franklin, Floyd Nichols, and Kelton Sams. Sams had worked as a 
liaison between the Project Go staff and Allen's community development department and 
had been one of Allen's closest and most trusted allies in the organization. After Sams 
46
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appeared on a radio panel discussion on the previous day and spoke about the poverty 
program in Houston without permission from the HCCAA Board, Hartsell Gray 
persuaded Francis Williams to fire Sams rather than give him a simple warning. After 
walking a picket line for several hours, many of the protesters began blocking the 
entrances to the HCCAA building and refusing to allow anyone to enter or exit. When 
Francis Williams returned from lunch that afternoon, he had to force his way through the 
pickets in order to reach the door. Once inside, Williams called the Houston police and 
asked them to remove the protesters. Police officers arrived within minutes to disperse 
the crowd. The protesters agreed to leave peacefully, but Allen and Sams vowed they 
would return the next day until changes were made to the poverty program.47 
Williams and Gray were furious about HCCAA employees being involved in 
protests against the organization, and the next day they fired twenty-three employees they 
had witnessed picketing with Allen and Sams. Williams stated that the reason for the 
firings was that these employees failed to report to their assigned posts on the day of the 
protest, but it was clear that Williams and Gray wanted to send a message to any other 
HCCAA employee who was considering challenging their authority over the poverty 
program. The firings also represented the latest development in Gray's attempt to purge 
the organization of radicals and militants loyal to Earl Allen, and by the end of the 
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summer Gray's crusade to clean up the HCCAA staff was well on its way to 
completion.48 
One of the fears consuming Williams, Gray, and other members of the HCCAA 
Board was that a riot could break out in Houston and poverty workers could possibly be 
implicated in it. Other than the police riot on the campus of Texas Southern University in 
May 1967, Houston had been mostly spared the racial violence that plagued other major 
cities in the mid-1960s. At the same time, no one in Houston interpreted the absence of 
an outbreak of violence for an absence of racial tension. After riots had caused 
widespread destruction in Watts, Newark, Detroit, and many other American cities, 
Houstonians understandably were on edge about the possibility of a major riot in their 
city. This fear that gripped much of Houston undoubtedly had a profound effect on the 
administration of the War on Poverty in the city and created an atmosphere conducive to 
the purging of the radicals and black militants from the organization. 
In August 1967, the fear of an urban riot occurring in Houston also played a role 
in an episode involving HCCAA that bordered on farce. This drama involved an HCCAA 
supplies officer and an order for several surplus rifle scopes from the United States Air 
Force, and the event pushed the conservative leaders of HCCAA into an even more 
defensive position and prompted Williams and others to dissociate themselves from the 
alleged radicals even further. The saga began in July when George T. Miller, a sixty-four-
year-old white Houstonian and HCCAA Property Control Manager, placed an order for 
seven surplus telescopic rifle scopes from Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, 
48
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without getting approval from any of his superiors in the organization. Although Miller 
would later claim that he wanted to purchase the scopes in order to build microscopes 
from the lenses to use in an HCCAA job training program, there is some evidence that 
this explanation was fabricated after the story broke in August. Regardless of Miller's 
motive, on August 3 agents with the Houston office of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation decided to investigate the matter quietly before the local press discovered 
the story. The FBI did, however, notify the OEO Office of Inspection that they were 
conducting an investigation, and OEO officials called the Houston Police Department's 
Intelligence Division to make them aware of what was going on. Two days later FBI 
officials determined that neither Miller nor HCCAA had violated any federal law and 
ended the investigation.49 
The FBI's decision not to pursue the investigation any further infuriated members 
of the Houston Police Department, especially Police Chief Herman Short, who decided to 
take matters into his own hands. During a routine news conference on August 11, Short 
revealed to reporters that Miller had attempted to order the telescopic rifle scopes and 
insinuated that poverty workers wanted to use them for violent purposes. Stating that he 
was filled with "such a feeling of disgust and outrage," Short showed members of the 
press the order form submitted by HCCAA and pointed out that the wording "specifically 
asked for scopes equipped with standard range settings that could be attached to high-
powered rifles." When reporters approached George Miller about the order, Miller 
claimed he could not remember submitting any order for rifle scopes and stated that the 
49
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order may have been submitted without his signature. A day later, however, Miller held 
his own news conference and stated that he indeed ordered the surplus rifle scopes and 
that they were to be converted into microscopes for a job training program. The Houston 
Chronicle quoted a master gunsmith, however, who argued that "there is no conceivable 
way a telescopic sight can be converted into a microscope." Predictably, a controversy 
soon arose over exactly what use an antipoverty agency would have with military grade 
rifle sights.50 
Upon receiving the details of this developing story from his home district, 
Houston Congressmen George Bush demanded a full congressional investigation into the 
rifle scope order. On August 14 Bush addressed the House of Representatives and stated 
that the entire rifle scope incident "indicates a gross stupidity on the part of OEO" and 
that poverty workers in Houston were "totally lacking in judgment." Bush continued, "In 
this critical summer period of civil unrest, a citizen of Houston might well believe that 
the scopes were ordered for use in a disturbance. After reading of the sniping incidents in 
Detroit, Newark, and other cities, it is understandable that a Houston citizen might view 
an order for scopes as a threat to the peace of his community." It was understandable for 
Houston citizens to make this assumption, according to Bush, but even he implied that it 
was unlikely that HCCAA would order rifle sights to use in a riot. As he stated to 
Congress, there were several possible explanations for the order. Although the mystery of 
the rifle scope episode was never solved to many observers' satisfaction, the most 
50
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probable explanation for the rifle scope order boiled down to political graft. Bush 
suggested to Congress that Miller or one of his employees wanted to obtain the scopes to 
give to their friends to use on their deer hunting rifles. This would explain the request that 
the scopes have the capability of attaching to high powered rifles.51 
Despite the fact that Bush recognized the improbability that HCCAA employees 
wanted to use the rifle sights in case a riot broke out in Houston, he nonetheless went a 
step further in order to link the poverty program and the potential for riots even more 
closely. For example, Bush reminded the Congressmen that very recently HCCAA had 
come under fire for hiring potential rioters. "The ordering of the scopes," Bush continued, 
"was revealed only a week after the facts were released that the Houston OEO had hired 
two young men under indictment for murder in connection with the death of a police 
officer in the recent disturbances at Texas Southern University." Because of these two 
incidents, Bush demanded a full congressional investigation of the poverty program in 
Houston and urged investigators to ascertain why HCCAA employees would have 
required rifle scopes to fight poverty in the city.52 
After Bush's call for an investigation, federal investigators from the Air Force, the 
OEO Office of Inspection, and the FBI rushed to Houston to conduct a complete 
inventory of all HCCAA's possessions. More importantly, Bush succeeded in persuading 
the House Education and Labor Committee to initiate a full investigation of all of 
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HCCAA's activities in Houston, a development that brought national attention to these 
local controversies. This investigation would prove to be short lived and its report was 
inconclusive, but in the fall of 1967 the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 
under the direction of Arkansas Senator John L. McClellan, pursued a more 
comprehensive inquiry into the connection between Houston's community action agency 
and the potential for urban riots in the city. Bush had wanted to make a connection in 
people's minds between the poverty program and urban riots, and by using the rifle scope 
fiasco in Houston he was able to accomplish that goal. Although federal investigators 
eventually agreed with Miller's explanation that the lenses from the scopes were to be 
used to build microscopes for a job training program and approved the delivery of the 
lenses without the scopes, the entire event added yet another blemish to an organization 
already under attack for its alleged ties to Black Power militants and potential rioters. 
After the rifle scope incident, HCCAA leaders, particularly Francis Williams and Hartsell 
Gray, became even more cautious and conservative in their outlook and distanced their 
organization even further from supposed militants and radicals as Welch and Short once 
again ramped up their attack on the poverty program in Houston.53 
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The increasingly cautious and conservative approach of HCCAA's administrators 
and their purging of radicals and militants from the organization led to even deeper 
divisions within the community action agency and caused a rapid decline in support from 
Houston's poor neighborhoods. A striking indication that HCCAA had lost the support of 
many of Houston's poor residents was the incredibly low voter turnout during elections 
to place poor residents on the HCCAA Board of directors. In the midst of Earl Allen's 
protests against the organization in mid-August 1967, HCCAA Board members, under 
pressure from OEO officials in Washington, tried to meet federal guidelines for including 
the poor on their board by holding elections in several poor neighborhoods in the city. 
HCCAA employees set up thirty-eight polling places located in nine target areas and 
opened them all day in order to ensure a high voter turnout. Their hopes were dashed, 
however, when less than 1 percent of eligible voters in the poor neighborhoods showed 
up at the polls. In one district, not a single person voted, and the result was that no 
representative was sent to the board from that area.54 
Even more damaging to the reputation of HCCAA than low voter turnout, 
however, was a rapidly increasing number of poor residents who began speaking out 
against the organization and expressing their disappointment with the poverty program. 
During a meeting in July 1967, as Hartsell Gray was attempting to rein in the activities of 
Allen and his community organization staff, several residents from one of the 
neighborhoods where Gray had removed HCCAA community organizers arrived to lodge 
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their complaints with the board. One resident expressed outrage that since Allen's staff 
members had been removed, neighborhood centers were being closed down and a 
complete communication breakdown was threatening to occur between poverty workers 
and poor residents. Another resident complained that the few HCCAA employees who 
remained in her neighborhood refused to speak with poor residents and instead simply 
made notes about the activities of community organizers in the area. A third resident 
informed the board that the director of the neighborhood center in her area frequently 
refused to allow residents to use the HCCAA facility for meetings and other events. All 
of the residents who attended the meeting agreed that their neighborhoods desperately 
needed community organizers to return and continue the work they began under Allen's 
direction.55 
These complaints went largely unaddressed, and poor residents began 
complaining to reporters from the local newspapers in order to make their voices heard. 
A team of Houston Chronicle reporters visited four of HCCAA's ten target areas around 
the city in early September 1967 to ascertain how much the War on Poverty had helped 
Houston's poor. Their final report described their mission as "uncomfortable and soul-
depressing" as they witnessed firsthand the seemingly incurable "want, deprivation and 
misery of body and spirit." Many of the poor residents made very critical comments 
about the federal War on Poverty and how the local community action agency 
administered it. "For all but a few," the report stated, "the federal War on Poverty is no 
more than a slogan. It is as distant in effect as the Civil War is in time." One resident they 
interviewed proclaimed, "Some poor people are being helped by the poverty program. 
55
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But the very poor are not." By 1968 several poor Houstonians had resorted to writing 
letters to President Johnson to inform him that the people of Houston were quickly losing 
faith in the War on Poverty because of the way in which the HCCAA Board administered 
the program.56 
By far the loudest complaints about the way HCCAA employees and the board 
administered the poverty program in Houston came from Mexican Americans in Area 9, 
a poor area near the ship channel on the east side of the city. In February 1968 Hector del 
Castillo, president of a Mexican American community group in the area, sent a letter to 
Southwest Regional OEO Director Walter Richter expressing his shock and outrage that 
the HCCAA Board of directors had recently diverted more than $300,000 from Area 9 
and used it for programs in a section of the city with no Mexican American residents. 
Later in the month A. D. Asios, the chairman of the Area 9 Committee on the HCCAA 
Board of directors, expressed his alarm to Richter that for six months the HCCAA Board 
had completely neglected Area 9. Asios proclaimed that he was very angry that the area 
was then being offered "a token program which is totally inadequate, unequal in its 
application and completely discriminatory." Richter responded to both men by trying to 
shift the blame from HCCAA to the delegate agencies that were responsible for 
implementing the programs in Area 9. Richter admitted that there had been problems 
Carlton Carl, Jane Manning, and Susan Caudill, "Houston's Poor: Their Plights and Their Hopes," 
Houston Chronicle, September 10, 1967 (quotations); Mildred Robinson to Lyndon Johnson, 25 September 
1968, Box 10, Folder General Correspondence, Aug-Dec 1968, Office of Economic Opportunity, 
Southwest Region, Community Action Programs, District Supervisors, Records Relating to City Economic 
Opportunity Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record Group 381, NARASW; Freddye M. Thompson to 
Lyndon Johnson, 25 September 1968, Box 10, Folder General Correspondence, Aug-Dec 1968, Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Southwest Region, Community Action Programs, District Supervisors, Records 
Relating to City Economic Opportunity Boards, 1965-1968, Houston, Record Group 381, NARASW. 
extending programs into the area but promised that Francis Williams would adequately 
address their concerns.57 
Apparently the response from Richter and the action taken by Williams did not 
satisfy Mexican Americans in Area 9, and in August 1968 they approached Texas State 
Representative Lauro Cruz from Houston with their grievances about the poverty 
program. Cruz was able to convince officials at the southwest regional OEO office that 
an inspection should be performed to investigate the allegations being made about 
HCCAA's neglect of the Mexican American community in Houston. The inspection team 
found that the HCCAA Board was indeed guilty of neglecting Houston's Mexican 
American community in programming, using discriminatory hiring practices, and 
denying Mexican Americans a voice in the planning and implementation of the poverty 
program in the city. Although OEO officials outlined several steps that the HCCAA 
Board could take to remedy these problems, by the end of 1968 very little had been 
accomplished; Mexican American residents of Area 9 continued to complain about the 
poverty program.58 
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While HCCAA administrators became more conservative in their implementation 
of the War on Poverty in Houston, Reverend Wallace B. Poteat, Ecumenical Fellowship 
Latin American Channel (EF-LAC) project activists, and their VISTA volunteers 
attempted to continue with their more radical and confrontational approach to community 
action. In the city's Third Ward, VIST As organized residents to go to Houston City 
Council meetings to put pressure on the councilmen to build a public library in their 
neighborhood. A VISTA volunteer in the Fifth Ward organized a neighborhood council 
to pressure the city council to build more parks and other outdoor recreational areas in 
their neighborhood. Another volunteer in the Fifth Ward organized the tenants who lived 
in homes owned by the same landlord and pressured the owner to repaint all of their 
houses. After achieving this victory, this newly formed tenant union successfully 
persuaded city officials to pave the roads and install streetlights in their neighborhood. In 
an impoverished neighborhood near the ship channel a VISTA volunteer began holding 
meetings to educate residents about how to set up their own credit union, and in another 
area on the east side a VISTA organized parents into a committee to monitor school 
board decisions that affected schools in their neighborhood and to arrange extracurricular 
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activities for their children. In another neighborhood a VISTA volunteer organized the 
Golden Age Club of senior citizens to provide activities and lobby the city council in the 
interests of retired persons.59 
After living in Houston's poor neighborhoods and witnessing firsthand the daily 
lives of those living in poverty, nearly all of the VISTA volunteers recognized the need 
for welfare reform. This was true all over the country; as poverty workers came into close 
contact with families that depended on welfare payments primarily through Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), it quickly became apparent that changes in 
the welfare system were needed. Many poverty workers across the country discovered 
that a number of loosely knit grassroots organizations had already been formed, mainly 
by mothers, to advocate for higher welfare payments and better treatment from 
caseworkers. With assistance provided by community organizers, many of whom were 
VISTA volunteers, the National Welfare Rights Organization was born in 1967 out of 
these local pressure groups. As historian Premilla Nadasen has argued, "the welfare rights 
movement was perhaps one of the most important political and social struggles of the 
1960s."60 
VISTA volunteers in Houston quickly recognized the need for welfare reform, but 
few could locate existing welfare rights organizations in the city like those found in other 
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parts of the country. In a report filed with the HCHR Board of Directors in July 1967, 
VISTA volunteer Frank Barrett argued that based on his experiences in many of 
Houston's poor neighborhoods, "one of the great problems of this wealthy city is the 
plight of the welfare recipient in Houston and the distinct aura of the 1930s which 
surrounds the administration of public assistance." Barrett proposed that VISTA 
volunteers begin organizing the poor into cohesive groups that would be able to pressure 
the Harris County Welfare Department and the Commissioners Court to increase the 
amount of welfare payments and demand fair treatment for all Houston citizens receiving 
welfare support. Barrett described the impossibility of poor and relatively powerless 
individuals effectively dealing with the welfare establishment in Houston and argued that 
only through organization could welfare recipients be empowered to make demands on 
the city's welfare bureaucracy. Going a step further, Barrett advocated using lawyers 
from the Houston Legal Foundation to demand real reform of the welfare system by 
filing lawsuits against pillars of the welfare establishment whose administrators abused 
the system or treated recipients unfairly. The VISTA volunteer, argued Barrett, would 
thus serve as a catalyst for reform and could assist attorneys by using the local media to 
expose flaws and inequalities in the city's welfare system. Most importantly, Barrett 
argued that an effort to push for welfare rights in Houston would empower poor residents 
to demand justice from a system that had thus far denied it from them. Barrett's report 
had a profound effect on EF-LAC project directors and other VISTA volunteers working 
in Houston, and by the end of the year VISTAs in all areas of Houston had begun 
organizing welfare rights organizations.61 
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second fire that the neighborhood "is a breeding ground for crime and antagonistic racial 
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fires had been the result of arson, Reverend Poteat proclaimed that the arsonists must 
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building in which the VISTA volunteers had established a teen recreation center, evicted 
the VISTA tenants after receiving multiple complaints from his other tenants about 
profanity, drinking, and fighting at the center. Poteat and the VISTAs were able to get 
500 neighborhood residents to sign a petition demanding they be allowed to stay in the 
building, but Sedita refused to budge. Ironically, the teens who frequented the center had 
just voted to name the building the "Sedita Recreation Center." After the VISTA 
volunteers got some publicity surrounding these issues, landlords began arbitrarily raising 
the rents on their apartments and community centers. Critics of the VISTA volunteers in 
Houston also accused the EF-LAC project of being a haven for draft dodgers, a charge 
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VISTA volunteers were veterans of the United States Armed Forces and the fact that 
VISTA service did not exempt a volunteer from military service.62 
In addition to property destruction and public accusations, one VISTA volunteer, 
in a report on the conditions in Houston, recounted a number of hostile actions against 
their programs: "The day of the last fire some of the local segregationists tried to break a 
chair over my head in a restaurant. The Chairman of the Board of the project was shot at 
by a local Klaner. The Ku Klux Klan used to call the director of the project at home at 3 
a.m." The Houston Police Department, which Reverend Poteat always argued was 
infiltrated by members of the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society, was openly 
antagonistic to VISTA volunteers in poor neighborhoods. In January 1967, the same 
month that arsonists set fire to the East End Teen Center for the second time, officers 
from the Houston Police Department's Criminal Intelligence Division began a 
confidential investigation of a VISTA volunteer in Houston because they believed he had 
"Civil Rights political affiliations."63 While the East End Teen Center was burning to the 
ground in the middle of the night in January 1967, police officers arrested VISTA 
volunteer Marc Jacobs and charged him with loitering simply because he was standing on 
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the front lawn of his rented home across the street from the fire and at one time attempted 
to help extinguish the fire. As the officers were taking him to the police station, they 
accused him of being an atheist and a beatnik and made numerous "offensive statements 
about VISTA." Houston Legal Foundation attorneys eventually convinced the courts that 
police officers misinterpreted Jacobs's attempts to help contain the fire as obstructing 
their work, but police harassment continued. While Frank Barrett, a VISTA volunteer in 
the ship channel area, provided emergency transportation to the hospital for 
neighborhood residents, he received six separate citations by the Houston Police 
Department within a twenty-four-hour period for having a local residence but an out-of-
state driver's license. The charges were clearly spurious and Barrett was never prosecuted 
in court, but this kind of harassment from Houston police officers severely hindered the 
work of the VISTA volunteers in the city. Police officers also repeatedly harassed two 
female VISTA volunteers in the Third Ward for being the only white girls in the 
neighborhood. In the midst of increasing concern over rioting in urban ghettos that began 
in 1965, Reverend Poteat warned that "unless communication at the grass-roots level 
between the white community and the black community is opened up, understood, and 
supported by the white community, Houston may be in for serious trouble."64 
An additional problem that the VISTA volunteers faced beginning in 1967 was an 
increasing number of conflicts with HCCAA, the city's official community action 
agency. Before May 1967, VISTA volunteers in Houston had received enormous support 
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from H-HCEOO, particularly because William Ballew, Charles Kelly, and Earl Allen 
were sympathetic with the tactics employed by the VISTAs. Beginning during the 
summer of 1967, as Francis Williams and Hartsell Gray attempted to shift the activities 
of the recently merged HCCAA in a more conservative direction and away from 
community organizing and empowerment of the poor, the work of many VISTA 
volunteers inevitably clashed with that effort. In fact, VISTA volunteers in Houston 
became some of the most vocal critics of HCCAA's conservative swing. During an 
inspection of HCCAA in late August 1967, a federal OEO inspector noted that the 
VISTAs in particular were the most critical of Williams. "The VISTAs like and 
sympathize with the major militant leaders," stated the inspector, "feel they are the 
natural leaders of the ghettos, and are alarmed at the cleanup that Williams is doing." An 
open feud between HCCAA and the EF-LAC project began early in 1968 when several 
Mexican American organizations in the ship channel area, together with VISTA 
volunteers, protested the way the community action association planned to spend a 
$300,000 grant from the federal government in the area. Mexican American civic leaders 
proclaimed that HCCAA would only agree to fund "a token program, inadequate in 
comparison to needs, unequal in application and totally discriminatory." EF-LAC 
organizers argued that the tactic of HCCAA was to develop antipoverty measures in their 
offices and implement them in neighborhoods regardless of whether residents wanted 
them or not. In an interview with the Houston Chronicle, Francis Williams, HCCAA 
executive director, exclaimed that if the residents of poor neighborhoods in the ship 
channel area did not want the federal funds spent on programs in their area, then HCCAA 
would be happy to spend the money elsewhere.65 
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Federal OEO inspectors placed the blame for this dwindling support among poor 
residents and grassroots antipoverty activists squarely on the shoulders of the conflicting 
factions within HCCAA that had existed since before H-HCEOO and HAY had merged 
to form a single community action agency for the city. According to the inspection team, 
the internal divisions within HCCAA were incredibly harmful to the entire antipoverty 
effort in the city because petty squabbles were filtering out into the staff in the target 
neighborhoods. As long as the staff remained divided, there was little hope that poor 
people would become confident in the work being done in their neighborhoods. One 
inspector believed that Hartsell Gray was mostly to blame for these internal divisions 
because of his arbitrary firings and reassignment of HCCAA personnel. The inspector 
remarked that because of Gray's actions, "the poor are very suspicious of HCCAA." 
With no unity and very little sense of direction among themselves, HCCAA leaders could 
hardly expect to inspire confidence or trust among Houston's poor residents.66 
HCCAA administrators not only suffered from diminishing support from the very 
people they were supposed to be helping, but they also faced declining support from 
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OEO officials in Washington who were beginning to back off of their commitment to the 
concept of community action and from conservative members of Congress who started 
increasing their attacks on the entire poverty program. As historian Allen J. Matusow has 
shown, national OEO officials were in retreat by 1967, and it was inevitable that local 
community action agencies would follow. "In 1967," argued Matusow, "the question was 
not whether CAP would continue to promote change but whether it would even be 
permitted to exist." There were certainly enough conservative votes in Congress to 
abolish OEO and end the War on Poverty, and according to Matusow it fell to an unlikely 
savior of the poverty program to ensure its continuance. Democratic Representative Edith 
Green of Oregon, who since the early days of the juvenile delinquency program had 
opposed the very concept of community action, submitted a last minute change to the 
OEO reauthorization bill in October 1967 that ultimately persuaded enough conservatives 
to support the bill and saved the War on Poverty from being unceremoniously terminated 
just three years after its inception.67 
Although the Community Action Program did not end in 1967, the shape and 
direction of it changed dramatically after Congress passed the OEO reauthorization bill in 
October. The Green Amendment essentially allowed local governments to take control of 
local community action agencies, effectively giving mayors the power to dominate 
agencies that had become too meddlesome to the status quo. The irony of the situation lay 
in the fact that by the fall of 1967 most local community action agencies had backed off 
any previous commitment to radical community action and had become little more than 
dispensers of social services. The Green Amendment simply codified what had already 
Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper 
&Row, 1984), 269. 
taken place in nearly every town and city in the country and ruled out the possibility of 
any community action agency successfully appealing to federal OEO guidelines in its 
quest to challenge local power structures. After the Green Amendment passed, federal 
regulations were on the side of local governments.68 
The passage of the Green Amendment had long-term consequences for the War 
on Poverty in Houston, but its immediate effect was to encourage HCCAA administrators 
to make their organization even more amenable to city government officials. The 
HCCAA Board of directors had scheduled a second round of elections to place more poor 
residents on the board for February 1968, but after the passage of the Green Amendment 
southwest regional OEO officials advised the board to postpone the elections until the 
effects of the amendment on local community action agencies became clearer. Once the 
elections had been postponed, it became apparent that in order for HCCAA to continue 
its role in implementing the War on Poverty and receive funding from OEO, Mayor 
Welch would have to give the organization official designation as Houston's community 
action agency. The Green Amendment thus gave Welch the power to require whatever 
changes he desired in HCCAA's structure and to withhold official sanction if HCCAA 
leaders refused to comply.69 
The southwest regional OEO office dispatched OEO Field Analyst Hamah King 
to Houston in early April 1968 to assist HCCAA leaders meet the new guidelines and 
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help make any needed organizational changes to satisfy Welch. Since Francis Williams 
and Hartsell Gray had been successful in purging the radicals from the HCCAA rolls, 
Welch's only major requirement was that the organization centralize control of the 
poverty program into a much smaller board of directors. Rather than a 150-member board 
of directors, Welch desired a 21-member board composed of 7 representatives of public 
officials, 5 from private organizations, and 9 representatives of the poor. Members of the 
HCCAA Board quickly agreed to these terms, and on June 30, 1968, Welch officially 
designated the organization as the legitimate community action agency for the city of 
Houston.70 
By the end of 1968 HCCAA, faced with diminished support from national OEO 
officials and having lost credibility in Houston's poor neighborhoods, had become 
nothing more than a deliverer of social services with a centralized and bureaucratic 
governing board. In July, Francis Williams moved into the position of Executive Director 
and the HCCAA Board elected Joe Foy, a prominent Houston businessman and vice-
president of the Houston Natural Gas Corpration, as their chairman. Foy promised that he 
would lead the organization "out of the wilderness" and into the business of delivering 
much needed services to poor residents of Houston. A Houston Chronicle reporter noted 
optimistically that Foy and the board would now enjoy greater control over the 
70
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organization than previous boards and that HCCAA had recently replaced much of their 
71 
staff with trained professional social workers. 
HCCAA's new programs and activities during 1968 are illustrative of the 
organization's commitment to the delivery of social services and complemented the 
services the organization began offering the previous year. In April HCCAA 
administrators initiated a program called the Special Community Action Program (SCAP) 
that reassigned the majority of the community organizers who remained on the HCCAA 
staff and placed them in neighborhood centers where they were instructed to help poor 
residents locate needed social services. In July HCCAA employees launched a $750,000 
youth summer camp for poor children and teenagers that provided activities such as 
swimming, recreation, and arts and crafts. That summer HCCAA also held a job fair in 
downtown Houston to bring employers and potential employees together and instituted a 
Neighborhood Health Services program to provide temporary federally-funded medical 
services in poor neighborhoods. In September HCCAA got approval from OEO to 
administer Project Money Wise, which was a consumer education program aimed at 
Houston's elderly population. As historian Allen J. Matusow argued, "Instincts for self-
preservation having prevailed over formal commitments to change, once militant CAAs 
rapidly evolved into tame dispensers of services." The experiences of HCCAA after the 
passage of the Green Amendment confirm that this was true for the once militant 
community action agency in Houston and show that HCCAA now "served - not 
threatened - local authority."72 
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Francis Williams's and Hartsell Gray's success in purging the radicals from their 
organization and making it more palatable to the city's public officials undoubtedly 
helped ensure HCCAA's continued existence, but in a short time they also made HCCAA 
so conservative and racked with internal divisions that the organization lost the support of 
Houston's poor people. By 1969 HCCAA was large, bureaucratic, centralized, overly 
sensitive to the wishes of public officials, and alienated from the very people it was 
created to help. Little hope remained that such a cautious HCCAA could bring about 
social change capable of attacking the root causes of poverty. As Tolstoy had described 
the Battle of Borodino, the War on Poverty in Houston had been filled with starts and 
stops, illusory victories, discouraging defeats, and misinformation, and the experience 
frustrated any attempt to ascertain progress in the fight against the evils of poverty. The 
city's community action agency, once dominated by idealistic antipoverty activists 
determined to try a new approach to solving the problems of poverty through a radical 
interpretation of the community action concept, had become little more than a 
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bureaucratic charity organization based on the same service delivery philosophy that had 
failed to lift people out of poverty for decades. As often occurs in history, the 
conservative defenders of the status quo had won, and the real losers in this battle were 
not the radicals who once controlled the poverty program in the city, but the people living 
in poverty who had their hopes and expectations raised only to have them dashed when it 
was no longer politically expedient to fight on their behalf. 
By 1969 HCCAA had ceased to be a positive force for social change in Houston. 
Yet the War on Poverty continued, albeit in modified form. The election of Richard 
Nixon signaled massive changes in the federal antipoverty program. Although local 
circumstances continued to shape its implementation in Houston, it was in the final years 
of the War on Poverty that diminished federal support for an active community action 
agency in the city doomed the federal antipoverty program to failure and culminated in 
the end of the War on Poverty by the mid-1970s. 
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Chapter 6 
De-Escalation of the War on Poverty in Houston, 1969-1976 
During the first four years of the War on Poverty in Houston, a diverse group of 
grassroots activists - ranging from community organizers dedicated to the principles of 
Saul Alinsky, to religious activists who combined Old Testament prophetic social justice 
advocacy and the Christian social gospel with radical politics in their sponsorship of 
VISTA volunteers, to more moderate advocates of social service delivery - struggled 
against the city's public officials, conservative defenders of the status quo, and 
sometimes each other in their quest to make the federal War on Poverty meaningful in the 
lives of Houston's poor people. As the experiences of these activists have shown, 
grassroots implementers of the War on Poverty were indispensable for carrying out the 
poverty war on the ground and in many ways shaped the contours of the programs. Yet 
they did not engage in the battles of the War on Poverty alone, nor did they create their 
own war on poverty in Houston out of nothing. Rather, grassroots antipoverty activists in 
Houston used federal programs and relied on the resources and authority of the federal 
government to wage their battle against poverty in the city. In many cases grassroots 
activists were also able to expand these federal programs into vehicles for social change 
in their crusade for racial and economic justice, but the federal government was equally 
important in determining what the War on Poverty could accomplish. It was this fluid 
relationship between the federal government and grassroots activists that determined the 
fate of the War on Poverty in Houston. 
In short, the federal government, in addition to grassroots activists, was important 
for the implementation of the War on Poverty in Houston. A focus on the grassroots 
activists who implemented the poverty programs in Houston has revealed several 
important points about how the War on Poverty operated on the ground, but at the same 
time we must not lose sight of the significance of the federal government to this story. 
Throughout this dissertation I have shown that the actions of War on Poverty 
administrators at the national, state, and regional levels affected the implementation of its 
programs at the grassroots level, even while grassroots antipoverty activists at times 
transformed these programs in their efforts to empower Houston's poor residents. 
Nowhere was the importance of the federal government illustrated more vividly, 
however, than in the 1969-1976 period when diminished federal support for the struggle 
against poverty doomed it to failure on the ground in Houston. The conviction and 
determination of grassroots activists were crucial for the implementation of the War on 
Poverty in the city, but it was virtually impossible for these activists to continue their 
efforts in the absence of federal support, funding, and authority. Just as grassroots 
activists in Houston had been propelled by the federal mandate to fight a War on Poverty, 
they also had the wind abruptly taken out of their sails when the federal government 
retreated from its commitment to fighting poverty. The result, of course, was disastrous 
for the War on Poverty in Houston. 
Many historians of the War on Poverty have portrayed the Green Amendment, 
passed by Congress in the fall of 1967 as part of the OEO reauthorization bill, as the end 
of the story of community action and even of the entire War on Poverty.1 It is easy to 
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understand why this interpretation has persisted. The Green Amendment codified into 
law a phenomenon that had been occurring at least since 1966; namely, the practice of 
city mayors and other local public officials taking control of community action agencies. 
Once public officials regained a firm grip on these agencies, there was little chance that 
these agencies would be able to carry out their original mission, which almost always 
required challenging the status quo to reform local institutions and the local 
establishment. The Green Amendment, therefore, guaranteed the legal right of mayors to 
take control of local community action agencies, even if it neither required them to do so 
nor stipulated the manner in which they could do it. 
As with nearly every other aspect of the War on Poverty, local circumstances 
dictated how the Green Amendment would affect local community action agencies and 
the entire antipoverty program on the ground. In Houston, although it resulted in 
significant changes to the Harris County Community Action Association (HCCAA), the 
passage of the Green Amendment did not prompt Mayor Welch or any other public 
official to assume immediate control over the organization. Rather, the Green 
Amendment launched a process that continued into the early 1970s in which the mayor 
assisted in HCCAA's gradual but steady decline into irrelevance in the city. Meanwhile, 
VISTA volunteers in Houston, who were unaffected by the Green Amendment because 
their sponsoring agencies were autonomous and not bound to HCCAA, continued to 
organize poor residents and use confrontational tactics until 1972. In Houston, therefore, 
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the Green Amendment represented not the end of the poverty program but rather the 
beginning of the final act of the War on Poverty in the city.2 
To a much greater degree than the Green Amendment, national political 
developments beginning in 1969 weighed heavily on the course of the War on Poverty in 
Houston. Upon assuming the presidency that year, Richard Nixon, the candidate many 
Americans believed would crack down on 1960s-style political activism, lacked a clearly 
defined domestic agenda for his administration. During the campaign Nixon had 
occasionally blamed the Democrats for skyrocketing crime rates and runaway inflation 
and left voters assuming he would eliminate much of the Great Society, but he rarely 
spoke out on domestic issues with much conviction. Despite Nixon's apparent lack of 
interest in domestic affairs, however, the new president did have, in historian Irwin 
Unger's words, "a constellation of prejudices with policy implications." Above all, Nixon 
"considered the Great Society primarily a payoff to blacks and Hispanics and deplored 
the supposed kowtowing to black militants and white left-liberals of his predecessor. . . . 
Poverty was not a shame; it was a misfortune that could be overcome by people who 
applied themselves." Nixon himself had come from a poor family, and he believed in the 
American myth of the self-made man. His own personal background, combined with his 
beliefs about the causes of poverty and the effects of federal programs to eradicate it from 
society, determined how the new president would change the War on Poverty over the 
next several years.3 
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Despite his opposition to the philosophy of much of the War on Poverty, in his 
first term Nixon did not begin eliminating poverty programs as his more conservative 
allies had wished. Rather than bringing the War on Poverty to a halt, the new president 
put a major emphasis on decentralizing power in an effort to do away with government 
bureaucracy. Calling his loosely formed domestic agenda the New Federalism, Nixon 
wanted to take the power that Lyndon Johnson and the liberals had amassed for the 
federal government and return it to state and local governments. Nixon and the 
Republicans sharply disagreed with Johnson and many liberal Democrats about where 
political power should be lodged. Johnson and many War on Poverty planners believed 
that state and local agencies were at best inept and at worst protectors of a social and 
racial caste system, particularly in the South. Their solution, as part of the War on 
Poverty, was to create a federal agency like the Office of Economic Opportunity to carry 
out a strong domestic reform agenda and in the process to bypass state and local power 
structures in an effort to empower society's disadvantaged. Nixon's New Federalism, on 
the other hand, offered the opposite argument by suggesting that the federal government 
had failed to solve society's problems and calling for the restoration of power to 
governors, mayors, and other pillars of the nation's local establishments. In a sense, 
Nixon's domestic policy assumptions created an atmosphere that allowed for an 
extension of the same spirit that had produced the Green Amendment in 1967.4 
On August 8, 1969, Nixon delivered a speech to the nation outlining his vaguely 
defined domestic policy. The president said that for the previous eight years the liberals 
had turned the federal government into "a bureaucratic monstrosity, cumbersome, 
unresponsive, ineffective," and he committed his administration to the task of shrinking 
4
 Unger, Best of Intentions, 302-303. 
its power. As for the War on Poverty, Nixon promised to restructure the Job Corps and to 
reshape rather than abolish the Office of Economic Opportunity. OEO had "a vital place 
in our efforts to develop new programs and apply new knowledge," Nixon said, but it 
would be severely reduced in size and transformed into a "laboratory agency" to 
experiment with new ways of solving the problems of the poor. Once antipoverty 
methods proved successful, they would be transferred out of OEO and into appropriate 
agencies for implementation. Rather than being the administrative body responsible for 
directing the War on Poverty all over the nation, OEO would now serve as a small 
experimental agency and be removed from the day-to-day operations of the federal 
poverty program.5 
The application of Nixon's New Federalism to the War on Poverty was simple 
and direct. Nixon retained the antipoverty programs that had proven their effectiveness, 
but he turned the administration of them over to state and local governments and 
agencies. Soon after his speech on his domestic agenda in August 1969, Nixon closed 
fifty-nine Job Corps centers and sharply cut funding to those that remained. The president 
also appointed conservative allies to top OEO positions, most significantly Illinois 
representative Donald Rumsfeld as the new head of OEO. Nixon made a significant 
change to the position, however, by placing the OEO director in the executive cabinet, 
thereby making it easier for the president to watch closely over OEO's activities. 
Rumsfeld, in turn, appointed several conservatives to administer OEO's Office of 
Planning, Research, and Evaluation (OPRE), and they predictably concluded that many 
5
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War on Poverty programs were ineffective, unpopular among public officials, and in need 
of either elimination or drastic change. Thus Nixon's strategy to refrain from openly 
attacking popular OEO programs but simultaneously to fill top OEO positions with 
conservative critics of the War on Poverty had the effect of reducing the size of OEO 
without making the new president appear as an opponent of its programs.6 
Nixon and Rumsfeld's actions to curb the activities of several programs had 
profound implications for the War on Poverty at the grassroots level. In 1970 Nixon 
instructed Rumsfeld to strip the Legal Services program of its law reform potential and 
place local personnel under the direction of public officials, and Rumsfeld even went so 
far as to threaten to replace the popular national director of the program if he failed to 
carry out the president's wishes. Predictably, Nixon and Rumsfeld got their way. In 1971 
and 1972 Nixon transferred the wildly popular Head Start program to the department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and slowed its growth. In 1973 Nixon got 
Congress to pass the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, which moved the 
Job Corps to the Department of Labor and other manpower programs to local government 
agencies. After Nixon's landslide reelection in 1972, the president moved to attack OEO 
and the entire War on Poverty more openly. He severely cut funding to the agency; for 
example, in 1969 funding for OEO was $1.9 billion, yet by 1973 Nixon had reduced that 
amount to $328 million. In January 1975, after Nixon's resignation, President Gerald 
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Ford closed OEO completely but allowed a remnant of the Community Action Program 
to survive under the newly created Community Services Administration. By this point, 
however, CAP was a simple deliverer of services and totally uninterested in reform.7 
These national developments within OEO greatly affected operations at the 
agency's southwest regional office in Austin, which was responsible for supervising the 
War on Poverty in Houston. By April 1969 Rumsfeld was busy charting a new course for 
OEO that reflected Nixon's desire to decentralize War on Poverty programs and reduce 
the size of government bureaucracy. In his speech at the press conference where Nixon 
announced his appointment, Rumsfeld promised to find out what worked and what did 
not and to eliminate ineffective programs. "The President has talked of the voices we 
have lost amid the shouting," Rumsfeld proclaimed, invoking Nixon's appeal to the 
Silent Majority during the campaign, "the voices of quiet anguish, the voices that speak 
without words, the voices of the heart." The new OEO director pledged to make the War 
on Poverty successful by rendering its programs more appealing to the group of 
American citizens who were responsible for Nixon's victory the previous year - the 
Great Silent Majority of mostly white and middle-class citizens who had grown weary of 
1960s social activism, racial conflict, annual urban riots, protests, demonstrations, and 
radical community organizers who stirred up the poor. Rumsfeld's most significant 
change to OEO came when he began transforming it from the administrative body for the 
War on Poverty into an experimental agency. According to Rumsfeld, OEO would 
become a laboratory for testing various approaches to solving poverty, as Nixon had 
promised in his August speech. Once a program proved its effectiveness, it would be 
moved out of OEO and into the proper federal agency to administer it, such as HEW or 
7
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the Department of Labor. Nixon had made it clear that he wanted "a good Nixon 
Republican" to direct the federal War on Poverty, and it seemed that in Rumsfeld he got 
Q 
exactly what he wished for. 
By the end of the summer in 1969, Rumsfeld had embarked on a plan for the 
complete reorganization of the OEO bureaucracy. He appointed a task force to travel to 
all regional OEO offices and report back to Washington about each office's activities, 
and the report generated by these visits called for a major reorganization of OEO at all 
levels. According to the report, there was an urgent need for OEO officials to delegate 
certain programs to other federal or local agencies, overcome management deficiencies 
plaguing the agency, and most importantly, "reorient the agency to the new thrust of this 
[presidential] administration." Above all, Nixon and Rumsfeld wanted to rid OEO of 
bureaucrats. The reorganization plan accordingly called for the merger or elimination of 
several OEO offices and positions, the integration of many of the office's activities, and 
the restructuring of regional offices to ensure closer financial control by the new director. 
In a memo sent to all OEO employees in August, Rumsfeld stressed the need to 
implement these organizational changes rapidly.9 
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Once Rumsfeld's efforts to reorganize the OEO bureaucracy were underway, the 
new director turned his attention to the fate of the Community Action Program (CAP). 
During a speech in October 1969, the new OEO director outlined a redefined mission for 
CAP that would reflect the Nixon Administration's commitment to the Silent Majority. In 
a clear attempt to make CAP more palatable for the Republican Party's enlarged 
constituency of mostly white middle-class Americans, Rumsfeld stressed the need to 
broaden the appeal of community action. "We have operated too long on the assumption 
that the poor have natural enemies with whom it is useless to talk," Rumsfeld stated, and 
this "prophecy has been self-fulfilling. We have created enemies, many of whom might 
have been natural friends if we had sought them out." The poor, according to Rumsfeld, 
had been "treated as a separate nation at war with the rest, as if only they were the ones 
calling for improved services, as if only they were pointing to the decaying blight of our 
cities, as if only they felt institutions were unresponsive to their needs, as if only they 
wanted social change... . It is not just the poor who will benefit from change." Rumsfeld 
promised that under his direction, CAP would unite the poor and nonpoor to create an 
alliance to solve the problems of poverty.10 
In his effort to broaden the base of support for community action, Rumsfeld told 
his staff that they would have to work together to clarify the goals and sharpen the 
objectives of CAP. The expectations placed on CAP in the past had been unreasonable 
and unrealistic, Rumsfeld told them, and in the future local community action agencies 
must rely on a whole system of public and private institutions and agencies to solve the 
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problems of the poor. Community action agencies were ill equipped to complete the tasks 
of planning, coordinating, and providing solutions to the nation's poverty on their own, 
but an attack on poverty was still possible if most of the effort could be expended by state 
and local governments, city and county welfare agencies, and the private sector.11 
In order to promote this partnership between local community action agencies and 
established institutions, Rumsfeld made it clear that while community action agencies 
should be advocates for the poor, they should never alienate the nonpoor. Above all, this 
meant that local antipoverty activists associated with CAP would be forced to drop the 
use of confrontational tactics in the fight against poverty. "If CAA efforts are dominated 
by the kind of confrontation tactics which divide communities and further isolate the poor 
from other groups instead of bringing them into closer relations with the community," 
Rumsfeld warned, "Community Action will soon be without the broad support it must 
have. And the really good efforts of CAAs would go down the drain. The results would 
be tragic for this country - the poor and the nonpoor alike." Confrontational tactics on 
behalf of the poor, of course, would threaten this middle-class support and produce a 
backlash against the poverty program, which in reality had already begun before Nixon's 
election in 1968. In fact, there was very little need for the type of changes Rumsfeld 
called for in this speech because the majority of local community action agencies had 
been effectively tamed by conservative attacks and no longer engaged in confrontational 
tactics. Nevertheless, Rumsfeld's statements made it clear that the Community Action 
Program would no longer have official sanction to offend the middle class, and in the 
11
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OEO reorganization plan he made sure conservative staffers would have more direct 
control over the types of activities in which members of local CAAs engaged.12 
All of these changes in the War on Poverty at the national and regional levels 
beginning in 1969 had a tremendous effect on the local antipoverty effort in Houston, 
particularly on the Harris County Community Action Association (HCCAA). Local 
elected officials and conservative interests had effectively neutralized any radicalism that 
had existed in the organization by the end of the previous year, but HCCAA nevertheless 
continued to play the most important role in the administration of the War on Poverty in 
the city. Although HCCAA already suffered from an overbearing local power structure, 
hostility from many of Houston's poor, and diminished support from OEO officials in 
Austin and Washington, beginning in 1969 the city's community action agency began a 
steady decline into irrelevance. By the time Nixon took office, HCCAA was simply a 
benign deliverer of social services, but even those services were scaled back during the 
first few years of his administration. The organization was also beset with administrative 
difficulties, including a tumultuous board restructuring and a lengthy absence of an 
executive director that ultimately proved to be the final nail in the coffin of community 
action in Houston. The changes in Washington, coming at a time when HCCAA 
desperately needed guidance and a renewed sense of mission, virtually ensured that the 
agency would become a nonentity in Houston's War on Poverty. 
12
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HCCAA's board restructuring that began during the summer of 1969 illustrated 
how alienated the agency had become from the people it was designed to serve. Mayor 
Louie Welch had been successful during the previous year in forcing the HCCAA Board 
of directors to centralize control over the War on Poverty in the city by reducing the size 
of the board and increasing the representation of public officials. HCCAA went without 
an executive director for several months during the fall of 1969 and spring of 1970, and 
Welch worked to gain even more control over the organization during this time of 
uncertainty. In July the board's representatives of Houston's public officials voted as a 
bloc to remove members of the city's NAACP chapter from HCCAA's board and prevent 
any organization representing the Mexican American population from being appointed. 
According to an OEO inspector sent from Austin, this particular meeting was an attempt 
by the city's public officials and HCCAA leadership to hold an unannounced election 
meeting to avoid the votes of the other members of the board and force their will on the 
board by determining its composition. Southwest regional OEO officials responded by 
declaring HCCAA's meeting null and void and ordered its board to schedule another 
meeting with a quorum present to elect representatives. 
Southwest regional OEO representatives noted that Welch was "extremely 
unhappy with our action" to require HCCAA to comply with federal OEO guidelines, but 
in the end Houston's community action agency was forced to hold another meeting to 
elect representatives in a democratic way or else face a loss of funding. The problems, 
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however, did not end there, particularly with regard to HCCAA's relationship with the 
city's Mexican American population. As the 1960s led into the 1970s in Houston, the 
city's Mexican American population became increasingly organized around civil rights 
issues and more vocal in their displeasure with the city's public officials. In a special 
report on the impact of the War on Poverty on Mexican Americans in Texas, federal 
OEO inspectors noted that HCC AA failed to reach a large number of Mexican Americans 
in Houston because the agency created target neighborhoods where poor whites and 
African Americans were in the majority. Mexican American activists in Houston had 
begun demanding a strict apportionment of federal dollars spent on poor Mexican 
Americans in the city proportionate to their percentage in the population, but HCCAA 
Board members refused to alter their budget and argued that the Mexican American 
population already benefited from War on Poverty programs to a greater degree than their 
numbers warranted. In May 1970, after the HCCAA Board had consistently refused to 
address these problems, members of the Mexican American Youth Organization 
(MAYO), a militant Chicano group, appeared at a HCCAA meeting and threatened 
several board members because they had failed to name a Mexican American to one of 
the vacant top-level positions within the agency. Having already alienated a large 
segment of Houston's poor population the previous year, HCCAA Board members 
continued to draw the ire of the city's poor residents who believed the agency was not 
serving their needs. Without pressure from Austin and Washington, HCCAA continued 
its decline into an agency that had little effect on Houston's poor and often provoked the 
anger of many of the city's poor residents.14 
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Mayor Welch and other city officials could read the handwriting on the wall. 
While OEO officials at the national level were rapidly changing the face of the War on 
Poverty and becoming increasingly condemnatory of activist community action agencies, 
HCCAA was embroiled in its own controversies and suffered from mismanagement and a 
lack of direction. Houston's public officials correctly surmised that HCCAA would no 
longer be of much consequence in the city. This was quite a change from the relationship 
Welch and implementers of the local War on Poverty once had. At one time Houston's 
community action agency was an activist antipoverty organization that could use the 
threat of organized protest to win concessions from city officials. There is no doubt that 
Welch was extremely apprehensive about the prospect of mass demonstrations occurring 
in his city, and as a result he had been responsive to public demands to address the 
problems of poverty in Houston in the past. During the winter of 1966-1967, community 
organizers were able to win a series of small yet significant victories for the city's poor 
by confronting Welch and other public officials and coercing them into taking action on 
behalf of poor Houston residents. Even as late as February 1969 Welch and his staff 
sought to extend city services to four well organized low-income areas in the northern 
part of the city before, as a confidential internal memo stated, the mayor was "forced or 
unpleasantly pressured" into taking the action. This is precisely the reason community 
organizing had been moderately effective in Houston and why grassroots activists had 
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been able to achieve a few victories. Welch responded to large numbers of citizens 
exerting pressure from the community.15 
By 1969, however, Welch had learned his lesson about approving federal funding 
to fight poverty in Houston without retaining control over how the money would be spent 
and, more importantly, what types of programs would be funded and who would 
administer them. The mayor and other public officials' actions to reduce HCCAA to a 
simple deliverer of services and to force the organization's leaders to abandon 
community organization over the previous two years had, by design, allowed Welch to 
pursue alternative avenues to fight poverty in Houston that would show he cared about 
the plight of the poor in his city but at the same time not require him to give up any of his 
power or allow his constituents to be threatened. Beginning in 1969 Welch took 
advantage of President Nixon's efforts to decentralize power in the War on Poverty and 
began to advocate using federal block grant programs to fight urban blight in Houston 
that could be administered by branches of the city government rather than pesky poor 
people or rabble-rousing antipoverty activists. In the process, Welch stole any authority 
HCCAA still had as the administrative body for the War on Poverty in Houston; taking 
cues from the new presidential administration, he secured his own power over how 
federal antipoverty funds would be spent in his city. 
The most glaring example of how Welch accomplished this goal of circumventing 
HCCAA's little remaining power and taking almost complete control of the War on 
Poverty in Houston was his transformation into a vocal advocate for Houston's 
15
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participation in the Model Cities program. Like many other moderately conservative 
politicians in the emerging Sunbelt South, Welch had always been attracted to federal 
funding for improvements to the city of Houston as long as there were no strings 
attached, and during the War on Poverty he welcomed federal funds that bypassed 
HCCAA and did not invite interference from the poor. Model Cities became a tool for 
some Sunbelt mayors to regain control of local wars on poverty that had become irritants 
to local public officials, and Houston's experience with the federal program shows just 
how directly the changes at the national level determined the course of the War on 
Poverty at the grassroots.16 
Lyndon Johnson and his advisers conceived of Model Cities (then called 
Demonstration Cities) in 1966, but the program was extremely slow to get off the ground. 
The idea for a massive federal program to attack blight in the nation's decaying urban 
centers initially came from United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther and Detroit 
Mayor Jerome Cavanagh when the two men submitted a report to Johnson in May 1965 
calling for a plan to rebuild the nation's inner cities and make up for the failings of Urban 
Renewal. Like much of the War on Poverty, the solution for the country's decaying urban 
centers would involve coordination of all the public and private resources available to 
help rebuild the cities, while at the same time would also allow inner-city residents to 
have a voice in its implementation. In the original plan, Houston was to be chosen as one 
of six "Demonstration Cities" that would prove the effectiveness of this new approach to 
solving urban problems. Although Johnson and his staff were initially cold to the idea of 
16
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a revamped Urban Renewal program, the Watts riot that occurred in Los Angeles that 
summer gave fresh urgency to the problems of the cities. It was in the wake of Watts that 
Johnson assembled a task force to study Reuther and Cavanagh's proposal. The president 
and his advisers responded favorably to the task force's report in December, but the 
president, as he had done with the proposal for the Community Action Program a few 
months prior, expanded Model Cities from an experiment in rebuilding the nation's cities 
into a full-fledged government program that would fund sixty-six cities of all sizes 
selected from hundreds of applications. The White House spent the first half of 1966 
drumming up grassroots support for Model Cities and defending it against attacks by 
Congressmen claiming it would reward rioters. Finally in November Johnson signed the 
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 before officially 
changing the name of the program to Model Cities and placing it in the recently created 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The federal program would not 
be as large in its first year as Johnson hoped, however, because the Senate designated 
1967 as a planning year, and as a result it was not until 1968 that many local politicians 
from cities likeTiouston began paying attention to the new federal program for the 
nation's cities.17 
Although Welch was not overly eager to obtain a Model Cities grant during the 
planning year, in mid-1967 he did permit a few members of his staff to draw up an 
application for Houston. In July HUD officials released a list of cities, including four in 
Texas, that had been approved for a Model Cities planning grant, but Houston was not 
17
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among them. The city's rejected application revealed a problem peculiar to the city of 
Houston that would haunt Welch's later efforts to obtain a Model Cities grant. Houston, 
unlike any other major city in the United States, had no zoning laws. According to 
Houston historian David McComb, early efforts to promote city planning and to enact 
land zoning ordinances began during the 1910s and 1920s, only to be defeated by real 
estate agents and the Houston Property Owners' League, whose spokesmen argued that 
"such planning was discriminatory, arbitrary, and damaging to small property owners and 
real estate interests."18 
Another attempt to pass a zoning ordinance occurred during the 1930s and 
resulted in a series of land zoning hearings at City Hall. Antizoning advocates argued that 
"zoning would throttle city growth and would interfere with the constitutional right to 
hold property." As the debate dragged on into the late 1940s, several Houstonians 
opposed to zoning ordinances had even harsher words for the proposal. Zoning laws, 
according to opponents, would "create a dangerous club in the hands of any dictatorial 
administration." One prominent leader of the antizoning faction in Houston proclaimed 
that "a zoning ordinance is an exercise of the police power of government. . . . Houston 
was built by men of vision, not by slide-rule experts armed with an omniscient egotism 
and a pocket full of silly statistics." Another antizoning activist exclaimed that zoning 
"just goes back to the idea of Joe Stalin, that one man can figure out everything - the 
whole plan." Hugh Roy Cullen, a reactionary but nonetheless influential voice in city 
politics, stated that Houston was "doing too well to try this un-American, German plan." 
18
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Houston residents predictably went to the polls and defeated this latest zoning plan by a 
two-to-one margin. Zoning came up as an issue once more in the early 1960s, but was 
again defeated, not to return as a major issue in Houston city politics until the Model 
Cities application once again made zoning laws a hot political topic in the late 1960s.19 
According to McComb, one significant consequence of Houston's lack of zoning 
ordinances has been the inability of the city to benefit from any federal urban renewal 
projects. The federal government has insisted on some degree of city planning in order to 
determine eligibility for federal funding to attack urban blight, but this type of planning 
was exactly what Houstonians deliberately and consistently avoided. When HUD began 
awarding Model Cities planning grants during the summer of 1967, federal officials 
inevitably left Houston off their list because an absence of zoning ordinances meant little 
or no control over how the money would be spent in the city. HUD officials were explicit 
in their reason for rejecting Houston's application; without control over land use, city 
officials could not guarantee Model Cities funds would be used to carry out the mission 
of the program. HUD Secretary Robert Weaver made it clear to Welch that HUD officials 
sincerely wanted Houston to be a part of the Model Cities program despite the city's 
reluctance to pass zoning laws. If a zoning ordinance was out of the question, Weaver 
suggested that the mayor advocate an alternative measure that would grant the city 
government some power over land use in the city. Welch had not yet been persuaded to 
become an advocate for the new federal program, however, and Weaver's overtures had 
little effect. By the end of 1967, federal officials had approved the Model Cities 
19
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applications of sixty-three cities, with Houston being the only major American city that 
could not even qualify for a planning grant. 
Beginning in January 1968, Mayor Welch began to warm up to the idea of 
making a bigger push to get Model Cities funding. The timing of his shift from 
indifference to open advocacy was quite telling of his intentions. During the last few 
months of 1967, Welch, along with other city officials and local politicians, had 
successfully tamed HCCAA and watched approvingly as the once confrontational 
community action agency became embroiled with internal battles over the purging of the 
group's radical community organizers. With HCCAA effectively neutralized, Welch 
began searching for ways to bring federal antipoverty funds to Houston without having to 
go through the city's community action agency, and in the Model Cities program he 
discovered that he could secure a block grant from the federal government without 
having to abide by the wishes of HCCAA. A direct grant program like Model Cities 
would allow Welch to enjoy much more control over how the money would be spent in 
the city than he had over community action funds in Houston. 
As the city's rejected application stated the previous year, the first step in 
persuading HUD officials to approve Houston's Model Cities application was to 
convince city council members to pass an ordinance that would allow for land control in 
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the city. Upon returning to Houston from Washington, where he had met with HUD 
Secretary Robert Weaver to ascertain the exact requirements, Welch told the city council 
that the city only needed to pass a moderate housing code rather than a full-fledged 
zoning ordinance in order to qualify for Model Cities funding. A few months prior, a 
group called the Citizens' Advisory Committee on Low Rent Housing had submitted a 
proposal to the council for a city housing code in their effort to make Houston eligible to 
receive federal assistance building low-rent housing projects in the city. Under the 
proposed housing code, the mayor would appoint a "building official" who would 
"inspect substandard houses in a systematic manner and also answer tenants' 
complaints." This building official could also order improvements to substandard housing 
to bring it up to a series of minimum standards, which included requirements that each 
house be equipped with running water and connected to an approved sewer system, have 
a bathroom inside the house, be water, rodent, and insect proof, be able to be heated to 
seventy degrees, and have a safe garbage container. During the first few months of 1968, 
Welch urged members of the city council to pass this housing code not necessarily to 
gain federal funds to construct low-rent housing, but to prepare Houston to receive Model 
Cities funding.21 
City Council members were skeptical about the proposed housing code and made 
several complaints about the implications of its passage. Several of the charges that some 
council members leveled against the proposed housing code were strikingly reminiscent 
of the arguments against passing zoning laws in Houston in the past. "Some claim the 
code," stated a Houston Post reporter in January 1968, "is too tough and concentrates 
dangerous powers in the hands of a 'building official' who would work directly for the 
21
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mayor under the Board of Appeals, which also would be chosen by the mayor." 
Shockingly, several councilmen were concerned about the requirement that every house 
have an indoor bathroom and running water because it would be too strict for many 
homeowners. According to an engineer employed by the city, the indoor bathroom 
requirement "will affect several thousand of the 12,000 dwellings that have either septic 
tanks or outdoor privies." One city councilman expressed sympathy for landlords and 
homeowners who lacked the means to make improvements to their homes. "No one has 
answered me satisfactorily," he charged, "on what happens when [the building official] 
orders a fellow who can't afford it to make $5,000 in improvements on his house." 
Despite these reservations, Welch remained confident that the city council would 
eventually pass the proposed housing code, and he called for a series of informal 
meetings between councilmen and representatives of the Citizens' Committee on Low 
Rent Housing in order to iron out a compromise. 
While the city council debated the housing code, Welch and other public officials 
continued moving forward in their preparation of a Model Cities application that could be 
approved. In the process, Welch made it clear that HCCAA was not welcome in the 
discussions. In an effort to push the community action agency even further to the 
sidelines of the antipoverty fight in Houston, Welch and other city officials drew up a 
new Model Cities grant application in March 1968 that designated the Community 
Welfare Planning Association (CWPA), rather than HCCAA, as the required social 
planning board for the implementation of the federal program in Houston. The CWPA 
was the central coordinating board for the traditional welfare agencies in Houston and 
had been integral to the creation of the city's first community action agency in 1965, 
22
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which was hopelessly conservative and almost totally controlled by public officials. The 
CWPA had been mostly shut out of the poverty program in Houston since William 
Ballew took over the city's community action agency in 1966 and adopted radical and 
confrontational tactics, but the Model Cities program offered the CWPA a way back in. 
Several CWPA staff members made sure they were involved in writing up the Model 
Cities application for the city and assured Welch they would provide the necessary 
support to get it approved. Welch accepted the offer and was sure to hold up his end of 
the bargain when it came time to designate a social planning board for the 
implementation of the Model Cities program in Houston.23 
In selecting a demonstration area of the city where the first-year Model Cities 
planning grant would be used, Welch also sought to keep HCCAA from being involved 
in the program. He and other city officials chose a small area in the old inner city that had 
been served by Houston Action for Youth (HAY) before the merger between HAY and 
H-HCEOO to create HCCAA in May 1967. The new HCCAA had retained the more 
conservative ex-HAY officials who already administered programs in that particular area, 
and there were very few community organizers who worked in this particular part of the 
city. In focusing on this area for the Model Cities demonstration, Welch sent another 
clear message that HCCAA, especially its community organizers, would be left out of 
this federal program.24 
Unfortunately for Welch, by the fall of 1968 the Houston City Council had not yet 
approved the proposed housing code required for the Model Cities application. As one 
23
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HUD official told President Johnson, without some way of ensuring proper land use in 
Houston, the city's Model Cities application was "clearly in no shape to be approved." 
Welch was determined to find a way for his city to take advantage of this massive federal 
program, so in October 1968 he sent Blair Justice, one of the mayor's staffers, to 
Washington to meet with HUD officials and White House personnel in order to convince 
Model Cities administrators that the program would be effective in Houston. During this 
visit, Welch and Justice decided to change tactics. Rather than trying to coax the city 
council into passing the housing code, the mayor and his staff would convince HUD 
officials that Houston's existing deed restriction system provided sufficient control over 
land use in the city to make its Model Cities application approvable. 
In reality, this argument was quite a stretch. Deed restrictions in Houston usually 
applied to the city's affluent neighborhoods whose residents wanted to keep the 
atmosphere residential, to ward off undesirable business developments like gas stations, 
and often to bar home sales to nonwhites. For example, according to Houston historian 
David McComb, the deed restrictions in the affluent River Oaks neighborhood "restricted 
the land to allow only one resident or family per lot, no hospitals, no duplexes, no 
apartments, only Caucasian ownership, no livestock, no dumping, and no signs." The 
HUD requirement of a city land control ordinance, however, was designed to ensure that 
a city governmental body existed and possessed the authority to carry out the Model 
Cities program in an effective way. As the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan 
Development Act of 1966 stated, HUD must verify that "local administrative procedures 
are available for carrying out the program on a consolidated and coordinated basis . . . 
25
 Unknown Author to Lyndon Johnson, memorandum, 14 October 1968, Box 8, Folder 1, White House 
Central Files, Local Government (Ex LG), LBJL (quotation); Larry Temple to Blair Justice, 19 October 
1968, Box 16, Folder 1, White House Central Files, Local Government (GEN LG), LBJL. 
[and] the program is consistent with comprehensive planning in the entire urban or 
metropolitan area." Zoning ordinances were tailor made for guaranteeing that these 
requirements would be met, but Houston's refusal to legislate zoning laws illustrated the 
city's deliberate avoidance of the type of comprehensive citywide planning that the 
Model Cities program required. Deed restrictions were clearly not intended to aid in 
planning an entire urban area; if anything, deed restrictions were another way to shun the 
very planning that Model Cities tried to encourage by offering affluent Houston residents 
a way of controlling their own neighborhoods without forcing them to approve of 
citywide zoning ordinances. Nevertheless, at Welch's request Justice met with HUD 
officials in Washington and tried to persuade them that Houston's deed restrictions were 
an adequate means of land control in the city. Justice also contacted Larry Temple, 
Special Counsel to President Johnson, who promised to look into the matter.26 
Blair Justice's visit to Washington helped bring the Houston situation to the 
attention of key Washington officials, but problems with its Model Cities application 
remained. Larry Temple kept his promise to look into Houston's application, but what he 
discovered was not what Welch and Justice had hoped for. After contacting HUD 
officials to inquire about Houston's application status, Temple received a response from 
Robert Wood, Under Secretary of HUD. Wood informed Temple that the problems with 
Houston's application were insurmountable without a zoning ordinance for the city. 
Without some form of land control, Wood stated, "there is a grave doubt that Houston 
could make the required impact on its environmental and housing problems." The city's 
26
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deed restriction system, according to Wood, was a totally inadequate method of land 
control because its requirements were enforced not by the city government, but by 
individual residents. Wood also alluded to the fact that the city had been unable to benefit 
from Urban Renewal funding in the past for precisely the same reasons. "In short," Wood 
concluded, "the inability of Houston to use one of the major government-funded tools 
(urban renewal) provided for sharing the problems that face it, makes it a high risk for 
model cities funding. . . . To make an exception for Houston from the requirements of. . . 
Model Cities would undermine the future effectiveness" of the program.27 
Welch's efforts to persuade Washington officials to approve Houston's Model 
Cities application, however, did not end with the conclusions drawn by HUD 
administrators. On December 4, 1968, Welch had a telephone conversation with 
President Johnson on the subject of his city's application. Although the specific content 
of this conversation is unknown, it is clear that Welch was able to convince the outgoing 
president to instruct HUD to approve Houston's application for a Model Cities planning 
grant. Just ten days prior to Welch and Johnson's conversation, HUD officials had 
reiterated their judgment that Houston's application was unacceptable. After Welch's 
appeal to the president, despite the fact that nothing on the application had changed, HUD 
officials suddenly reversed their ruling and awarded Houston a Model Cities planning 
grant of nearly $270,000. After more than a year of telling Houston officials that without 
an effective means of controlling land use in the city the application could not be 
approved, HUD officials suddenly agreed with Welch and Justice that the deed restriction 
system was sufficient. Although this was no guarantee that the city would receive a full 
27
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Model Cities grant in the years to come, it was nevertheless an impressive political 
accomplishment for Welch and the city of Houston. 
Welch was happy to bask in his victory among Houstonians, and he used the 
occasion to drive HCCAA even further out of the fight against poverty and urban blight 
in the city. After HUD officials announced the approval of Houston's Model Cities 
planning grant, Welch, in a blatant disregard for everything the Community Action 
Program had tried to achieve in Houston, proclaimed that "for the first time, the way is 
clear for a coordinated attack on all of the problems of the poor." According to Welch 
and Justice, the planning grant would bring improvements "in all areas of urban living -
health, employment, education, crime and delinquency, housing and welfare and the total 
physical environment including such things as streets, parks, drainage and utilities." Blair 
Justice also told Houstonians that they could reasonably expect more than $20 million in 
federal Model Cities funding over the next several years. Welch and Justice had become 
champions of using federal funding to fight poverty in Houston, even though they and 
other city officials had provided very minimal support for the city's community action 
agency and had even attacked its community organizers, who for several years had been 
attempting to accomplish what Welch now supported. 
The mayor's disingenuousness about why he was an advocate for the Model 
Cities program, however, did not end with his newfound appreciation for attacking the 
root causes of poverty. Welch also pretended to have become a strong supporter of the 
ideal of maximum feasible participation of the poor in the poverty program. The mayor 
28
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proclaimed that Urban Renewal had been a failure all over the country because the 
program did not include poor people in its planning and implementation. Model Cities, 
according to Welch, was different because it took into account the wishes of the poor. 
Yet Welch had left out HCCAA completely, the organization in Houston, despite its 
internal controversies and increasingly conservative approach to solving poverty, with the 
best means of including the poor in a meaningful way through its neighborhood councils. 
While appearing to care about the plight of the poor, in reality Welch had successfully 
taken control of antipoverty funding in the city and removed HCCAA from the center of 
the poverty program in Houston.30 
When Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in January 1969, he disliked the 
Model Cities program because of the large federal bureaucracy it created, particularly 
within HUD. At the same time, however, the new president believed that a program like 
Model Cities fit in quite well with his overall agenda of decentralization and his effort to 
give local governments control of the War on Poverty. Though he was somewhat 
conflicted, Nixon allowed the Model Cities program to continue. In Houston, Welch was 
moving swiftly to implement the planning grant and prepare for a full Model Cities grant 
application the next year. In January 1969 Welch created a Model Cities department 
within the city government and appointed George McGonigle, former executive at the 
Humble Oil Company, as Model Cities director. The mayor also continued to court the 
involvement of the Community Welfare Planning Association (CWPA), rather than 
HCCAA, as the organization that would assess the community impact of Model Cities 
decisions and improvements and ensure citizen participation in the program. By April 
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1969 Welch had created a sizeable city government bureaucracy to administer the Model 
Cities program.31 
As this process of creating a city agency to direct the Model Cities program 
moved forward, Welch assumed a steadily increasing amount of power over the poverty 
program in Houston as he centralized the administration of a large part of it in the city 
government. With HCCAA beset with administrative difficulties, internal conflicts, and a 
clear lack of direction due to the lengthy absence of an executive director, Welch was 
able to consolidate his own authority over the War on Poverty in the city. As other 
Sunbelt politicians welcomed federal funding so long as they could control how it would 
be spent, Welch had become an open advocate of the Model Cities program precisely 
because, unlike the Community Action Program, he could control every aspect of it 
through his own Model Cities department within the city government. In the process, he 
was also able to marginalize HCCAA even further. No longer would most of the federal 
antipoverty funds flow into an organization outside of the city bureaucracy. From then 
on, according to the plan, Welch would enjoy determining how a large portion of the 
federal money coming into his city would be spent. 
31
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Despite Welch's efforts, however, a full Model Cities grant never materialized in 
Houston. Welch and other city officials put extraordinary emphasis on preparing an 
application acceptable to HUD administrators, but several city council members 
remained uncooperative on the issue of land control in the city as government officials 
wrangled over how to spend the millions of federal dollars sure to come to the city. By 
the time Nixon finally ended the Model Cities program in 1973, Houston officials had 
still not been able to draw up an acceptable application for a full grant. In its place, Nixon 
implemented his revenue sharing plan, which was never able to address the problems of 
the nation's cities adequately. The long saga of Model Cities in Houston, therefore, ended 
in disappointment. More importantly, however, despite Welch's failure to gain federal 
Model Cities funding, the mayor was able to use the Model Cities program in the city to 
push HCCAA to the sidelines in the fight against poverty in Houston. The entire process 
was emblematic of how changes in the War on Poverty in Washington greatly affected 
the poverty program at the grassroots level. Welch and other city officials, as well as 
many HCCAA administrators, responded to Nixon's efforts to decentralize power and 
return authority back to local governments. While HCCAA scrambled to regroup, Welch 
assumed control of the poverty program in Houston. By becoming an advocate of the 
Model Cities program, even though the final result was a failure, Welch was able to take 
control of federal antipoverty initiatives and marginalize HCCAA while also appearing to 
fight on behalf of the poor.32 
While Welch pursued Model Cities funding for the city and HCCAA increasingly 
became irrelevant in the War on Poverty, the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) 
program in Houston attempted to sustain its somewhat clandestine attack on the root 
32
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causes of poverty by continuing to employ community organization and empowerment of 
the poor. For the previous three years Reverend Wallace B. Poteat, EF-LAC project 
activista, and VISTA volunteers had largely flown under the radar of local officials in 
their quest to effect social change in Houston by organizing the poor. Beginning in 1969, 
however, VISTAs in Houston experienced a marked increase in harassment from the 
city's police department, particularly its criminal intelligence division. Although VISTA 
volunteers were able to carry out their direct attack on poverty in the city for a longer 
period of time than the Community Action Program did, they nevertheless eventually 
suffered significant defeats at the hands of the city's public officials who wanted to stop 
the volunteers' radical community organizing and confrontational tactics. By 1972 the 
VISTA program in Houston was a shell of its former self, and late that year the 
sponsoring organizations bid farewell to their last volunteer. 
The final demise of the VISTA program in Houston did not, however, come 
solely as a result of attacks by local officials. In addition to police harassment, the city's 
VISTA volunteers suffered from a changing focus in Washington. As Nixon had 
reorganized OEO, consolidated power in the White House, and placed loyal 
conservatives in charge of key programs, the new president likewise sought to centralize 
control over VISTA and reorient the volunteer program away from its confrontational 
tactics. Although an ideological attack on the VISTA program was not to come until 
Nixon's second term in office, which was after the VISTA program had ended in 
Houston, the new president did successfully lay the groundwork for the conservative 
assault on VISTA between 1969 and 1972 by reorganizing the federal bureaucracy 
overseeing the volunteer program. As historian T. Zane Reeves has shown, Nixon 
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assigned the task of evaluating the VISTA program's alleged accomplishments to the 
newly created Office of Management and Budgeting (OMB), whose staff members were 
interested in quantitative measurements of the War on Poverty's effectiveness. VISTA, 
however, was not a program with accomplishments that were easily quantifiable, and 
predictably the OMB was not satisfied with anecdotal stories of success.33 
Nixon also instructed staff members of OEO's Office of Planning, Research, and 
Evaluation (OPRE) to investigate and submit detailed reports on all War on Poverty 
activities, and OPRE's report on VISTA justified the eventual conservative attack on the 
program. Even before the investigation began, according to Reeves, OPRE investigators 
were "convinced that VISTA projects were proposing political organization for the poor 
rather than self-help programs for them." OPRE's final report on VISTA, argued Reeves, 
"revealed an activist culture at VISTA that confirmed conservatives' worst fears." 
Authors of the report concluded that for the majority of the volunteers, their experience 
as VISTA volunteers politicized and radicalized them, exposed them to leftist political 
ideologies, and made them suspicious of the government and of the intent of federal 
social programs.34 
Nixon knew he could not simply eliminate the VISTA program outright for fear 
that a political showdown with a mostly sympathetic Congress and several popular 
VISTA support groups would threaten his chances of reelection. Rather than simply 
cutting the VISTA program from the War on Poverty, the president, as he had done with 
33
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the Job Corps and Head Start, removed the VISTA program from OEO's jurisdiction and 
placed it in a new agency called ACTION that would oversee the activities of national 
voluntary service, including VISTA and the Peace Corps. According to Reeves, the 
conservative ideologues who staffed ACTION believed if VISTA remained in OEO, its 
activist culture and radicalizing tendencies would be retained. These conservatives 
believed that "drastic action must be taken that would change the organizational cultures 
in antipoverty programs. Only if agency volunteers and staff carried an achievement ethic 
to the poor would there be any hope of liberating the poor from poverty. In their 
assessment, VISTA had done more harm than good for the poor." By 1971 Nixon had 
begun directing his conservative appointees within ACTION to instill an explicitly 
conservative ideology into the VISTA program that would eliminate all community 
organizing activities and establish conservative alternatives to VISTA for college-aged 
volunteers. According to Reeves, this new conservative ideology driving VISTA would 
allow administrators to have greater control over the volunteer program and to rid it of 
"an embarrassing legacy of activist idealism."35 
During the first two years of Nixon's efforts to reorient the VISTA program to be 
more in line with conservative principles, most VISTA volunteers in Houston remained 
committed to community organization and empowerment of the poor. Reverend Wallace 
Poteat and other members of the Ecumenical Fellowship's Latin American Channel (EF-
LAC) project, the major VISTA sponsoring organization in Houston, remained steadfast 
in their pledge to eradicate the evil of poverty in the city using prophetic religion and 
Saul Alinsky-style community organization. One way Poteat tried to continue the fight 
35
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against poverty in Houston using VISTA volunteers was to team up with Reverend Earl 
Allen's organization, known as Human Organizational, Political, and Economic 
Development, Incorporated (HOPE). Following the turmoil within Houston's community 
action agency when the HCCAA Board forced him to resign in August 1967, Allen 
created his own antipoverty organization to continue using tactics of radical community 
organizing and protest demonstrations to force confrontations with the city's public 
officials. In 1968 both Poteat and Allen worked to strengthen the ties between HOPE 
members and VISTA volunteers and devised several antipoverty projects on which the 
two groups could work together. During an EF-LAC board meeting in February, Allen 
made it clear that HOPE community organizers were attempting to teach the poor the 
power of collective action and confrontation and that the VISTA volunteers must agree 
with this approach if they wanted to work with HOPE organizers. Poteat assured Allen 
that the VISTAs were indeed committed to the same confrontational tactics and that he 
had personally notified VISTA administrators that the EF-LAC project was interested in 
receiving only militant volunteers in the future rather than "nice middle-class kids." Over 
the next two years the relationship between EF-LAC and HOPE would grow stronger, 
until by 1970 new VISTA volunteers arriving in Houston to work with the EF-LAC 
project were immediately assigned to a training program led by Earl Allen and other 
HOPE leaders to teach the new volunteers how to organize the poor and confront local 
public officials in their effort to combat poverty in Houston.36 
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Houston's VISTA program also went through a leadership change in 1968 and 
1969 that showed how committed the volunteers and members of the sponsoring agencies 
remained to community organization and confrontational tactics. In early 1968 Reverend 
Poteat announced that he would resign at the end of the year to assume a position in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, directing a War on Poverty program similar to the EF-LAC project. In 
August 1968 EF-LAC project members held a meeting to select Poteat's replacement. 
The EF-LAC board had narrowed their pool of candidates to two finalists, Barry Kraut 
and Paul Allen. Kraut worked at a local Presbyterian church in the city and had served for 
several years on the EF-LAC board, while Allen currently directed an antipoverty 
program in Washington, D. C. During the meeting, the board allowed both Kraut and 
Allen to explain their antipoverty philosophy and describe how they would lead the EF-
LAC project and the VISTA volunteers in the city. It became clear early during the 
meeting that Kraut held a very conservative view of what the proper role of a VISTA 
volunteer was in a community, while Allen demonstrated that he would be a better fit 
with the organization created by Poteat to organize the poor and confront the evil of 
poverty. While Kraut stated that he viewed the VISTA volunteer as a model for the poor 
to teach them how to join the middle class, Allen proclaimed that the role of the 
volunteers was to force the establishment to change when needed. The focus, according 
to Allen, should be on organizing the poor in order to empower them to challenge local 
public officials and institutions and bring about needed structural changes in Houston. At 
the end of the meeting, EF-LAC board members and VISTA volunteers voted 
overwhelmingly to name Paul Allen the new director of the project.37 
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Houston's VISTA volunteers continued to develop new and innovative programs 
to combat poverty in the city through 1971. In 1969 the VISTAs established projects that 
included an urban arts program to help develop any latent talent among poor residents, a 
welfare rights organization, the strengthening of neighborhood centers, community 
organizing to put pressure on the Legal Services program to fight for the rights of the 
poor, and a free educational system called the University of Thought that attracted more 
than 1,000 students during the summer of 1969. Later in the year, after Houston's Legal 
Services personnel proved to be impervious to pressure from the city's poor residents and 
their VISTA allies, volunteers developed a VISTA Legal Program to "educate the poor 
in, and enable the poor to act upon, their rights under the law." The VISTA legal program 
would go further, however, in its effort to attack some of the root causes of poverty in the 
city. The VISTA lawyer would be encouraged to "go beyond the individual services 
approach of legal aid by developing a working knowledge of a specific area of law that 
has direct impact upon the poor." These areas of expertise might include consumer 
advocacy, school desegregation and discrimination, economic development, 
discrimination in health services, human rights in employment and law enforcement, 
housing issues, discrimination in public services and utilities, and welfare rights. All the 
while VISTA volunteers continued to pressure the Legal Services program in Houston to 
fulfill its mission as a catalyst for law reform.38 
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A community organizing effort in which the VISTA volunteers put a large 
amount of effort, and one that aroused the indignation of public officials like Mayor 
Welch, was an attempt to include poor residents in the decision-making processes of the 
proposed Model Cities program. Welch had become attracted to Model Cities precisely 
because he could bypass the community action agency and ignore poor residents in his 
attempt to secure federal funds to make improvements to the city, even though he had 
openly advocated the involvement of the poor in the program. Unfortunately for 
Houston's poor people, HCCAA Board and staff members were in no position to demand 
the inclusion of poor Houston residents in the program's planning stages. The mayor had 
not considered, however, that the city's VISTA volunteers might begin organizing poor 
residents to claim their rightful place in the Model Cities program. As early as May 1968 
VISTAs and members of the EF-LAC project expressed concern that Welch was 
attempting to keep total control over Model Cities and to prevent residents from having a 
voice in how federal funds might be used in Houston. By the end of the year, EF-LAC 
project members and VISTA volunteers had familiarized themselves with the Model 
Cities legislation and were determined to make sure that Welch followed the federal 
requirement that residents of a city must consent to the mayor's plan for Model Cities 
funding.39 
During the summer of 1969, after the city council approved the application for a 
Model Cities grant and Welch had created a government department to oversee the 
program in Houston, VISTA volunteers initiated an organizing drive in the city's poor 
neighborhoods to create a Model Cities Citizens' Council, as stipulated by the program's 
39
 Minutes of EF-LAC Board of Directors, 28 May 1968, Box 2, Folder 5, VISTA Collection; Minutes of 
EF-LAC Board of Directors, 23 October 1968, Box 2, Folder 5, VISTA Collection. 
requirements. As a VISTA newsletter stated in July, Houston's volunteers were 
"devoting much of their effort in the time before the August 3rd election in letting the 
neighborhoods know that they should have a voice and they have a mandate to become a 
part of Model Cities if this program is going to become what it can be." Despite the 
mayor's public pronouncements, citizen involvement in the Model Cities program in 
Houston was simply too radical for Welch and his appointed officials in charge of 
implementing the program in the city. In October 1969 Houston's Model Cities Director 
George McGonigle contacted Benton Russell, one of the city's VISTA sponsoring 
officials, and strongly suggested that he regain control of the activities of the VISTAs, 
particularly with regard to organizing poor residents to make demands on the city's 
Model Cities department. Russell replied to McGonigle first by explaining the 
relationship between a VISTA sponsoring agency and the volunteers. "The projects in 
which [the volunteers] work are 'their' projects," Russell stated, "and although we are 
interested and concerned about them, we could never dictate policy to them in autocratic 
or bureaucratic methods. Our direction is through advice and counsel. We do not 
'instruct.' We are their sponsors, if you will, not their bosses." With regard to citizen 
participation in the Model Cities program, Russell scolded McGonigle: "I think we 
should perhaps examine our programs which we in our middle-class, middle-aged way 
undertake. I am sure we do not see the problems exactly as the younger generation, but 
let us not condemn their actions when they do what seems best. . . . If the [Model Cities] 
program is worthwhile, it can stand on its merits. Let's make sure, however, that our 
program is 'of the poor and not 'for' the poor. Let's be sure that our program is listening 
to and abiding by the will of the area people, for this is what model cities is all about. If 
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we have put together such a program, then I don't think we have much to fear from well-
meaning VISTAs." In other words, Russell granted full sanction to the VISTA 
volunteers' efforts to organize the poor to make sure they would be allowed to participate 
in the decision-making processes of the Model Cities program.40 
It was probably no coincidence that in 1969, as the VISTA volunteers ramped up 
their efforts to develop innovative programs to empower the poor and placed a major 
emphasis on their efforts to include the poor in the Model Cities program, the Houston 
Police Department launched a series of harassment campaigns against the volunteers. In 
January HPD Intelligence Division officers began conducting surveillance of a support 
group for former presidential contender Eugene McCarthy, and in a report they noted that 
several VISTA volunteers attended an organizational meeting for the group. HPD officers 
also began focusing on the volunteers' alleged misuse of government vehicles. In May an 
officer on patrol near the construction site for Houston's new airport came upon a 
government-issued vehicle that contained Dorothy Brown, a white VISTA volunteer, in 
"an apparent embrace" with Terence Smith, an African American male. "This does not 
seem to be official business," the officer stated in his report, "so please report this to the 
proper authorities." HPD officials turned their report over to the General Services 
Administration, the federal agency responsible for overseeing use of government 
property, and GSA representatives subsequently performed an investigation of the 
charges and concluded there was no wrongdoing on the part of Dorothy Brown or the 
Houston VISTA program. Brown maintained that she had stopped the vehicle to discuss 
with Smith a particular problem he was having adjusting to life in Houston after recently 
40
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moving from Alaska, and while they were having this conversation the police officer 
approached. HCHR and EF-LAC project leaders did, however, give her a warning for not 
taking into consideration how the situation might have appeared to enemies of the War on 
Poverty and of the VISTA program in Houston.41 
The rising amount of interest in, and resulting criticism of, the VISTA volunteers' 
activities in Houston, however, stemmed not only from the city's public officials but also 
from the community action agency. By the fall of 1969, as VISTA volunteers were 
launching organizational drives to create citizens committees to participate in Model 
Cities planning, HCCAA officials began showing a surprising amount of concern about 
the activities of the VISTAs. In November the HCCAA Board of directors, which 
included representatives of the mayor's office, appointed a special committee to study the 
role of Houston's VISTA volunteers in the War on Poverty in the city, allegedly at the 
request of the Texas OEO office. After making a few telephone calls, however, Houston 
VISTA supervisor Roger Armstrong discovered that the Texas OEO office had never 
ordered HCCAA to investigate the activities of VISTA volunteers in Houston. In an 
angry letter to HCCAA Executive Director Francis Williams, Armstrong exclaimed, "If 
HCCAA - its administration or its board - desires to know more about Houston's VISTA 
Project, we would be happy to supply you with information on its activities. . . . 
However, in the absence of any concrete reason why a special HCCAA Board committee 
should study the role of Houston's VISTA Project, you should be aware that we would 
consider the establishment of such a committee precipitous. It would be unwarranted and 
41
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[cause] an undue negative reflection on Houston's VISTA Project and its existing 
sponsorship."42 
When this threat of an investigation failed to bring the VISTA program under the 
control of the HCCAA Board, several board members moved to consolidate all of 
Houston's VISTA volunteers under the direction of the HCCAA Board. These board 
members were able to convince a state OEO official that HCCAA should run the VISTA 
program in the city, and this official submitted a formal request late that fall to 
consolidate all the VISTA volunteers in Houston under the direction of the HCCAA 
Board. This strategy also failed; VISTA Regional Administrator Edward Dela Rosa 
rejected the request, stating that the "present sponsors have demonstrated the ability to 
carry out an effective VISTA program in Harris County." Dela Rosa also expressed hope 
that HCCAA officials and members of the city's VISTA sponsoring agencies would be 
able to resolve their disputes with each other and to continue to carry out the War on 
Poverty in Houston in an effective way. As long as each group had such strikingly 
different and competing ideas about how to attack poverty and what role the poor should 
play, however, it seemed unlikely the friction between HCCAA and the VISTA program 
would resolve itself.43 
Between 1969 and 1972, a series of changes at the national level damaged the 
VISTA program in Houston and ultimately brought it to an end. During an EF-LAC 
board meeting in February 1969, project director Paul Allen reported on a recent trip to 
Washington during which he noted several changes in the VISTA program. The national 
42
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VISTA training centers were no longer recruiting young college-aged volunteers but 
rather individuals with bachelor's and master's degrees who were specialists in some 
particular field. The VISTA program was being professionalized, according to Allen, and 
national VISTA officials were calling for more direct supervision on the part of local 
sponsoring agencies. This national development ran counter to everything Houston's 
VISTA program stood for, whose sponsoring agencies prided themselves on using young 
and idealistic volunteers who were free to attack poverty in the city with a remarkable 
amount of freedom to determine their own tactics. The national OEO office, under the 
direction of Donald Rumsfeld, was also trying to take more direct control over the 
VISTA program nationally and to use local community action agencies to control VISTA 
activities in local communities. This effort by the new OEO leadership prompted OEO 
Official Paul Duncan to issue a position paper on the place of VISTA in OEO, which he 
sent out to all regional OEO administrators in June 1969. In the position paper Duncan 
stated that VISTA must remain autonomous within the OEO structure because VISTA 
was "more a movement than a program" and "must be concerned with equity and 
idealism in order to produce results." VISTA must retain its independence from the 
establishment and from local community action agencies, according to Duncan, in order 
for the program to stay relevant to young people and to preserve the victories achieved by 
volunteers all over the country. "VISTA is working well," Duncan concluded, "why 
make a change? Why risk a good thing?"44 
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Despite Duncan's pleadings, national OEO administrators continued their efforts 
over the next several years to strip the VISTA program of its autonomy and force the 
volunteers to drop their confrontational tactics. By 1970, these national changes had 
produced visible effects on Houston's VISTA program, not the least of which was 
decreased morale among the volunteers and a nagging uncertainty about the future of the 
entire volunteer program. In a letter to Congressman George Bush in April 1970, 
Houston VISTA supervisor Roger Armstrong expressed great concern that national 
developments in the VISTA program were negatively affecting the volunteer effort in 
Houston. "I think VISTAs are making clear," Armstrong stated, "that they feel that a 
number of recent actions by OEO both nationally and regionally indicate that there is a 
lack of support of VISTA by the Office of Economic Opportunity administration. They 
feel that these new developments will result in either making VISTA less effective in 
working with the poor or possibly could result in VISTA being cancelled altogether. . . . I 
feel that this would be tragic if true." Armstrong requested an urgent meeting with Bush 
in order to make sure that Bush supported the continuation of the VISTA program in 
Houston. The next month, after Bush had failed to respond favorably to Armstrong's 
overtures, the HCHR director fired off another letter exclaiming that the VISTA 
volunteers in Houston "are deadly serious in their concern that someone listen to their 
cries of alarm. They do feel recent administrative decisions within the Office of 
Economic Opportunity have not been in the interests of the poor or of the VISTAs who 
are working on behalf of the poor." Armstrong again requested a personal meeting with 
Bush, but this also went unheeded.45 
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After failing to receive an adequate response from Congressman Bush, Armstrong 
sent an equally urgent letter to OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld expressing alarm over the 
diminishing amount of support for community organizing and institutional change from 
national OEO and VISTA officials. After detailing a few of the VISTA-initiated 
programs in Houston, Armstrong stated that many VISTA volunteers in the city were 
"seeking social and institutional change. This . . . is needed if the causes as well as the 
symptoms of poverty are to be addressed. However, as you know there are certain special 
interest groups in society who are threatened by such change and react against it. It would 
be sad indeed if national and regional support of these VISTA efforts were to wither 
under the pressure of these reactionary forces." Armstrong pleaded with Rumsfeld to 
reply with a word of encouragement that would show the VISTA volunteers in Houston 
that OEO continued to support their grassroots efforts, but Rumsfeld never responded to 
the letter.46 
Most likely Rumsfeld did not reply to Armstrong's letter because he would not 
have been able to provide those reassuring words. Nationally, the VISTA program was 
being consolidated under the ACTION umbrella. Nixon was beginning to appoint 
conservative ideologues to top positions within that agency, a development that would 
ultimately change the nature of the federal volunteer program all over the country. 
VISTA volunteers and members of their sponsoring agencies in Houston felt these 
changes acutely by 1970. In an annual report on Houston's VISTA activities that year, 
VISTA supervisors lamented the fact that national developments had irreparably harmed 
the VISTA program in Houston. In addition to a lack of support for community 
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organizing and empowerment of the poor, authors of the report presented a list of several 
additional decisions made by new OEO officials that had a negative effect on the VISTA 
program in Houston, including a withdrawal of the one-year draft deferment for 
volunteers, the perpetual vacancies in top-level VISTA positions in Washington, and a 
changed VISTA recruiting policy that steered many college-aged volunteers away from 
the program. "Many volunteers began to feel that the VISTA in the field was no longer 
being supported in his work," the report stated, and the result was "a drop in re-
enrollment from 60% last year to 10% this year, and a decrease in expected new National 
Pool Volunteers by 50%." In just two years, the changes in the VISTA program at the 
national level had had a profoundly negative effect on the local volunteer program in 
Houston.47 
In 1972 national VISTA and OEO officials made a decision that finally brought 
an end to the VISTA program in the city of Houston. Once Nixon had moved the VISTA 
program into ACTION, the new agency changed the funding requirement for volunteer 
sponsoring organizations. Whereas the VISTA sponsoring agency had been responsible 
for only 10 percent of the funding before 1972, ACTION'S new requirement stipulated 
that the sponsoring agency must pay half of the cost of the volunteers' expenses. For 
Houston's VISTA program, the total sum would have been more than $12,000, an 
amount no VISTA sponsoring agency in the city could afford to pay. The current VISTA 
volunteers were allowed to continue their work until the end of the year, but many 
volunteers believed this was simply the first step in a process to eliminate the VISTA 
program completely from the War on Poverty. As a local newspaper reporter covering the 
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VISTA story stated, the VISTA program in Houston thus "came to an end on a note of 
sorrow and bitterness." As a final blow to community organizing and confrontational 
tactics, the EF-LAC project, whose members had defined their mission based on using 
VISTA volunteers, finally disbanded in 1972 and ceased to be a force for social change in 
the city of Houston.48 
With the VISTA program gone from Houston, HCCAA remained the only agency 
in the city charged with carrying out the War on Poverty in the early 1970s. By that time, 
however, HCCAA had become a simple deliverer of social services, but even those 
services were severely scaled back and the participation of the poor was virtually 
nonexistent. In 1976, after President Gerald Ford dismantled OEO and reorganized the 
community action agencies under the newly created Community Services Administration, 
HCCAA likewise reorganized and renamed itself the Gulf Coast Community Services 
Administration (GCCSA), which still exists today. In order to accomplish this 
reorganization, however, GCCSA administrators made one final assault on the 
participation of the poor in the poverty program. In January 1976, just months before the 
organization became GCCSA, HCCAA Board members voted to remove any 
administrative powers that remained within the ten delegate agencies, which were 
responsible for implementing the various community action initiatives in the target 
neighborhoods and for making sure the poor were involved in the planning and 
implementation of these programs. While the ten delegate agencies would still serve as a 
"voice for the poor," in reality they would have no power to enforce anything. Despite 
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Shaw, W. M. McKenzie, and Ken Nicoll to Thomas L. McKenzie, 30 June 1972, Box 1, Folder 4, VISTA 
Collection. The VISTA program did not end nationally, as many volunteers in Houston feared, but the 
shape of the program changed dramatically in the early 1970s. 
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opposition from several parties, including the city NAACP chapter's president who 
argued that the withdrawal of the administrative duties of the ten delegate agencies was 
"a gross disappointment to the idea of getting the program to the grassroots," the 
HCCAA Board approved the plan. As evidenced by GCCSA documents detailing the 
organization's activities, by 1976 the War on Poverty in Houston consisted of a 
disorganized assortment of a few social services delivered by an agency totally 
uninterested in the participation of the poor, social change, or empowering those Houston 
residents who had been systematically denied power over their own lives.4 
Between 1969 and 1976, the War on Poverty gradually came to a close in 
Houston. While the Green Amendment initiated this process in 1967 and 1968, the 
decline of the poverty program in the city took several years to play out as Mayor Welch 
and other public officials pushed the city's community action agency to the sidelines of 
the War on Poverty. More importantly, changes within OEO at the national and regional 
levels had profound effects on the War on Poverty in Houston. Without a doubt, 
grassroots antipoverty activists who were responsible for implementing the poverty 
program on the ground in Houston were vital for the success of the War on Poverty, but 
equally important for its fate was the federal government and national OEO officials. The 
dynamic relationship between the federal government and local antipoverty activists had 
determined the course of the War on Poverty in Houston, and between 1969 and 1976 
this relationship brought the poverty program to a close in the city. Whereas grassroots 
49
 Tommy Miller, "Community Action Association Board Approves Reorganization," Houston Chronicle, 
14 January 1976, newspaper clipping, Box 11, Folder 1, Community Services Administration, Region VI 
(Dallas, Texas), Records Relating to County Community Action Agencies, 1976-78, Record Group 381, 
NARASW (quotation). For the types of activities in which GCCSA members engaged in the late 1970s, see 
Fred Hofheinz to Ben Haney, with attached activity report, 14 September 1976, Box 11, Folder 1, 
Community Services Administration, Region VI (Dallas, Texas), Records Relating to County Community 
Action Agencies, 1976-78, Record Group 381, NARASW. 
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activists in the mid-1960s had enjoyed a remarkable amount of support from federal OEO 
officials to carry out a progressive, confrontational, and even radical Community Action 
Program in Houston, beginning in 1969 they saw that support gradually disappear 
because of Nixon's reorientation of the poverty war. The Green Amendment, therefore, 
was the beginning of the end of the War on Poverty drama in the city of Houston because 
it launched a process that took several years to complete. The Nixon Administration's 
efforts to reorient OEO away from confrontational tactics and shrink the size of the 
poverty program's bureaucracy was thus the final blow to the War on Poverty in 
Houston, and by 1976 there was virtually nothing left of what was once a vibrant, 
proactive, and confrontational program to address the problems of the poor in the city. 
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Conclusion 
Beyond Success or Failure 
In January 2008, as the presidential election season was beginning to bloom, a 
reporter asked candidate Hillary Clinton to comment on a recent speech given by her 
rival Barack Obama in which he blasted his critics, including Clinton, who said he was 
building up false hope for change in America and suggested he should instead focus on 
giving the country "a reality check." Obama, who was building his presidential campaign 
on the idea that grassroots political organizing could provide enough support to get him 
elected, said that Clinton's comments were akin to someone telling Martin Luther King 
that he was giving people false hope during the civil rights movement. When asked about 
this speech, Clinton attempted to highlight the role of political leaders and their 
relationship with the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. "Dr King's dream," 
Clinton said, "began to be realized when President Lyndon Johnson passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, when he was able to get through Congress something that President 
Kennedy was hopeful to do and that presidents before had not even tried. But it took a 
president to get it done. That dream became a reality - the power of that dream became 
real in people's lives - because we had a president who said, 'We're going to do it.'" 
Thus began one of the many minor controversies of the 2008 election campaign that 
launched a national debate about the nature of social change and the rewriting of 
American history.' 
1
 See Carl Hulse, "Civil Rights Tone Prompts Talk of an Endorsement," New York Times, January 11, 
2008. 
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The debate about the nature of the civil rights movement that Clinton's comments 
spawned, including the very lively conversation among historians that occurred in many 
arenas ranging from National Public Radio call-in shows to online H-NET discussion 
groups, highlighted the continuing disagreement over where social change occurs in 
American society. Does change happen in a top-down way, as Clinton suggested, or does 
it happen from the bottom-up? Is social change initiated by politically powerful 
individuals at the top of society or by relatively powerless people at the grassroots? 
The implementation of the War on Poverty in the city of Houston between 1964 
and 1976 provides further evidence that social change actually comes from the bottom of 
society. In this case, it was the grassroots antipoverty activists and poor residents of 
Houston who transformed a fairly moderate federal social welfare program into a vehicle 
for social change. Although the federal legislation was important, it was the local people 
on the ground in Houston who recognized that the War on Poverty was opening a 
window of opportunity creating favorable conditions for the formation of a powerful 
social movement that could have a significant impact on society. This was clearest in 
Houston in late 1966 and early 1967, when William Ballew, Earl Allen, and an army of 
community organizers won a series of small victories against the city's public officials.2 
Yet did the War on Poverty open a window of opportunity in Houston long 
enough for grassroots antipoverty activists and poor residents to create a powerful social 
movement capable of bringing about a measurable degree of social change? In other 
words, were they able to achieve what many radical, labor, and New Left groups had 
failed to achieve in the past; namely, the creation of an interracial movement of the poor? 
2
 For an excellent theoretical discussion of how these windows of opportunity periodically open to allow 
for the formation of a social movement, see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and 
Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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First, it is clear that grassroots activists and poor residents in Houston were able to 
achieve some significant victories in their battle against local public officials and 
conservative defenders of the status quo. The extension of water and sanitation services 
to poor areas of the city, the opening of the Settegast Clinic, and the registration of large 
numbers of new voters were just a few examples of the ways in which local activists had 
empowered the poor in Houston. These achievements certainly indicated that conditions 
were favorable for the creation of a powerful social movement in the city. 
These successes, however, also provoked a powerful backlash from pillars of 
local power in Houston, and this counterattack was ultimately fatal for the building of a 
strong social movement in the city. In many ways the conservative backlash made perfect 
sense. Grassroots antipoverty activists and poor Houston residents were indeed using the 
War on Poverty to present a powerful challenge to the city's public officials and were 
threatening to upset the traditional balance of power in the city. In short, they challenged 
the very idea that local public officials could continue to govern the city without taking 
the interests and demands of the poor into consideration. With the help of grassroots 
activists, poor Houston residents stood up to be counted as full citizens of the city and 
demanded that their voices be heard. As a serious political challenge, Houston's public 
officials understandably dealt with it as such. Local public officials discredited the city's 
community action agency and VISTA program by linking their activities with the threat 
of an urban riot and by locating conservative allies on the HCC AA Board and staff to 
begin dismantling their community organization efforts. 
It remains difficult, therefore, to assess the legacies of the War on Poverty in 
Houston. Despite the small victories that historians are uncovering through grassroots 
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studies of the poverty program, we must be careful not to confuse relatively small 
achievements with the overall success of the War on Poverty. In other words, we must 
resist the temptation to turn the War on Poverty into a grassroots success story. At the 
same time, however, we should also not attach too much significance to the failures of 
the War on Poverty at the grassroots level. The failures, of course, were obvious and 
numerous. Perhaps most damaging, grassroots activists and poor residents misunderstood 
and underestimated their opponents. Activists like Ballew and Allen, who had read Saul 
Alinsky's work and seemingly understood the complexities of power, failed to 
comprehend the immense power of local public officials, particularly Mayor Louie 
Welch, Congressman George Bush, and Police Chief Herman Short. They also were 
never able to offer poor residents a clear articulation of how Alinsky-style community 
organization would provide solutions for the problem of income inequality. Grassroots 
activists and poor residents were ultimately unable to create a broad multiracial coalition 
of poor residents united by class, and in the end they were unable to sustain themselves 
and their efforts in Houston's poor neighborhoods when the conservative counterattack 
came along and federal support dwindled. So if we should not focus too much attention 
on these questions of success versus failure, what should we be concerned with? Why is 
the story of the War on Poverty in the city of Houston important? 
The implementation of the War on Poverty in the city of Houston reveals that the 
fluid interaction between federal policies and grassroots activists created a significant site 
of conflict over the meaning of American democracy and the rights of citizenship in the 
1960s and 1970s that has been largely overlooked by historians. Houston's experience 
with these antipoverty programs shows that grassroots activists - if only for a short 
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period of time - were able to seize the tools and authority provided by the federal 
government through the War on Poverty to challenge conservative defenders of the status 
quo. In so doing, they contested mainstream liberal definitions of democracy, which 
many local public officials and their constituents in Houston had narrowly interpreted in 
such a way that it did not have a place for meaningful participation of the poor in the 
decisions that affected their lives. By opening avenues for grassroots activists and poor 
residents to transform federal policies into vehicles for social change, the War on Poverty 
provided an array of tools for many different activists with various ideologies to use in 
their struggles to bring about a more participatory form of democracy on the ground in 
Houston that would include more citizens in the political, cultural, and economic life of 
the city. By viewing the War on Poverty through this new paradigm of democracy, the 
focus can be shifted from whether or not the federal antipoverty program eradicated or 
significantly reduced poverty in the United States to how the War on Poverty helped 
expand democracy in America, and along the way historians can gain valuable new 
insights into the nature of the American political system.3 
By placing the story of the War on Poverty within a larger narrative about 
struggles over democracy in America, historians can free the history of the War on 
Poverty from the narrow constraints of the decade of the 1960s, federal social policy, or 
The term "participatory democracy" refers to a form of democracy articulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
in The Social Contract (1762) that envisioned citizens participating fully in collective decisions. 
Representative democracy, according to this view, was not a legitimate form of democracy at all because, 
Rousseau argued, citizens forfeit their own participatory power by electing others to act for them. In the 
1960s, many intellectuals and grassroots activists, particularly those associated with the emerging New 
Left, began calling for a political revolution in order to implement a more participatory form of democracy 
in America. The Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), issued in 1962, 
spelled out this vision. See Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 225-231; and Frank Cunningham, Theories of 
Democracy: A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2002), 123-141. Historian John A. Andrew, in 
his national study of the War on Poverty, argued that the Community Action Program sought to "produce 
social change through participatory democracy," but failed to investigate the claim further. See Andrew, 
Lyndon Johnson, 68. 
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even the fate of twentieth-century American liberalism. Seen in a new light, the War on 
Poverty appears as an integral part of the democratic experiment in America, and its 
implementation at the grassroots level in Houston reveals both the possibilities and the 
limits of American democracy. The story of the War on Poverty thus fits into a larger 
tradition of efforts to expand and broaden the definition of American democracy as well 
as efforts to defeat them.4 
By taking the longer view, the short-term success or failure of the War on Poverty 
shrinks in importance. What is significant is that this story happened at all. The fact that 
grassroots activists and poor Houston residents were able to transform a federal poverty 
program into a vehicle for social change, even for a short period of time, highlights the 
ingenuity and creativity of local people struggling to expand the meaning of democracy 
in America. When another window of opportunity to expand the meaning of democracy 
Broadening our understanding of the War on Poverty allows us to see it as part of a larger narrative about 
the complicated and changing nature of democracy in America. By framing the antipoverty programs of the 
1960s as part of ongoing efforts to expand and broaden the definition of American democracy, the War on 
Poverty can be thought of alongside the American Revolution, the rise of Jacksonian Democracy, 
Reconstruction, the Populist challenge, the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights Movement 
as important developments in American history when an increasing number of American citizens 
demanded inclusion in the democratic experiment. A small selection of the historical works that frame 
these events within the context of struggles for democracy includes Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of 
the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992); Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: 
Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: Norton, 2005) and Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the 
American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Harry L. Watson, 
Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); Eric Foner, 
Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper & Row, 1989); C. Vann 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951); 
Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976); Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeomen Farmers and the 
Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); David 
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Nell Irvin 
Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987); Alan 
Dawley, Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991); David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-
1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial 
Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Dittmer, Local 
People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); Adam 
Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 1995); Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black 
Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
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presents itself, perhaps today's democratic activists can draw on these lessons from the 
War on Poverty. 
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